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ABSTRACT 
The focus of this work is the centrality of federal bargaining in the 
competitive political processes of democratic federations and of the necessity 
for fashioning institutions to channel and regulate that barg~ining· so-that it is not 
disruptive of 'norinal' policy-making. Chapter 1 introduces the argument and 
points out the insufficiency of the purely public goods provision approach to 
understanding federal political processes. The key distinction we make in the 
way federal bargaining can be institutionalized is between the systems that allow 
bilateral interactions between the center and the unit representatives, versus 
those where unit representatives must develop some degree of consensus on 
a proposal before presenting it to the center. 
Chapter 2 tests a hypothesis that a party's current place in the 
(institutionalized) federal bargaining process affects voters' electoral choice and 
modifies the incentives that political entrepreneurs and political parties face. In 
application to Canada, which allows bilateral interactions between unit 
'representatives' (provincial Prime-Ministers) and the federal 'center', and 
Germany, where implementation of federal policies is effectively delegated to the 
sub-national level, we look for evidence of electoral balancing by comparing 
electoral returns in federal and sub-national elections. We show that electoral 
dynamics are, indeed, consistent with the hypothesis that voters balance 
between federal and provincial (federal and Lander) elections in these two 
federations. 
ii 
When representatives of federal subjects are limited to joint action, as 
when they communicate with the center by means of passing ready pieces of 
legislation that can be either signed or not by the nationally elected executive, the 
long-term implications of their representational weights in the bargaining process 
can be assessed. In chapter 3, using the data on allocation of federal grants in 
the US, we assess the proposition that outcomes of federal bargaining reflect 
bargaining weights of the participants. More specifically, we show that relatively 
small US states, being better represented in the Senate, systematically benefit 
in the process of federal grant distribution. 
The fourth chapter addresses the political process in a federation Russia 
with a still evolving bargaining system and, where the issue of federal bargaining 
is the focus of national political discourse. We are able to support the hypothesis 
that federal level pol\cies affect local electoral behavior, as well as do the 
outcomes of bilateral discourse between federal subjects and the 'center'. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTUAL AND 
METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FEDERAL 
ELECTORAL RESEARCH 
1.1 The Federal Problem and Why It Requires a Political Solution 
Theorists of federalism tend to treat federal units as rational actors when 
discussing the pros and cons of forming, joining or leaving a federation. 
Attempts to find rational grounds for the failure of federal stability separatist 
movements, for example, are closely related to an often-used 11efficiency11 
argument in the context of federal stability. Namely, it is argued that to survive, 
a federation must advantage all of its constituent units, and, conversely, 
secession is best explained in terms of a unit's dissatisfaction with federal 
arrangements relatively to what it believes it can receive as a fully sovereign 
player. However, if no individual speaks and acts on behalf of a federal unit, the 
resulting 11behavior11 of that unit is rarely explainable in terms of some notion of 
collective rationality. On the one hand, Riker (1975) argues that because the 
cost of dissolution might outweigh the gains from their demise, "nonefficient" 
formations can survive. On the other hand, federal units are known to secede 
even if they bear significant cost from doing so (Horowitz 1985). Non-rationality 
of collective action combined with distorted incentives to political entrepreneurs 
who mobilize subnational constituencies to a large degree can be held 
accountable for that. 
This starting section aims to introduce the following general premises for 
the subsequent case-based analysis of the federal process and the ability of a 
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democratic federation to reproduce as a long-run institutional organization: 
(1) Although the set of relevant decision makers are commonly 
conceptualized as the set of federal units (plus, perhaps, the federal 
government itself), in the political context this approach is inadequate. 
The "behavior" of federal units is dictated by competitive electoral 
processes within them that generate entrepreneurial incentives of a 
potentially counter-productive nature from the point of view of a federal 
unit at large. 
(2) The motivations of participants, therefore, cannot be reduced to simple 
macroeconomic efficiency calculations. Owing to the way in which intra-
unit ethnic or religious or other divisions influence political motives, a 
federal unit can appear to act "irrationally." 
(3) Democracy in general, and electoral competition in particular, produce 
the strongest institutional influence on the performance of a federal 
organization. 
1.1.1 An Economic Argument in Favor of the Federal Form of 
Government 
Mainstream analysis of federal institutions in economics is based on an 
understanding that greater economic efficiency could be achieved through the 
'rational' allocation of economic functions among different levels of 
government. Once we accept that a free-market economy without a 
government sector is likely to malfunction owing to a variety of externalities, 
Mikhail G. Filippov Political Competition in Federations 3 
public goods, and economies of scale (Musgrave 1959), federalism provides a 
rationalizable form of governmental intervention into the economy. 
Of course, there is a serious practical issue of how to divide functions 
among levels of government, but, in general, in absence of cost reduction due 
to the economies of scale and the inter jurisdictional externalities, the option of 
decentralized federal public good production will be at least as efficient as any 
centralized solution (Oates 1972). If in addition we assume that larger markets 
are more economically efficient than smaller ones (i.e., that there exists at least 
one public good more efficiently produced nationally), adding the need for 
economic integration to that of decentralized regulation and public good 
production, federalism becomes an economically superior form for organizing 
governmental activities. 
Simple economic arguments in favor of federalism, however, ignore 
political issues. As Oates (1972) admits, for an economist, "constitutional and 
political structures are of less importance: what is crucial for him is simply that 
different levels of decision-making do exist, each of which determines levels of 
provision of particular public services in response largely to the interests of its 
geographic constituency." In other words, for an economist, federation is a 
union of different geographic units jointly allocating a budget. Such a union 
needs not be anything else but an economic alliance or confederation with 
mutually open markets and at least some joint financial resources to allocate. 
The allocation of resources has to be based on criteria of mutual economic 
benefit, for which no political structure is really needed. Moreover, political 
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process imposes "transaction costs" and is a drain on economic efficiency. 
1.1.2 The Pattern of Federation Failure in the Twentieth Century 
The importance of politics is perhaps no better illustrated than at the time 
of democratic transition. In the second half of this century all non-democratic 
federations collapsed or experienced serious political problems shortly after 
democratic reforms were introduced. In late 50's and 60's almost all African and 
Asian federations collapsed after a few years of independence (see Table 1.1 ). 
In the early 90's all East-European federations (Czechoslovakia, the USSR, and 
Yugoslavia) ceased to exist once democratic political process in these countries 
started. 
A common explanation for such federal failure assumes that former non-
democratic federations were inefficient, or, at least, that they have been 
perceived as inefficient by some of their participants. Consider, for example, a 
group of federations formed after the World War II, where, following Riker and 
Lemco (1987), we take a state to be a federation if it calls itself one (in the 
Constitution)1, and limit our selection of states to those that encountered 
political challenges posed by mass democracy, including the post-communist 
Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, and Soviet regimes.2 
1Congo is an exception; its constitution had never been amended to mention 
federalism, because federal features, originally bold, continued to weaken 
toward the end of its existence. 
2Such a selection of federal states corresponds to Friedrich's definition of 
federalism as "a kind of division of separation of power ... applied on a territorial 
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In each of these federations, democracy was introduced with the concept 
of a universal franchise as a firmly established democratic norm. Thus, 
politicians were necessarily exposed to the imperatives of mass electoral 
campaigns before the terms of the federal bargain fully crystallized (Deutsch 
1961, Huntington 1968)~ New democratic federations universally experience 
regional, ethnic, linguistic, or religious conflict (Frank et al. 1968, Dikshit 1975, 
Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). Table 1.1 lists failed post-war federations and 
illustrates the consistency of the pattern. All federations are either successful 
and last for a long period of time (Table 1.2) or, if unsuccessful, disappear 
shortly after their inception. Importantly, all unsuccessful federal regimes 
attempted the use of elements of democratic political process - elections, 
referenda, constitutionalism. 
Non-democratic federations could preserve national unity, even if they 
were economically inefficient, by forcing sub-national units to comply with the 
federal rule. Long-term stability can be provided as long as a strong federal 
center can extract more resources from sub-national governments than is 
needed to maintain the mechanisms of compliance (coercion). Thus, for every 
sub-national unit, the benefits from the federal union are below its share in its 
basis." As Duchacek (1991) points out, such a definition excludes all 
authoritarian systems (e.g., the former Soviet Union, or Czechoslovakia) from 
the federal category since they are all committed to the prevention of any 
division, separation, or other dilution of centralized power. Although the 
complete and unconditional exclusion of authoritarian regimes from the set of 
federations can be questioned, to treat democratic and non-democratic 
federations differently seems reasonable. 
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cost, but there is also a significant political cost P that the center imposes to 
prevent a successful secession. The Soviet Union, for example, extracted 
enough resources from its republics to spend billions of dollars on wasteful 
military and space programs, but was nevertheless able to maintain federal 
stability, ostensibly, through the fear of punishment of any dissent. Federal 
stability of such a type resembles a colonial relationship. 
Democratic political reform, if it occurs in such a non-voluntary 
federation, quickly destroys the mechanisms of coercion that sustained federal 
or imperial stability. Local political leaders acquire independent legitimacy as 
they win competitive local elections. The new democratic state simply cannot 
rely on the old political institutions and enforcement mechanisms, such as 
powerful security agencies and military force. If inefficient, such a federation 
should fall apart once the coercive pressure is gone and the political cost of 
secession is reduced. 
The preceding argument, however, is insufficient, in that it assumes that 
economic relationship between the center and the sub-national units remains 
unchanged with democratization. It ignores the fact that everywhere 
democratization also changes the state's economic role, reduces the scope of 
government activities, and introduces democratic control over state budget and 
expenditures, making the state more efficient in producing a public good 
because electorally unsanctioned expenditures become eliminated. In general, 
nothing precludes the new democratic state from restricting its involvement only 
to mutually beneficial and efficient from the units' point of view economic and 
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social projects. In this respect, the economic justification of federalism should 
apply in full, and the previous history of non-democratic wastefulness must be 
irrelevant. Regardless of what happened in the past, a new federation has as 
good a chance of becoming an economically efficient union as anything else. 
The ratio of benefits to costs could be changed with the state transformation. 
Alternatively, even if the old federation dissolves at some point for some 
political reasons, its former members could form a new union at a low cost by 
using the old federal infrastructure, if the union is mutually beneficial and 
economically efficient. The latter served as an argument in favor of the 
dissolution of the former Soviet Union and creation in its place of the new 
· Commonwealth of Independent States. 
Correspondingly, the dissolution of a democratic federation cannot be 
taken as evidence of any preexisting inefficiency, nor does it imply that the 
population in general preferred dissolution.3 It mostly reveals the shortcomings 
of the design of preexisting political institutions in the face of new 
circumstances. The quick disappearance of Soviet, Czechoslovak and 
3E.g., Skalnik (1997) reports that in March 1992 respondents in the Czech and 
Slovak republic reported the following opinions among Czechs and Slovaks on 
the preferred form of Czech-Slovak State Relationship (in percent). 
Unitary Federation Confederation Independence No 
Opinion 
State 
Czech Republic 34 27 6 11 22 
Slovakia 13 24 32 17 14 
Czechoslovakia 27 26 15 13 19 
Apparently, the secession was the second choice for a majority of 
Czechoslovak voters (Elster, 1995). 
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Yugoslav federations as soon as elements of democracy were introduced 
reflects the inability of old institutional forms to adapt to rapid changes in the 
demands being placed on them and to properly motivate the leading decision-
.makers. To identify the causes of separatism and the dissolution of federations, 
then, we need to address those internal processes that account for the "actions" 
of every subject of a federation (state or province), and not restrict analysis the 
assessment of how efficient interactions among them at the federal level are. 
[Table 1.1 is about here] · 
Out of 14 federations that currently exist for longer than the average 
duration of a failed federation (7.7 years) and where elements of electoral 
competitiveness are present, only 4 were formed in the post-war period: India, 
Pakistan, Malaysia, and Nigeria (see Table 1.2). We would like to call them 
democratic, although serious limits on democratic process are present in all of 
them. Pakistan had a long history of successive military regimes. Malaysia has 
a two-chamber federal legislature in which the members who are nominated to 
the upper chamber by the central government outnumber those who are 
elected. The Constitution also provides for a Conference of Rulers (princely 
hereditary heads of the nine states which have such an institution, and 
governors, appointed by the central government in the rest), and the executive 
Head of the Federation, who is "very much a constitutional monarch" (Dikshit 
1975, 133}. In Nigeria democracy is only a promise, which may or may not be 
realized. The main features of the Indian political system were formed long 
before independence, while the interim period witnessed a significant erosion of 
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democratic practices and of such a crucial attribute of democratic politics as a 
competitive party system (Kohli, 1990), until its recovery in the last decade. 
[Table 1.2 is about here] 
1.1.3 The Problem of Free-Riding and an Economist's Solution to It; 
Multiple Equilibria 
Implicit in blaming federation failure on economic inefficiency is the 
premise that the greater the promise of cooperative gain, the greater is the 
likelihood of cooperation. The most apparent problem here is the 
incompleteness of such a premise, which derives from ignoring the extent to 
which the preconditions for prosperity will be realized in reality. The power of 
the state can undermine any economic program or policy. Unless political 
interests are compatible with the economic structures sufficient to occasion 
prosperity, that prosperity will not be realized or will not be sustained. The 
Soviet Union is again a case in point, where the dissolution, arguably, resulted 
as much from the political calculations of its chief instigators (e.g., Russia's 
president Yeltsin's intention to remove the federal president Gorbachev from 
power, Kravchuk's desire in Ukraine to secure his domestic political position by 
taking advantage of the nationalist sentiment in Ukraine) as from the economic 
failings of the Union - failings that were hardly resolved by the USSR's 
dismemberment that in many ways magnified the economic plight of its 
republics. 
But there are other less obvious problems with the above premise. First, 
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other things being equal, prosperity and efficiency, understood as improved 
prosperity for all, erodes the power of a democratic 'enforcer' - the center. 
Suppose a 'federation' consists of two federal subjects, suppose also, that if 
both 'comply' and cooperate by paying their full share of taxes, T, each receives 
a benefit, 8. But if one subject unilaterally defects so as to avoid paying, the 
benefit afforded by the federation to each subject declines to 812. Finally, 
suppose that defections are punished in the fixed amount P. Figure 1.1 a 
portrays this situation and shows that absent any punishment (if P = O}, as long 
as T < 8 < 2Tthe situation is a Prisoners' Dilemma in which the dominant 
choice for both subjects is not to comply even though both prefer the outcome 
['comply,' 'comply'] to ['don't comply,' 'don't comply']. On the other hand, if 
punishment is sufficiently severe, i.e., if P > T-812, then compliance becomes a 
dominant strategy. 
To comply 
Not to comply 
Figure 1.1a 
T o como1v 
8-T, 8-T 
812-P, 8/2-T 
N ot to comply 
B/2- T, 812-P 
-P, -P 
Suppose that, following the advice of international economic organizations, the 
federal government transforms its policies so as to increase the efficiency of its 
operation and programs. At this point there can be a number of possibilities. 
One possibility is that 8 simply increases for a given T due to a technological 
change, in which case, if the increase is sufficiently great (if 8 > 27), the 
Prisoners' Dilemma disappears even with zero punishment, and compliance is 
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no longer a problem. But another possibility is to suppose that the economy 
expands at a constant level of technology and an increase in efficiency must be 
accompanied by an increase in expenditures, i.e., only the net benefits 
increase. If such a transformation, say, doubles the net benefits so as to yield 
the game in Figure 1.1 b,_ then the compliance now is assured only if P > 2 T-8. 
To comply 
Not to comply 
Figure 1.1b 
To com I Not to com I 
2 8/2- I 2 8/2 -P 
-P, -P 
Notice, that in order to sustain compliance at an increased level of 
prosperity a greater punishment is required, which is to say that, in this instance 
at least, the increased efficiency of the federal government actually renders 
federal stability more difficult to sustain. Another troubling feature of federal 
economic enforcement is that redistribution aimed to even out economic 
inequalities lowers the incentives for cooperation even further. Suppose a 
fede.ral subject, /, I= 1 and 2, can generate Xi units of benefit from its own 
resources, let X1 ~ X2 , and suppose that if neither player cooperates, their 
respective payoffs correspond to this benefit. Let the national government be 
able to tax a compliant region at the rate t. The government divides its resulting 
budget (O, tx; or t(X1+X2}}, between subsidizing the poorer state and the 
production of the public good that benefits both players - in the ratio of a and 1-
a respectively. Finally, suppose that governmental investment in the public 
good has a multiplier associated with it so that one unit spent by it on legitimate 
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activities produces b units of benefit to each region. The two-person game, 




Don't coo erate 





Notice that 'don't cooperate' dominates 'cooperate' for player 1 (row chooser) 
as long as b(1-a) < 1. For player 2 (column chooser), if 1 fails to cooperate, 
then 2 should not cooperate when b < 1, whereas if 1 cooperates, 2 cooperates 
as well (not cooperating is better than cooperating if a+b(1-a) < 1, which is 
never the case because 1 's cooperative strategy is conditioned on b(1-a) > 1, 
and a>O). Several conclusions follow. 
1 . The preference of the recipient of the resource transfer (column chooser) 
is unchanged by the magnitude of that transfer: Compliance cannot be 
bought as long as there is no punishment for noncompliance; therefore, 
a satisfaction with the federal arrangement that could not be successfully 
challenged in a local campaign can never be bought. The recipient's sole 
concern is that its marginal benefit though the public good outweighs its 
marginal contribution, as if no transfer were taking place. 
2. At the same time, incentives of the economically stronger participant to 
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cooperate are lowered compared to the case without redistribution. The 
row chooser, who without redistribution prefers to cooperate only if b > 1 
- if the national government's 'productivity', b, is greater than 1 - now 
must also take the loss from redistributive policies into account. It fails to 
contribute whenever b(1-a) < 1, even though it might be that b > 1 . 
. 3. Even if a subsidy is automatically withdrawn as a punishment for non-
compliance (with the central government pocketing the unredistributed 
resources), i.e., column chooser's payoff in the lower left cell of Figure 
1.2 is X2 + t(1-a)bX1, whether cooperation will occur depends on the 
constraints that row chooser faces. Even if row chooser cooperates, 
column chooser prefers to cooperate only if X2<a(X1+X2)+b(1-a)X2• But 
recall that row chooser cooperates only if b(1-a)> 1, and thus the 
condition always holds. The binding constraint for full cooperation 
remains b > 1 /(1-a). So nothing is changed if the poorer region is 
threatened with a withdrawal of the subsidy designed to encourage its 
cooperation. 
Correspondingly, when the federal government attempts redistributive 
policies, full cooperation may not be sustainable even when the individual 
marginal benefit of the public good exceeds marginal cost for each participant. 
The general conclusion, then, is that although a drastic increase in productivity 
can induce cooperation, mere efficiency cannot do so. Absent some system of 
selective reward or punishment, a federal government that is 'merely efficient' 
will continue to confront the general problem of compliance and cooperation. 
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Moreover, the federal units' behavior is affected only by parameters band a 
(and by P in Figures 1 .1 a and 1 .1 b), even though the success of a central 
government's economic development plan may be influenced by t, X1 and X2 • 
But even if we take an especially narrow economic view of these parameters, 
their values will be heavily dependent on political things. The parameter b, the 
'technology' of the federal public good production, for instance, is a function not 
only of 'economic' policy - regulating the 'right' industries and providing for a 
budget balanced 'optimally' between various categories of spending (all of 
which is determined by political things), but also of the degree of corruption that 
pervades public sector activities. And it goes virtually without saying that 
subsidies a and the structure of punishments and rewards will be determined 
politically and to the officeholders maximum electoral advantage in sub-national 
units as well as nationally. In 1995, for instance, Russian president Yeltsin 
sought the support of regional bosses in the upcoming parliamentary and 
presidential elections not by rewarding compliance with his policies as much as . 
he pursued a federal policy of 'rewarding' noncompliance. Direct federal 
subsidies were not allocated only on the basis of economic need, but also on 
the basis of the perceived likelihood that doing so would shore up his political 
support. We return to this general point in Chapter 4 below. 
Thus, absent selective punishments (and rewards), cooperation and 
compliance require a degree of productivity in the provision of public services 
that may not be met even under the most favorable circumstances, and 
sustaining even a mutually desirable federation by democratic means requires 
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mechanisms other than merely direct economic incentives to federal units. In 
other words, purely economic instruments generally fail to completely answer 
the question of the ultimate source of enforcement and federal stability. 
Coercion of federal units by the federal center with a purpose of 
enforcing the provision of the public good is not a plausible framework for 
analyzing democratic federations and the relationships in them among 
governments of different levels. Although theoretically applicable to the 
Prisoners' Dilemma type of situations, coercion by a government of another 
sovereign government - and unit governments in democratic federations 
possess independent from the center sovereignty - amounts to nothing else but 
war. Considering punishment of failures to act cooperatively in such a context, 
one must immediately recollect Nigerian and Ethiopian civil wars, Yugoslav 
federal army invasion of Croatia, and the eliminationist effort of Russia's federal 
troops in Chechnya. This is clearly not the role a theorist of democratic 
federalism grants to the federal state. Even if underlying circumstances are 
those of the infamous Prisoners' Dilemma, something other than coercion must 
transform it into some other game where cooperation is sustainable as an 
equilibrium outcome, before the democratic federal government can appear on 
the stage at all. Thus, the consensual decision to cooperate must be reached 
before the federal state comes into existence, and cannot be achieved other 
than through the formal system of incentives, i.e., by institutional means. 
Institutional arrangements that allow the federation to form, correspondingly, 
must be self-enforceable. Later we return to the discussion of the ways in 
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which such self-enforceability can be attained in an institutional system. 
If enforcement and 'punishment' of defections (in contrast with rewarding 
compliance) are outside the scope of a democratic federal state, then what 
remains are the role of executing the institutional prescriptions (and by doing 
this - allowing the incentive mechanism embedded into the constitutional rules 
to become a reliable environment for all participants of the federal process), 
and, possibly, if cooperative equilibria in a game played by constitutional rules 
are many, the coordinating role in selecting among them. Problem of federal 
coercion, in other words, must be solved in principle at the constitutional stage 
that transforms the interaction among participants into one where there are 
cooperative equilibria - by changing the payoff structure. 
Whether or not, when equilibria are many, federal government is 
involved in the equilibrium selection process determines the nature of the 
federal interaction as the game among N or N+ 1 'players.' 
A solution to the federal problem of compliance requires that formal rules 
are such, that free-riding is made an unattractive option. And the federal state 
comes in as an executor of the formal rules, if unchallenged in this capacity by 
regional representatives through political mechanisms. However, aside from 
punishment in order to overcome the Prisoners' Dilemma, there is also another 
function that the federal center performs, namely, that of solving the problem of 
federal coordination when equilibrium selection is required - in the process of 
federal bargaining. 
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1.1.4 The Problem of Coordination and Its Manifestation in Federal 
Political Process 
The coordinating function of the center is not in any way subordinate to 
its enforcement role, since the multiplicity of equilibria need not be less of a 
destabilizing factor than individual unwillingness to contribute toward public 
good production. The problem of federal coordination can exist in absence of 
the problem of federal compliance and precedes it historically, because free-
riding cannot start until some agreement on the levels of contributions is 
reached by the participants. For example, the punishment mechanisms, 
especially if constitutionally defined, can take different forms, from selective to 
universal, including the extreme one of complete reversion, when the public 
good is not provided at all if at least one participant refuses to participate in its 
provision.4 In such a case, free-riding is not an option as it leads to the 
termination of the federal program. But, even in the most favorable case when 
the federal program is highly productive (8/2-C > 0), so that there is no 
Prisoners' Dilemma and free-riding is not a dominant option, under reversion 
there are two equilibria in pure strategies. Either all units contribute resources 
41n fact, such a drastic mechanism does not necessarily have to be punishment 
per se; it is also possible, that for some reasons (e.g., electoral) the center 
cannot afford to go ahead with a program if even one member of the union has 
not explicitly committed to it. Electoral College and thus elected presidency in 
this regard may be an equivalent in a two-party system of such reversion 
mechanism. 
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and benefit from the federal program, or all choose not to contribute.5 
To comply 








Here already there is room for the role of the central government to 
coordinate actions of sub-national units to insure that the "efficient" equilibrium 
out of the two possible prevails. In this example, though, it is both evident on 
what option the center should focus the participants' attention, and likely that as 
a Pareto dominant, the cooperative equilibrium might prevail on its own. Things 
are not always that clear, though. And already this two-by-two example 
illustrates that there is a separate problem of coordination which can plague 
even very efficient federations and require political resolution. The issue of free-
riding may not be central to the federal problem in some federations, as they 
5The decision rule that we describe is the simplest version of the minimal 
provision mechanism. When a federation provides public goods, it has to 
determine the level of public good production and the way of sharing costs 
among the sub-national units. A mechanism is a function that describes the 
decision-making based on expressed units preferences. In the case of the 
minimal provision mechanism, each subject reveals its maximal demand of 
public good according to the given cost function, and the minimum announced 
desirable levels of production is selected as the level of public good production 
by the federal government. Of course, such a mechanism may be based on 
many feasible cost sharing rules - for example, equal cost sharing or 
proportional cost sharing rule. It has been shown that for any exogenous cost 
sharing rule, the minimum provision mechanism is the unique mechanism that 
satisfies the requirement of voluntary participation, makes it a dominant 
strategy for participants to reveal their true preferences over public good 
provision (strategy-proofness) and, in addition, is such that any feasible level 
of public good provision is attainable by the mechanism (full-range property). 
For more discussion and the proof see Ohseto (1997). 
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may never advance beyond the equilibrium selection stage - never formulate 
the exact terms of the federal agreement. 
More generally, when multiple equilibria exist, different sub-national units 
may pref er different equilibria, thereby inducing federal bargaining with respect 
to equilibrium selection. Thus, multiplicity of possible equilibria poses an 
. immediate threat to federal stability. In an efficient federation, each participant 
would be justified in seizing an opportunity to bargain for better terms for itself, 
as long as the allocation it seeks is associated with some equilibrium in the 
game. 
To illustrate this point, consider another example. Suppose that the 
federal program is provided only if the federal government is able to collect a 
fixed amount ($5 billion) in taxes. Also suppose that two sub-national units (the 
argument is easily generalizable to an N-unit case) receive an equivalent of $4 
billion of benefits each from the federal program, with the total net benefit of $3 
billion. With these parameters, the federal program is economically efficient, but 
. neither individual unit can provide it alone and, therefore, all sub-national units 
must agree to split the cost. Again, as under the reversion mechanism, 
complete free-riding is impossible. 
A continuum of possible equilibria could be sustained, as long as the 
sum of total contributions equals $5 billion (on the contract curve). And there is 
one additional "bad" equilibrium, when no joint federal program is provided. As 
both sides have different preferences over the possible equilibria, they have to 
negotiate and "bargain" to jointly select a particular outcome. Once an 
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equilibrium outcome is selected, no side would prefer to deviate from it (while 
they still prefer to switch to another possible allocation). Figure 1.4 simplifies the 
situation to allow the two federal units to choose only one out of four possible 
strategies: to comply with requirements of the federal program and pay $3 
billion, to pay $2.5 billion or to pay $2 billion. Also the sub-national government 
may choose to make no contribution to the program at all. 
To To To Notto 
contribute contribute contribute contribute 
$3 billion $2.5 billion $2 billion at all 
To contribute $1; $1 $1; $1.5 $1; $2 $0; $0 
$3 billion 
To contribute $1.5; $1 $1.5; $1.5 $0;$0 $0;$0 
$2.5 billion 
To contribute $2; $1 $0; $0 $0; $0 $0; $0 
$2 billion 
Not to O; -$3 $0; $0 $0; $0 $0; $0 
contribute at all 
Figure 1.4. 
There are four Nash equilibria in this game; three are a discrete 
equivalent of the contract curve in the original example: the first player pays $2 
and the second pays $3, both pay $2.5, the first player pays $3 and the second 
pays $2. The fourth equilibrium is when no agreement is reached and both 
players choose not to contribute. Players have strict preferences over possible 
equilibria and will try to access the coordination mechanism in order to bargain 
for better terms. 
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Different criteria and arguments could be used to coordinate players' 
actions: fairness, economic necessity, history of previous contributions. In fact, 
unless we are ready to make some ad hoc assumptions, we cannot predict the 
outcome of equilibrium selection. The outcome when the first player pays $3 
billion and the second pays $2 billion may not be viewed by the first player as · 
"fair," but it will not defect from the agreement until the process of equilibrium 
selection starts again. The big question is whether, even after once settled, 
federal terms are perceived as negotiable by the participants. More specifically, 
as the political process in a federation is mediated by elected officials of 
different levels, the question is whether or not such officeholders will offer their 
constituents their services in reopening the process of federal bargaining. 
In the presence of multiple equilibria there is no guarantee that 
participants of the federal bargaining would succeed in equilibrium selection at 
all. It follows, that without interference the federal agreement could be quite 
stable once it has been fully implemented, while at the same time it can fall 
apart, possibly, without a replacement, if the sides merely decide to raise the 
issue again. Another consequence of the coordination problem is that in 
practice it may be efficient to impose a federal agreement involuntarily, pressing 
all sides to it, because it may be politically impossible for sub-national leaders to 
accept any mutually beneficial compromise. 
Any new opportunity to renegotiate federal terms inevitably renews the 
second-tier game of division of the federal benefits in the form of equilibrium 
selection. Destructive renegotiation may come as a result of polarizing political 
Chapter 1 Introduction: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations . . . 22 
pressures for it in the course of elections, or it can be caused by "external" 
factors, such as democratization of the post-authoritarian and post-totalitarian 
states or independence received by the post-colonial states. The opening for 
federal renegotiation may also be created constitutional provision allowing 
change in federal terms, such as a clause that explicitly allows renegotiation of 
terms by referring to 'Constitutional laws' to be passed, or the one that 
guarantees the right and outlines the rules of secession. Secession itself or its 
threat can be viewed as a form of altering the terms of the initial bargain, since 
it is a powerful tool with which to extract concessions from the rest of the 
federation. In fact, all federations that constitutionally defined secession 
mechanisms have already collapsed, i.e., the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, and Burma. This fact is perhaps best illustrated by 
events in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia where the 
introduction of democratic processes undermined and delegitimized the old 
systems of rules (communist constitutions) and opened the door for new federal 
bargaining at the time of the institutional reform. Similarly, Ethiopia lost its 
province of Erithria as a result of a referendum after the weakening of its 
Marxist government. Pakistan lost its Eastern part after an attempt to draft a 
new constitution. The process of revising the constitution led to the dissolution 
of the West-Indian Federation. Political troubles in Nigeria were directly related 
to the electoral process. The number of illustrations can be easily extended to 
support the more general argument that the presence of institutional flexibility 
opens the door for dangerous renegotiation. 
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The dangerous contexts of renegotiation would explain why all 
federation failures have occurred early in each corresponding federation's 
history. All federations that ended (and formed) after the World War II collapsed 
quickly (see Table 1.1 ). The Central African Federation and the French African 
Federation dissolved im.mediately after independence, with little consideration 
of economic losses for the parties involved. The Federation of Mali and Senegal 
existed for only a few months, and the same is true for the Federation of Iraq 
and Jordan. The West Indian Federation and the United Arab Republic 
collapsed after a few years of existence. If one adds to this list the former 
communist countries - USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia - counting time 
since democratization, we can argue that there is a critical and dangerous 
period for federation survival of several years after its creation, a period in 
which the new federal organization is particularly vulnerable to the attempts at 
'improving' the terms of the federal bargain.6 The political explanation of the 
disruptive influence of renegotiation-prone periods in federations• histories lies 
in the incentives that federal bargaining opportunities create for politicians. This 
logic is further enhanced when a unit-level constituency itself is divided and 
successful political campaigning within a unit requires that politicians take an 
6US history reveals this as well. The constitutional provision that 'importation of 
such persons ans any of the state now existing shall think proper to admit, shall 
not be prohibited by the congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred 
and eight' (part 1 Section 9 Article 1), strengthened by the requirement that 
' ... no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight 
hundred and eight, shall in any manner affect the first and the fourth clauses in 
the ninth section of the first article' (Article 5) are but an attempt to prevent 
renegotiation of a particularly contentious issue. 
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extremist stand with respect to advocating their constituents' perceived interests 
in the union, hoping thus to receive a unified unit's vote. 
An economist might argue that a strong center is, nonetheless, the 
surest way to sustain cooperation at the efficient level, and that our design 
should merely focus on making renegotiation difficult. This argument, though, 
would be flawed, since many regional leaders nevertheless succeed even in 
'strong' federations at securing special 'breaks' for their federal units. The 
arguably 'strong' Russian Federation interacts with many of its subjects by 
means of signing bilateral treaties filled with unique and asymmetric 
arrangements. 
Of course, a strong Soviet-type federation would have had 'social 
efficiency' somewhere in its objective function, though it would also have 
defined it in accordance with its own point of view. But, suppose, our strong 
federal center is elected, and that securing support of federal units (as 
mobilized to vote in elections by regional elites) is essential for its reelection. 
Suppose, also, that the center's strength is due to the fact that it unilaterally 
decides economic (tax) policy throughout the federation (a reasonable 
supposition, closely matching recent fiscal reform efforts of Russian 
government, for example), but it is incapable to keep dissatisfied units in the 
federation by non-violent means once net benefits to them from public good 
provision fall to or below zero. 
As long as requests from federal units come in small groups or 
individually, and not as a collective demand (in which case it is irrational for 
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them to make a request, as their individual welfare cannot be increased by it), 
the center can accommodate them with regard to the current status quo. Of 
course, it is electorally damaging when lifting someone's burden, to raise the 
tax burden of someone else in compensation, especially if a similar conces~ion 
was previously granted to that someone. What might result is the national 
. incumbent who in a round of bi-lateral concessions receives an electoral 
advantage, while the level of public good provision falls below efficient levels. 
Advocates of the 'strong center' as the guarantor of efficiency need to specify 
how they see the electoral basis of a strong democratic center. It is possible 
that they do not have elections in mind in conjunction with thus enforcing 
efficient levels of public good provision. 
1.1.5 Bargaining over Equilibrium Selection as a Necessary Implication of 
the Need for Federal Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms 
The need for equilibrium selection is generated by a combination of two 
necessary attributes of democratic federations. The first is the presence from 
the very beginning of an institutional mechanism that transforms the federal 
game from a Prisoners' Dilemma into something that admits self-enforceable 
mutually beneficial solutions - the mechanism, which is fixed, formalized, and 
itself is a necessary condition of federalization. The second attribute is the 
necessity of leaving within such a formal institutional mechanism the window of 
flexibility that allows for conflict-resolution (Ostrom, 1990:100-2). Indeed, 
marginal adjustments in the exact federal arrangement must remain possible, 
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otherwise the whole union could collapse due to random and temporary special 
circumstances within some of the participants that make their full compliance 
with the requirements impossible or especially difficult. In fact, insisting on full 
compliance in such circumstances may not be viewed as fair. Thus, though for 
the most part federal coordination is supplied by constitutional means at the · 
stage of equilibrium selection, there must always remain room for what we call 
'residual coordination,' within which the ongoing conflict-resolution can be 
accomplished and which can change the outcome of equilibrium selection, if 
only temporarily. 
It is in the area of 'residual coordination' that the strategic federal 
interaction (also called federal bargaining) takes place. The form it assumes 
depends on several parameters. The first is the scope of coordination left 
uncovered by constitutional provisions. The second are institutional forms that 
are provided or evolve over time specifically for the purpose of conflict-
resolution. These institutional forms as a matter of principle may either involve 
or ban the federal center from the process of conflict-resolution, shaping the 
ongoing 'residual' bargaining as either Nor N+1 participant interaction. Finally, 
the form conflict-resolution takes depends on individual level incentives 
supplied to its participants throu.ghout the federal system of government and 
elections. Different specific circumstances of a country imply what the 
acceptable, safe levels of constitutional flexibility are. This flexibility, in turn, 
must be sufficient to meet the conflict-resolution demands, and a gap between 
the two is a logical possibility. For example, if conflict-resolution is expected to 
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be a singular focus of political attention within the units as well as nationally, 
e.g., in an ethnically divided federation, its safe scope may be very limited when 
stability properties of the process of residual coordination are weak. Decisions, 
for example, on how to allocate the burden of an economic reform or distribute 
sizable foreign aid, are best not made under such circumstances. When 
government offices themselves become a valuable national resource (as they 
are in many poor democratizing nations), their assignment also becomes just 
another problem of division at the inter-unit level. In such fragile circumstances 
the form of disruption of the federal 'bargain' often is the 'capture' of the center 
by the strongest federation member and subsequent coordination to that 
member's full advantage. Correspondingly, an argument can be made for 
narrowing, at least initially, the scope of residual federal coordination, even at 
risk of not being able to accommodate some special needs. 
The range of 'residual coordination,' however, does not qualitatively 
change the nature of the federal 'game.' The most consequential alterations in 
the game are brought about by institutions which specify whether or not (and 
how) the separately elected 'center' participates in it. 
Finally, the importance of the third component - the participants' 
incentives - derives from the multi-level nature of the game around the provision 
of a federal collective good stressed by Bates (1988) and Ostrom (1990). The 
difference between the multi-level logic of communal appropriation of 
commons' resources (Ostrom, 1990) and the multi-level logic of the federal 
political process, though, is that while the first unravels top to bottom, where 
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one common must protect its interests among many while still solving the 
problem of over-depletion of the resulting allotment by its own members, the 
federal process, on the contrary, is structured bottom to top. Due to the 
democratic, i.e., electorally based nature of the federal game, the preferences 
of units' representatives come from the unit-level competitive electoral 
processes, and may include potentially transcending the national level political 
aspirations of unit politicians. As federal units are represented by elected 
officials who all are subject to strains of competitive campaigns, the units' 
'preferences' are expressed as dictated by the determinants of unit-level 
electoral environments. According to Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1995), aside 
from the particulars of a specific constituency's preferences, much will depend 
here on how highly politicians value the future. This includes their own ability to 
reach future agreements on federal issues and reputations that one day would 
allow successful contention of national offices (something that an intensely 
particularistic stand in regional elections can undermine). On the other side of 
the scale are their most immediate unit-level reelection concerns. 
1.1.6 Political Institutional Imperatives in a Democratic Federation 
Based on individual economic incentives of subjects of federal 
agreements, even when ignoring politics altogether, we must admit that a 
voluntary federal union is likely to be unstable. A mechanism of enforcement 
and coordination is needed to sustain federal stability. Elsewhere it has been 
argued that such a mechanism, moreover, must be self-enforcing. But 
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self-enforcement does not imply in any way that participants unconditionally 
voluntarily abstain from disrupting the federal union - it is possible that they may 
choose to be "good citizens" only because other players' actions force them to 
follow such a strategy. Among equilibria there can be asymmetric 
arrangements, that som.e units though would choose to abide would 
nevertheless find very unfair. For example, when several units have already 
agreed to form a federation, such a union could impose additional cost on non-
members while at the same time effectively raise required contribution levels for 
late arrivals. 
In the presence of multiple equilibria and when constitutional issues are 
being discussed, there is no guarantee that federal bargaining will succeed in 
selecting any equilibrium without a destructive interim stage, as federal units 
clearly have conflicting preferences. The same federal arrangement that would 
be stable in a fixed institutional system with no renegotiation opportunities, 
would not, in all likelihood, survive renegotiation. This implies, among other 
things, the desirability of a speedy adoption of, possibly, expert-drafted (and not 
unit- or group-negotiated) constitutional documents. This may imply that the 
constitution will be brief and, on things other than the basic and inviolable 
principles of state organization, necessarily vague. That is not, though, to be 
'cured' by the follow-up of 'constitutional' laws and general open-endedness of 
the constitutional process. After all, in a federation additional ground can be 
covered through the constitutional process within federal units, as long as the 
latter is clearly subordinated to the solid and few guidelines in the federal 
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constitution (Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1995). 
However, an important concern that remains after the initial 
constitutional process is completed, is that political mobilization in a federation 
in the future does not become centered on the demands for re~egotiation. 
· 1.2 Analysis in Subsequent Chapters 
When conflicting groups or federal units are treated as subjects that 
posses individual rationality, the only way to interpret it, without entering an 
obvious conflict with the social choice assessment of the collective rationality, is 
attributing full decision-making power to the 'leadership' of a group. Meanwhile, 
the latter, in a democratic setting, is controlled through the electoral link 
between the 'leadership' and its constituency. The content of the electoral 
mandate as determined in competitive elections and reenforced by the prospect 
of reelection and not the vague group interest is what directs the actions of 
'leaders' or, simply put, officeholders. Thus, we must focus on the way subject 
representation in a federation is organized. Representational content of an 
office defines the purpose for which an electorate elects·any individual 
officeholder and thus the promises with which the candidate himself and his 
competitors can lure the voters. We assume that the content of a specific 
electoral mandate and the considerations that become important in a campaign 
for the office are closely connected. 
The literature describes two types of federal representative organization: 
(1) a case when federal subjects are effectively represented directly within the 
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national bodies so that addressing unit's needs at the federal level requires 
electing politicians willing to do that from the unit's constituency to the national 
office directly, producing national representatives responsive primarily to their 
constituencies and not to their political organizations, e.g., national parties, _and 
(2) a system of federal representation where a unit's distinct interests are 
. articulated and defended before the federation by its sub-national government 
that, if necessary, addresses or confronts the federal government as the 
outside force (Loewenstein 1965: 405-7, Gibbins 1982: 45-6). In this light, the 
perception by politicians and voters of a particular electoral mandate is based 
on how the role of the office is viewed within a larger institutional environment. 
Things that determine the content of a mandate are institutional to a large 
extent. The electoral process conducted within the framework of specific rules 
(e.g., mandating territorial versus proportional representation) and in view of 
constitutionally supplied electoral imperatives (such as government formation in 
Westminster systems, etc.) is arguably the strongest influence on the long-term 
perceptions with regard to the mode of unit representation. But institutions are 
not the only relevant influence. Expectations that national officeholders should 
engage in negotiations over the federal unit's well-being with the unit-level 
politicians who would serve as the unit's champions may originally be induced 
by pre-existing factors, e.g., past experience. But through influencing individual 
actions, such expectations may lead to the adjustment of the components of the 
political and institutional system in the direction of the dominant view in the 
electorate and/or among the elites. In this sense, the type of federal subject 
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representation would not be based exclusively on institutional causes. This, 
however, does not imply that for a given political system one type of 
representation or the other could not be promoted by institutional and 
constitutional selection. 
Institutional criteria for determining the type of unit representation include 
the presence of territorial electoral representation, the existence of the 
legislatively meaningful upper chamber, the disconnectedness of the fates of 
the executive and the legislature in electoral terms and the lengths of staying in 
office, presence of legislative oversight, and such things as explicitly negotiated 
agreements between the center and individual subjects, institutions for 
intergovernmental conferences and other forms of negotiation, existence of a 
system of special committees or other permanent bodies to regulate center-
subjects affairs, establishment of subject representational quotas in national 
governmental institutions, etc. Within a single political system, components of 
both types of representation can simultaneously be present; thus, the exact 
classification would always remain a matter of a degree. It is important, 
however, that when the federal subjects' representatives in the national 
government are free to act on behalf of their territorial constituencies, there is 
no foundation for a conflict betWeen local and national (legislative) electoral 
campaigns. The possibility, however, remains for local mobilization against the 
nationally (not territorially) elected executive branch, if such exists. 
In this work we adopt an approach that the essence of the federal 
process is federal bargaining, understood as bargaining over the selection 
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among many equilibria possible for a given federation. As the process of 
equilibrium selection is inherently redistributive due to the constraint on the joint 
resources that a federation possesses, its participants have conflicting 
preferences over the possible allocations, even though once selected, each of 
. -
those is implementable by virtue of being one of the equilibrium outcomes. A 
specific form in which the discourse between and among the elected officials 
representing units' interests in the federation and the center is institutionalized 
affects the nature of this discourse, the tendencies in electoral politics, and the 
outcomes of federal bargaining. We see two basic institutional possibilities 
within which federal bargaining over equilibrium selection can be conducted. 
The first limits representatives of all units to joint interactions with the center, 
where the consensus in some form must first be reached among them and only 
then addressed to the center in the form of a request or a bill that needs to be 
signed (as in the US). Alternatively, it may be possible, or, in some cases (e.g., 
Russia) explicitly stipulated, that representatives of individual units can enter 
bilateral interactions with the center on behalf of their constituents and that the 
concessions obtained within those interactions are unit-specific and do not 
spread to other federal units by the force of the precedent. 
In what follows, we address on the basis of four cases different forms 
that bargaining over equilibrium selection assumes under different institutional 
circumstances, and assess the implications of different forms of bargaining for 
the nature of the federal process and to the content of the electoral mandates 
tor local and national officeholders (the cases of Canada and Germany in 
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Chapter 2}, federal policies (the case of the USA in Chapter 3), and, with regard 
to our last case - Russia - for the prospects for democratic federal stability 
(Chapter 4). 
In this coflection of cases we consider the most general type of variation 
in the way bargaining over federal equilibria is institutionalized. The variation 
that we address is between federations where representatives of federal units 
can interact with the center bilaterally versus those where the procedure of unit-
center interaction is formalized and requires a decision to be reached among 
the units before the center is presented with a request (thus, no bilateral deals 
with the center are permitted). Admittedly, there are other dimensions of 
variation, and the impact of federal institutions (not only of institutions that 
constrain bargaining) on the federal process is complex. However, the one that 
we identify and on which basis we selected our cases not only has (in theory) 
immediate strategic implications for the participants at all levels, but also is 
clearly identifiable. 
A few definitions are necessary at this point. Governmental forms 
employed in different countries vary substantially, and we must impose general 
criteria to have the compatibility needed for comparisons. By federal center as 
contrasted with unit representatives, we understand officeholders each of whom 
possesses national legitimacy. This means that the center (1) must be elected 
nationally, and (2) must not be a collective body, but an individual officeholder 
or a small group of officials with a single source of legitimacy (e.g., the cabinet). 
National parliaments in party list PR electoral systems are disqualified, 
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because, even if elected by the constituency at-large, each MP belongs to a 
party which represents a (small) subset of electorate against the rest of it, and 
thus their legitimacy is not national. However, when the federal center is the 
Prime Minister and the cabinet that he heads, and their office is conditional on 
the parliamentary confiqence, the parliament that defends on the strength of 
party discipline in it can come very close to being a part of the federal center or, 
in other words, not being an assembly of local representatives. Thus, a 
parliament in a Westminster system would be fully identified with the center 
(cabinet). 
Many officeholders at once may have a claim on representing their 
federal units before the center. When this is the case, qualitative judgement is 
required to determine the weight of each form of representation. To give an 
example, in the United States congressional representatives in a structured 
simultaneous way represent their constituents' interests through the legislative 
process before the nationally elected executive endowed with serious 
. legislative powers. At the same time, state Governors represent their 
constituents' interests as well, when they find some particulars of execution of 
federal programs being delegated to the state level and left at their discretion. 
The first hypothesis that we test in chapter 2, in principle, applies to both 
forms of institutionalization of federal bargaining, though the concrete 
manifestations can be different in each. The centrality of federal bargaining to 
the federal political process implies that it is reflected in the incentives and 
behavior of politicians, political parties, and voters. In particular, federal 
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bargaining as an interaction between different offices (where unit 
representatives can act either jointly of separately) over the selection of an 
(equilibrium) arrangement as favorable for their constituents as possible creates 
incentives for voters to select different parties to control these o_ffices. The 
related hypothesis is that not only the (presumably) constant characteristics of a 
party, such as its ideology and policy stands, affect the voters' choices, but also 
the party's current position in federal bargaining (such as being in government 
or in opposition nationally, or in control of the presidency when it is the only 
nationally elected center). Thus, in testing this hypothesis in application to 
federations that allow bilateral interactions of unit representatives with the 
center, we look for evidence of electoral balancing by comparing electoral 
returns in federal and sub-national elections in Canada and Germany. We show 
that the electoral dynamics is, indeed, consistent with electoral balancing taking 
place between federal and provincial and between federal and Lander elections 
in these two federations. 
When federal units' representatives are constrained in their interactions 
with the federal center to joint actions only, as when they communicate with the 
center by means of passing ready pieces of legislation that can be either signed 
or not by the nationally elected executive, their representational weights in the 
bargaining process are firmly institutionalized and their long-term implications 
can be assessed. In chapter 3, using the data on allocation of federal grants in 
the US, we empirically support the proposition that outcomes of the federal 
bargaining reflect the bargaining weights of the participants. More specifically, 
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we show that relatively small US states, being better represented in Congress, 
systematically benefit in the process of federal grant distribution. 
The fourth chapter addresses the political process in a federation with a 
still unstable type of bargaining institutionalization, where the issue of federal 
bargaining is the focus of national political discourse, namely, Russia. There 
. exists a consensus over the ability of political leadership of the sub-national 
units there plays in 'delivering' votes in national elections. The hypothesis that 
we address is that the influence of regional politicians on the vote within their 
constituency at the federal level is yet another artifact of federal bargaining 
being reflected in the electoral process, rather than the mafia-style political 
manipulation on their part. We fail to find support to claims of the 'mechanical' 
nature of 'delivering' votes - by means of massively stuffing ballots. Instead, we 
find evidence in support of the willingness of regional· electorates, when federal 
bargaining is the focus of the national political process and partisan 
attachments are not formed, to view local politicians as strategic leaders in 
coordinating their national vote. We also are able to support a complementary 
hypothesis on Russian data, namely, that the federal level policies affects local 
electoral behavior as well. More specifically, it is found that regionally felt 
implications of nationally executed policy decisions in economic sphere 
systematically bias regional voting patterns. Thus, new electorates respond to 
the actions of both sides to the federal bargaining as a federal party system is 
forming. 
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Tables: 
Table 1.1 Federations that collapsed since the World War II 
A. Dissolved federations 
Mali Federation with 1959-1960 
Senegal 
United Arab Republic 1958-1961 
West Indian Federation 1958-1962 
Central African Federation 1953-1963 
Pakistan (with 1947-1971 
Bangladesh) 
USSR (1922) 1989-1991 
Yugoslavia (1946) 1989-1991 
Czechoslovakia (1969) 1989-1992 
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Existing federal countries formed before and after 1945 that 
survived longer than 8 years 
Federations formed Federations formed 











CHAPTER 2. IDEOLOGICAL BALANCING IN FEDERAL AND SUB-
NATIONAL ELECTIONS 
In the. first chapter we argued that different institutional forms of federal 
bargaining create specific policy and electoral incentives for politicians and 
voters. Here we specifically analyze electoral incentives for voters when federal 
bargaining takes place between different federal and sub-national offices. Our 
major premise, the validity of which we test on the case of Canada (and 
reconfirm for Germany) is that if voters take into account policy interactions 
between different governmental institutions, they may prefer to select different 
parties to control these institutions. Such incentives work toward the mutual 
independence of federal and provincial parties, especially in electoral arena 
. and may lead to disinte~rated party system in the federation, which, as Riker 
( 1964) argued may be regarded as the main variable .intervening between the 
social conditions and the specific nature of the federal bargain in a federal 
country. 
The possibility of balancing federal policy through different elections was 
analyzed in details in the context of the US politics (Fiorina 1992; Alesina and 
Rosenthal 1989, 1995). According to the moderating elections hypothesis as 
applied to the US politics, the American electorate achieves moderate policy 
outcomes by dividing the control over different governmental offices - the 
presidency and Congress - between different parties. This balancing manifests 
itself in a well-recorded phenomenon of divided government and in the midterm 
vote losses for a presidential party. Indeed, presidential parties' vote shares 
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declined in all the 19 midterm elections since 1918. Fiorina (1992) suggests 
that moderate voters have incentives to cast split-ticket votes as a mean of 
creating divided government and achieving more moderate policy outcome. 
Alternatively, Jacobson (1990) argues that American voters use different criteria 
to select candidates for different offices. For example, according to Jacobson, 
Republicans are viewed by voters as doing a better job as executives 
controlling governmental spending, while Democrats are better legislators and 
protectors of particular district interests. Voters, according to Jacobson, would 
prefer to see Democrats sending benefits to their district while the same voters 
would support Republican executive restricting congressional spending 
activities across districts and reduce taxes. Erikson (1988, 1990) concludes 
after comparing different explanations for the midterm loss that the data 
suggest that voters punish the party in power, regardless of its performance. 
Midterm elections seem to be used by voters (whether consciously or not) to 
balance the powers of different national institutions in the U.S. (Erikson 1988, 
1990, Fiorina 1992, Alesina and Rosenthal 1995). 
As Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) assert when they develop a general 
formal theory of institutional balancing, the "balancing" connection between 
elections of different levels may. not be unique to the US political process, but 
may be present in other democratic countries, especially in federations. Brady, 
Lohmann and Rivers (1997) analyze federal and Land elections in Germany, 
looking for evidence in support of the moderating elections hypothesis. They 
confirm that, similarly to midterm elections in the United States, federal 
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incumbent parties almost invariably lose support in German Lands during the 
periods between federal elections (see also Anderson and Ward 1995). Studies 
of by-elections in Britain, Canada, and Australia, while showing a certain 
negative relationship between parties' electoral success in the general and 
other types of elections, do not make any inferences· regarding voters' intention 
to balance policy. They all share a view of midterm elections (in fact, of any 
additional elections occurring between the general elections) as "referenda" of 
sorts on the government performance (Cook and Ramsden 1973; Mughan 
1986, 1988; Curtice and Payne 1991; Anderson and Ward 1995). 
In a more general context, when students of European democracies look 
at electoral performance of incumbent parties in coalition governments, they 
find a tendency for the parties in government to lose votes. In 22.8 percent of 
analyzed cases, all parties that participated in governmental coalitions lost 
votes in subsequent elections. And this is despite the fact that in the postwar 
period 54.2 percent of European parties with the greatest electoral gains did not 
enter resulting government coalitions, which rules out a simple statistical 
explanation of the phenomenon of the vote loss by incumbents (Budge and 
Kernan 1990). 
In this essay we begin by testing the moderating elections hypothesis in 
application to Canada with the idea that provincial elections there play a role of 
'balancing' national policy. In doing so, we compare provincial vote in federal 
elections with the outcomes of subsequent provincial elections in all Canadian 
provinces between 1949 and 1995. In order to account for the specifics of 
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Canadian institutional and party systems, we develop the model of federal 
electoral balancing parallel to the model of Alesina and Rosenthal (1995). 
Canada is a particularly interesting and challenging case for testing the 
11balancing 11 theory, because long before the idea of policy balancing was 
advanced in application to American politics, Canadian political scientists not 
only introduced the concept of policy balancing, but attempted to test the 
proposition empirically and then rejected it. It was a Canadian political scientist 
who in the late 501s first explicitly articulated the idea of 11balancing 11 elections as 
an explanation for a widely observed split-ticket phenomenon in Canada. 
Noting that while Liberals dominated the Canadian federal government for 
twenty years, their provincial control was limited to only two or three provinces, 
Underhill (1955, 1960) suggested that as if 11by some instinctive sub-conscious 
mental process, the Canadian people have apparently decided that...they will 
balance one party dominance in Ottawa with effective opposition in the 
provincial capitals 11 (1955: pp. 39-40). Similarly, Wrong (1957) wrote that, · 
11 
••• many Canadian voters chose to counter the power of the national 
administration not by electing a strong federal opposition but by voting against 
the Liberal party in provincial elections. 11 The balancing idea entered the 
conventional wisdom, with one prominent textbook observing that 11[t]he records 
suggest at least that provincial electorates have shown a decided tendency to 
fall away from the party which gains control of the Dominion parliament 11 
(Dawson, 1970, p. 486). 
While the idea of balancing was intuitive and attractive on theoretical 
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grounds, it was eventually rejected by most Canadian political scientists as 
lacking empirical support. In perhaps the single most influential article on 
Canadian balancing, Scarrow (1961) rejected the hypothesis on empirical 
grounds. Scarrow's basic objection was that instances of split-ticket voting by 
provinces at the provincial versus federal level were no greater than split-ticket 
voting for governor versus the president at the U.S. state level. 
Survey analyses did not reveal that voters actually intend to balance 
policy. For example, voters, when asked why they switch the vote in provincial 
elections, did not mention policy balancing considerations. Respondents who 
stated agreement with the notion of balancing theory were no less stable in 
their voting than objectors to it (Wilson and Hoffman 1970). And respondents 
rarely recalled instances when they followed balancing principles themselves 
{Perlin and Peppin 1971).1 To Canadian observers the "so-called" balance 
theory had become a discredited idea. In our view, Canadian studies rejected 
the balancing theory too quickly and without adequately examining the available 
evidence. In our view, the best test for policy balancing hypothesis that can be 
done using aggregate electoral returns is to show that federal parties suffer 
additional electoral losses when they control the federal government. And our 
analysis reveals that Canadian electoral dynamics is consistent with such a 
1 Two explanations were suggested for why surveys fail to reveal individual level 
balancing dynamics. First, not all voters should have policy balancing 
intentions, but only those who are in the ideological center or between parties. 
Therefore, before any individual level analysis can be done, analysis should 
separate voters according to their ideological views. Second, as a rule, surveys 
are specially designed to reveal individual intentions to balances policy. 
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proposition. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.1 briefly describes 
Canadian federal institutions, section 2.2 - the party system, and section 2.3 -
the individual-level electoral facts consistent with the principal logic of the 
balancing model. Section 2.4 outlines the model and formulates the hypothesis. 
Section 2.5 contains data analysis. Section 2.6 replicates the analysis for the 
case of German elections. Section 2.7 is a conclusion. 
2.1 "Executive Federalism" - Interaction Between Federal and 
Provincial Governments in Defining Policies 
Customarily, most critical political decisions in Canada are reached 
through negotiations between federal and provincial executives, in which either 
the 11first ministers11 or federal and provincial ministers responsible for a 
particular policy area meet together to work out a policy change. These informal 
Canadian institutions of negotiation are broadly defined by the special term -
11executive federalism 11 (Simeon 1972, Weaver 1992). Such executive 
interactions, although not mentioned anywhere in its constitutional documents, 
are described as the most important element of the country's institutional 
system. Canadian constitution can be viewed as a hybrid of the British and 
American constitutional traditions (Simeon 1993), in the sense that the 
Canadian constitution is both a written one, like the U.S. constitution, and an 
unwritten one, like British constitution. That unwritten provisions of Canadian 
Constitution are as significant as the written constitutional text, especially on 
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issues of federalism gives, it great flexibility: federal-provincial conferences 
where constitutional constraints on bargaining are loose can lead to major 
constitutional adjustments (Gibbins 1982). In fact, Smiley (1962) argues that the 
federal aspects of the Canadian constitution have come to be less what the 
Supreme Court says they are, than what the federal and provincial Cabinets 
and bureaucracies in a continuous series of formal and informal relations have 
determined them to be. 
Moreover, it came to be widely recognized that the interests of provinces 
and localities in Canada are represented and protected not so much by the 
members of the federal Parliament or Senate, but through an ongoing 
interaction between federal and provincial ministers and impressive 
bureaucratic machinery.2 The Canadian federal system - many argue - has 
developed in the direction of interstate federalism where regional and provincial 
interests are represented primarily by the governments of the constituent units, 
and because the intergovernmental conflict is extensive, it has to be resolved 
through intergovernmental negotiations and bargaining. Therefore, real policy 
questions are decided through interactions between federal and provincial 
governments. (By contrast, the U.S. can be characterized as an intrastate 
federation where national political institutions facilitate the representation of 
territorial and state interests directly at the national level. The Senate, the 
House of Representatives, and a popularly elected President all have sufficient 
2By some accounts there were 67 federal-provincial administrative committees 
in 1957, 119 in 1967, nearly 500 in mid-1970s, and around 1000 in mid-80s 
(Smiley 1976, Kernaghan 1985, Warhurst 1987). 
Chapter 2 Ideological Balancing in Elections . . . 50 
opportunities and electoral stimuli to be directly responsive to regional and local 
interests and the needs of particular constituencies). 
It is not only through executive interaction that provincial governments 
can affect federal policy decisions. The provinces control enough resources to 
counteract federal policy at the implementation stage. Because provinces and 
municipalities control nearly two-thirds of all public expenditures in Canada and 
about eighty percent of all public capital investments, a determined province 
can exert a significant counter-influence on fiscal policy of the federal 
government and jointly with large agencies and public utility corporations can 
have a major impact on domestic capital market and - through foreign 
borrowing - on capital flow and exchange rates (Leslie 1987). Thus, Ontario 
provincial government counter influenced federal fiscal policy in 1970 and 1971 . 
At that time, the federal government was seeking to offset inflation and was 
practicing a policy of fiscal restraint, with particular discretionary attention 
directed at the urban areas of Ontario. However, in the view of the Ontario 
government, unemployment was the more serious threat at the time, and a 
deliberate effort was made- - through the 1970 and 1971 budgets - to stimulate 
the economy, particularly in the basic investment sector (Leslie 1987). On 
another occasion, in the 1980s,. at the time when federal government was 
issuing direct grants to municipalities, the Quebec government was 
encouraging municipalities to rationalize their finances instead (Brown 1994). 
While responsibilities of the two levels of government - federal and 
provincial are separated in certain policy areas and are shared in others, there 
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is a significant overlap in governmental programs. The Economic Council of 
Canada reported in 1979 that in few areas of policy-making could either federal 
or provincial government act in isolation. Brown (1994) finds a half to two-thirds 
of governmental activities falling into the areas of both federal and provincial 
involvement (Brown 1994). Within these overlapping activities the objectives of 
the two levels of government often differ. The history of policy objectives 
differences have been recorded in the fields of regional development strategy 
(in Quebec), petrochemical development, transportation policy, assistance to 
industry, labor market training, energy development, and environmental 
protection (Brown 1994). 
In summary, not only are interactions between federal and provincial 
governments in Canada extremely important in determining policy outcomes, 
but to some degree they serve as the mechanism of checks and balances in the 
Canadian political institutional system. Both federal and provincial governments 
are important in defining the outcome. 
2.2 The Party System of Canada 
Historically, two parties have alternated in control over the federal 
government in Canada - the Federal Liberal Party and the Progressive 
Conservative Party. The Liberal party dominated in federal elections from 1896 
until 1957, being i.n government for all but fifteen years of this period. The 
Liberals were dependent for this success on their electoral dominance in 
Quebec, which they managed to maintain through an informal process of 
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alternating francophone Quebecers and Anglophones from other provinces as 
party leaders and federal Prime-Ministers. 
A minor presence in the political system is New Democratic Party formed 
in 1961 as a direct from the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), a 
socialist orientation party which goes back into the 1930s. The CCF/NDP has 
generally contested seats across the nation, in most if not all provinces. In 
197 4, for the first time it contested every seat, just as did the Liberals and the 
Progressive Conservatives. Another minor Canadian party, the Social Credit, on 
the other hand, generally confined itself to contesting a limited number of seats 
- principally in the West, and later in Quebec. Following the decline of its 
support in Quebec, this party virtually disappeared in 1984, elections receiving 
only 0.1 percent of the popular vote (Feigert 1989). The Reform Party of 
Canada was established in the Fall of 1987 as a political tool to represent the 
interests of Western Canada. Despite its impressive electoral success in the 
1993 federal election, the Reform Party so far has failed to establish strong 
positions in non-western provinces. 
Most scholars of Canadian political process agree, that with some 
degree of oversimplification, Canadian parties can be placed on a one-
dimensional left-right ideological continuum, with the NOP on the far left, the 
Liberals to the right, and the Conservatives to the right of the Liberals (Elkins 
1980). In order to place them ideologically, scholars compared Canadian 
parties based on their platforms (Irvine 1987), record of activities and 
advocated policies (Richard and Robert 1980), opinions and values of party 
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activists (Goldfarb and Axworthy 1988, Archer and Whitehorn 1990, Blake 
1988, Nadeau and Blais 1990). Thus Blake (1988) uses surveys to examine 
ideological differences between the delegates to the federal Liberal and 
Progressive Conservative leadership conventions. He finds that on average 
activists of the two parties held significantly different opinions on most matters 
of policy. Of course, there was some overlap in opinions, due to the variation in 
each party. Archer and Whitehorn (1990) show a considerable division between 
Canadian political parties in the expressed attitudes of their activist convention 
delegates on major issues. These divisions persist across policy areas. On 
most issues, New Democrat activists clearly are on the ideological left, 
Progressive Conservatives on the ideological right while the Liberal party 
delegates tend to locate themselves in the ideological center. 
In provincial elections, almost in every Canadian province two major 
political parties each regularly and routinely received 30 percent or more of the 
vote (McCormick 1989). The only exceptions were Alberta, where politics 
traditionally was dominated by one party, and Ontario, where three parties, the 
Liberals, the Conservatives and the NOP, were relatively strong. Since the 
1940s the Liberals were present in all provincial elections and were a major 
political party in seven or eight provinces (McCormick 1989).3 The 
Conservatives were relatively successful in five provinces in the 1940s and in 
eight provinces by the 1980s. The conservative party was not present in 
3 ln 1990s the Liberal party obtained more then 20 percent of the vote in all 
provincial elections. 
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Quebec since the 1930s. There it cooperated with the Union Nationale, which in 
the 1980s was replaced by Parti Quebecois. The NOP was successful in 
provincial elections in British Columbia and Manitoba. Social Credit was a major 
provincial party in Alberta and British Columbia. 
Parties with the identical names in federations may advocate different 
policies nationally and locally. Nevertheless, in the case of Canada such 
federal-provincial differences mostly restricted to specific policy disputes, but 
the left-right ideological differences have not usually assumed a federal 
provincial dimension neither for the Conservatives nor the Liberals. In 
particular, it had been observed that both levels of the Liberal party have 
occupied a fairly centrist ideological position (Dyck 1991 ).4 Overall, there are no 
indications that policy stands of the federal parties and their provincial 
counterparts are significantly different, .or that Canadian voters can identify such 
differences. 
2.3 Canadian Voting Behavior 
Following the original Michigan social-psychological model of electoral 
behavior, numerous studies have assessed the strength of party identification in 
the Canadian electorate. Most of these studies found little evidence of 
existence of stable party identification (Gidengil 1992). This concept seems to 
4At the same time due in part to policy disagreements, Ontario and Alberta 
Liberals set up separate provincial organizations. The Liberal party offers 
separate federal and provincial party memberships in Quebec, Ontario and 
Alberta. 
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be much less useful in the Canadian context than it is in the American. One 
reason for it could be that Americans at the polls face a complex multi-tiered 
ballot, and voters who use their party identification as an information shortcut 
can greatly simplify their task of voting. For Canadians, whose ballot is 
restricted to the choices for one office at one level of government, electoral ·task 
is much easier. Separate federal and provincial ballots combined with the 
practice of elections always separated in time make one's party affiliation less 
useful (Gibbins 1982). Thirty-five percent of electorate did not identify 
themselves with a party (Johnston et al. 1992). Thus Canadian voters display 
relatively high levels of volatility in their voting choice, which would correspond 
to low levels of party identification. Up to 41 percent of respondents have 
changed their party identification during the panel study of 197 4-80 (LeDuc, 
Clark, Jenson and Pammett 1984a). According to the 197 4 Canadian federal 
election study, around 18 percent of party identifiers had split their identification 
in federal and provincial politics - a figure that ranges from a low of 4 percent in 
Prince Edward Island to 35 percent in British Columbia. Overall, more than 60 
· percent of respondents were either weak in the intensity of their partisanship, 
unstable in their partisanship over time, or inconsistent between the federal and 
provincial elections (LeDuc, Clark, Jenson and Pammett 1980, Blake 1982, 
1985). The 1979-1980 election study found that only 61 percent of respondents 
during this short period of time maintained the same party identification with 
respect to both federal and provincial levels of government (Clark and Stewart 
1987). For example, in the 1979 federal and provincial elections in British 
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Columbia, 65 percent of voters made different partisan choices, even though 
the campaigns were concurrent and the elections were held only 12 days apart 
(Blake 1985). Different patterns of voting in federal and provincial elections may 
be viewed as a well documented peculiar feature of Canadian federalism 
(Blake 1982; Stevenson 1987; Uslaner 1990). 
The degree of partisan volatility between provincial and federal elections 
in Canada requires explanation. Consistent with observations about Canadian 
politics from the past (Underhill 1955, 1960; Wrong 1957; Muller 1968, Dawson 
1970), we propose a simple spatial model of 11balancing 11 elections that 
demonstrates that it is rational for some voters to support 
different parties federally and provincially, and then we test our model with 
electoral data from the period 1949-1996. 
2.4 Model of "Balancing" Elections 
The model of institutional balancing has been developed in application to 
American politics t9 explain the midterm vote-loss effect (Alesina and Rosenthal 
1995; Fiorina 1992). We want to use a parallel approach to explain the 
Canadian data. However, there are institutional differences between the US, for 
which the balancing model was.originally designed, and Canada - differences, 
that require the reformulation of the model before we can proceed with the 
analysis. Due to the parliamentary mode of government at both levels and the 
widespread practices of the joint executive decision-making, in the Canadian 
case we do not have the two branches of the national government interacting 
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over policies. Instead, we observe the interaction between governments of 
different levels - federal and provincial, but within the same executive branch. 
Two implications for the model follow from this fact. First, the elections to 
both interacting insti~utions are essentially single-member district contests 
between parties for the right to nominate the government, with the policy stand 
of each resulting government corresponding to the platform of the winning 
party. Second, because these are governments of different orders, and due to 
the rules operating in the Canadian national and provincial elections, the 
elections of two types are never concurrent, and the institutional counterpart of 
a government currently being elected is always fixed. For example, when 
selecting provincial government, voters always know which party controls the 
federal government. While in the American case the governmental 
overlap occurs only during the midterm elections, but not in the presidential 
years. 
When reformulating the model, we are looking at voters in a hypothetical 
province voting sequentially in federal and provincial elections. Each election 
results in formation of a government at a corresponding level, which is 
completely characterized by the policy platform of the party that wins elections 
and thus controls the cabinet formation. In other words, unlike in Alesina and 
Rosenthal (1995) where in a moderating congressional election it is the 
proportion in which the vote is divided that determines the policy position of the 
legislature, in the Canadian case of the two-tier parliamentary government we 
deal with two winner-takes-all elections, analytically equivalent to two 
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presidential posts being filled. Moreover, provincial voters know that, once 
elected, strongly partisan governments of the two orders will then interact to 
form federal policy (or, at least, the version of the federal policy that this 
province1s population will get to experience). That is, the provincial government 
will be able to negotiate specific concessions for itself, as well as to affect the 
development of the federal legislation of general nature in the direction of its 
policy preference. 
Following standard assumptions of spatial models of elections, we 
assume that in a policy space voters vote for policies nearest their ideal points. 
Voters' ideal points are distributed continuously. Two parties compete in both 
national and provincial elections and choose distinctive positions. (More 
restrictions are required for the case of three party competition which we 
consider in the Appendix.) 
The crucial assumption is that policy in the way it affects the province is 
determined as a linear combination of the platforms of the two governments, 
with the provincial winner•s policy ideal entering with a weight of a, where for 
simplicity a is restricted to 0 < a < 0.5. In other words, we assume that the 
federal government has greater impact on a resulting policy than the provincial 
government. 
Notice that if we take the possibility of balancing into account, the actual 
choice becomes from among four possible policy outcomes (two in each 
election). In a schematic unidimentional policy world, given that we restricted 
parameter a to be less than one-half, and if the Liberals are to the left of the 
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Conservatives, policy outcomes appear from left to right in the following order: 
the left-most policy L, LP is the outcome wh·en the Liberals control both 
federal and provincial governments, 
more moderate policies, L,GP and G,LP, are the outcomes when the 
government is divided between the Liberals and the Conservatives, and 
the right-most policy G, GP is the outcome corresponding to the 
conservative control of both levels of government. 
l------------------------L.,L.p------1.,c;p-------------<:,L.p--------c:,c;p ................. J 
0 1 
Figure 2.1. Policies resulting from different partisan combinations of 
national and provincial governments 
Midpoints between the four policies are the cutpoints, separating the 
liberal and conservative voters in different elections (except for the pairs L, GP 
and G, LP , and 
L, LP and G,GP-there is no election where the choice is between those 
outcomes). For example, the vote for the Liberals in provincial elections when 
the Conservatives control the federal government is to the left of 
( C 1 Lr + C 1 Cr >12 , because these voters prefer the divided government while 
voters to the right prefer the unified conservative control. 
The other cutpoints are 
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( L1 Cr + C 1 Cr )l2 - in federal elections when C is in power in the 
province; 
( L1 Lr + C 1 Lr )l2 - same, when L is in power in the province, and 
( L1 Lr + L1 Cr )l2 - provincial election when Lis in power nationally. 
Given the assumption that O < a < 112 , the cutpoint 
( C 1 Lr + C 1 Cr )l2 is always to the right of ( L1 Cr + C 1 c r )l2 
(because C 1 Lr is to the right of this cutpoint), and cutpoint ( L1 Lr + C 1 Lr )l2 
is to the right of ( L1 Lp + L1 Cr )l2. 
Assuming that voters' preferences within the province are fixed, but that 
the outcome of the federal election is decided by other provinces, this simple 
. model leads us to conclude that in a province: 
' i.e., 
1) Liberal vote is the highest in provincial elections under Conservative 
federal government. 
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2) The next highest is Liberal vote in federal elections under Conservative 
provincial government. 
3) The one after that is Liberal vote in federal elections, when they also 
control the province. 
4) And Liberal vote is the lowest in provincial elections under Liberal federal 
government. 
These observations hold true for any continuous distribution of voters 
preferences, including the case of the multi-dimensional issue space as long as 
voters' preferences over issues are separable. 
To illustrate the argument, consider the following interpretation. Suppose 
that the Liberal party is the federal incumbent. In the next provincial election 
voters have a choice - to let the Liberals control both levels of government or to 
'balance' the Liberals by giving the Conservatives con~rol over the provincial 
government. In fact, the balancing effect is equivalent to an electoral 
competition where an incumbent party's position is fixed, but another party can 
move closer to it in provincial competition. When the Liberals control the federal 
government, provincial Conservatives offer voters a relatively more moderate 
and attractive policy of a divided government. And only those who prefer to 
have the Liberals at both levels would vote for them provincially. Similarly, when 
the Conservatives control the federal government, more voters are ready to 
vote for the Liberals in provincial elections in order to balance federal 
Conservative policy. Balancing may take place over all policy issues where the 
Liberals and the Conservatives disagree and where federal-provincial 
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interactions exist. As we noted before, in the Canadian case, such interactions 
take a form of negotiations between federal and provincial executives. 
Notice that, according to our model, the decline in the Liberal vote in 
provincial elections does not lead to additional losses in the following federal 
election. Also the model does not predict that the policy balancing would lead to 
split partisan control of the two orders of government. It merely predicts that 
federal incumbent party would be relatively less successful in provincial 
elections. In particular, based on the model, we expect to find that vote for the 
national incumbent in the provincial election is lower when the party controls the 
federal government, but though a federal incumbent loses votes provincially, it 
regains its support in the next federal election. 
2.5 Estimating the Effect of Party Control 
Our primary data come from Canada Votes (Scarrow 1962) and Canada 
Votes: 1935-1988 (Feigert 1989), as well as from various editions of Politics: 
Canada. We take ~lectoral statistics for ten Canadian provinces between 1949 
and 1995. During this period, 15 federal and 127 provincial elections were held. 
For testing the hypothesis, we identify those provincial elections that follow a 
federal election (fall in between .the two federal elections). As a result, our data 
set includes 127 observations - from 12 to 14 observations per province. 
Between 1949 and 1996 two parties controlled the federal government 
in Canada - the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. There was also one 
minor federal party - the New Democratic Party which ran candidates in all 
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districts since 1971. Another minor Canadian party, - the Social Credit, on the 
other hand, generally confined itself to contesting limited number of seats -
principally in the West, and later in Quebec. The Reform Party of Canada was 
established in the Fa!I of 1987. as a political tool to represent the interests of 
Western Canada. Despite its impressive electoral success the Reform Party so 
far has failed to establish strong positions in non-western provinces. Depending 
on the treatment of minor parties, the Canadian federal party system had been 
characterized as a two party system, a three party system, or as a two major 
and two minor parties system. 
In provincial elections between 1949 and 1996, in almost every 
Canadian province two main provincial political parties each regularly and 
routinely received 30 percent or more of the vote (McCormick 1989). The only 
exceptions were Alberta, where politics traditionally was dominated by one 
party, and Ontario, where three parties - the Liberals, the Conservatives and the 
NOP were relatively strong. Since the 1940s the Liberals were present in all 
provincial e.lections and were a major political party in seven or eight provinces 
(McCormick 1989).5 The Conservatives were relatively successful in five 
provinces in the 1940s and in eight provinces by the 1980s. The conservative 
party was not present in Quebec since the 1930s. There it cooperated with the 
Union Nationals, which in the 1980s was replaced by Parti Quebecois. The 
NOP was the most successful in provincial elections in British Columbia and 
51n the 1990s the Liberal party obtained more then 20 percent of the vote in all 
provincial elections. 
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Manitoba. Social Credit was a major provincial party in Alberta and British 
Columbia. 
Our main dependent variable is the vote for the Liberals in provincial 
elections. We want to show that the Liberal vote in provincial elections declines 
when the party controls the federal government. We repeat the analysis for the 
Conservative party versus the "left" block of parties in which we include the 
New Democratic Party and the Liberals. If we show electoral losses in provincial 
elections for the Liberal federal incumbent, we should also be able to identify 
another party or a group of parties which gain votes at the Liberals expense. 
There are several reasons to start with the vote gains and losses of the 
Liberals. Out of the 17 federal elections that we include, the Liberals have won 
or were able to form the government in all but 6 (those of 1957, 1958, 1962, 
1979, 1984 and 1988). Of these the Progressive Conservative Party formed 
majority governments only three times. 
It is important to remember that when a challenger party replaces.the 
federal incumbent, its popularity among voters must be increased. In fact, we 
estimate that between 1949-1993 when the Liberals controlled the federal 
government in provinces their vote in federal elections was higher on average 
by 5.5 points, compared to the results of previous federal elections. When the 
Liberals controlled the federal government for more then one consecutive 
period, their vote in federal elections continued.to increase compared to the 
previous federal election (which they won) on average by 3 points. On the other 
hand, when the Conservatives won federal elections they gained on average 
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almost 7 points compared with the previous federal election. In general, the 
increase in popularity at the federal level should correspond to a greater vote 
for the federal incumbent in provincial election. However, according to our 
argument, the balancing effect should be reducing the federal incumbent's vote 
in provincial elections even as its federal vote continues to increase. All other 
things equal, the smaller the increase in the popularity of the federal incumbent 
the greater impact of balancing forces we should observe. It will be easier to 
identify this effect if we use data on the vote dynamics of a long-term federal 
incumbent. 
Second, the Liberal Party seems to be better represented in provinces 
and have provincial counterparts in all of them, although it is weak in Alberta 
and British Columbia. Notably, the Liberal Party support both in federal and 
provincial elections was distributed quite unevenly in time as well as across 
provinces, even when the Liberal Party dominated federal Canadian politics. 
The difference between a provincial vote for the Liberal Party in federal and 
subsequent provincial elections was also very unstable. Significant variation in 
the vote, both across elections and across provinces, is essential for testing our 
hypothesis. For example, If the support of a party was stable in provincial 
elections, and fluctuated in federal elections, then its success in federal 
elections must be trivially followed by the greater decline of electoral support (in 
fact, by a return to its normal stable level) in provincial elections. 
There are several ways to estimate the effects of the federal incumbency 
on the provincial vote. One way is to regress the provincial vote on the prior 
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federal vote in the province, plus a dummy variable for federal party control. An 
additional test is regress the provincial vote on the prior provincial vote while 
controlling for the federal incumbency. Alternatively, we can define a new 
dependent variable (the Liberal "vote gain") as the difference betwe~n the 
earlier and later provincial vote and compare the vote changes under the 
Liberal and Conservative federal control. 
We start with the analysis of the direction of changes in the provincial 
vote. Two outcomes are consistent with our argument. The party can loose 
votes provincially when it controls the federal government or gain provincially in 
the periods when it fails to win federally. It turns out, that the Liberal party lost 
votes when in power federally or gained provincial votes when federally out of 
power between two subsequent provincial elections in 80 cases. Changes 
between 47 provincial elections are inconsistent with the hypothesis. In the 
eastern provinces there are 33 correctly and 18 incorrectly predicted cases, in 
the western provinces there are 38 correctly and 26 incorrectly predicted 
cases, and in Quebec - 8 and 4 cases. 
However, simply counting the conforming cases says nothing about the 
magnitude of the provincial losses during the federal incumbency. Therefore, in 
the next step we compare the actual vote differences between provincial 
elections and federal elections, as well as between the subsequent provincial 
elections in the two states of the worlds -- when the Liberals controlled the 
federal government and when they were out of power. Table 2.1 shows that 
when we regress these differences on the dummy variable indicating the 
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periods of Liberal federal incumbency the estimated sign of the coefficient at 
the dummy variable is negative (as predicted) for al/ provinces, but estimates 
are not always statistically significant. Pooling all provincial data we record 
statistically significant losses both in the pooled sample and in the subsample of 
eastern and western provinces (see Table 2.1 ). 
2.5.1 Provincial to Federal Elections 
In our next test we define the dependent variable as the percent of 
voters supporting the Liberal Party in province i during a provincial election at 
time t. The support of the Liberal Party in provincial elections varied between 
0.5 percent and 66.3 percent across provinces and time. The first independent 
variable is the percent of voter supporting the Liberal Party in the same 
province during the preceding federal election. The range of this variable is 
between 12.7 and 71.9 percent. 
Figure 2.2 plots a regression line for the results of provincial elections 
and previous federal elections. The figure highlights the fact that when the 
Conservatives controlled the federal government, in most cases in the next 
provincial election the Liberals received higher support then the regression 
line would predict (these elections are indicated by squares). At the same time, 
when the Liberals controlled the federal government, they often did worse in the 
provinces then the regression prediction. To account for this effect, we include 
in our analysis the second independent variable - a dummy variable indicating 
periods of Liberal Government in Ottawa. 
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According to our hypothesis, if we assume that ttie Liberal vote share in 
provincial elections is positively correlated with the Liberal vote in the same 
province in federal elections but declines at the time of the Liberal Government, 
our statistical specification should be: 
where: 
Y1t = ~o + ~1 X111 + ~2 X2it + Eit , ( 1 ) 
province I's votes for the Liberal Party during the provincial 
elections at time t. 
X11t.1 province I's votes for the Liberal Party during previous federal 
elections ( t -1) 
Xw a dummy variable equal one during the periods of the Liberal 
majority government and zero otherwise. 
Several statistical methods are designed to deal with cross section and 
time series data (Hsiao 1986). The first step in all of them is to estimate a 
simple OLS model. OLS estimates for pooled data are reported in Table 2.3. 
Both b1 and b2 coefficients are statistically significant at 0.01 levels. If we had no 
suspicion that some OLS assumptions may not hold in our data, this test would 
allow us to sustain the hypothesis that when in power, the party's vote in 
provincial elections declines. According to the pooled OLS estimates, when the 
Liberals were a federal majority governments, their losses in provinces 
amounted to 12.6 percentage points of the vote. 
In order to account for the time-series cross-sectional nature of the data 
in our sample and the influence of province specific factors (possibly captured 
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by the error term), we also apply the fixed effect method (Hsiao 1986). Our 
model then takes the form: 
(2) 
where 131 's are intercepts, different for each province /. 
·Again, we find that the party in government suffers electoral losses in 
subsequent provincial election. Predictably, the losses estimated by the fixed 
effect method are lower than the OLS estimate - 6.8 percentage points 
(see Table 2.3). 
To avoid yet another problem potentially present in the time-series cross-
sectional data, namely, a possibility of province-specific variance component,6 
consider again the specification (1 ), but now, instead of assuming that 130 is 
fixed for all provinces, assume that they are independent random variables with 
a mean 130 and variance a2-w 
Our initial model is now transformed into 
where 130 is a common intercept for.all observations and µ1's are 
11 random 11 
intercepts for each cross-sectional group of observations.7 
Notice that this model is unbalanced in the sense that there are N cross-
sectional units observed over varying periods T1 for I= 1, . . . N. The time-
6 Breusch-Pagan test shows that provincial differences in variances in our data 
are highly statistically significant. 
7 1t is easy to show,· that the variance-covariance matrix in (3) is not a scalar-
identity type, therefore, the assumptions of the OLS model are violated, and 
OLS is not an efficient estimator. Instead, we must use the Generalized Least 
Squares estimator, which takes into account the form of variance-covariance 
matrices Vand c/J (Vis a diagonal element of c/J): 13 = (X'(c/J"1X)" 1X'c/J-1y. 
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series for the ten provinces contain between 12 and 14 observations. Baltagi 
and Chang (1991) provide a comprehensive review of different ways to 
estimate the random effect unbalanced model. We use the estimator suggested 
in Searle (1971 ). 
As Table 2.3 shows, the random effect model also supports our 
hypothesis that when in power nationally, the Liberal party suffers electoral 
losses in provincial elections. Based on the unbalanced random effect model, 
we estimate that the Liberal Party loses 8.6 percentage points of electoral 
support in provinces when it controls the federal government. 
As Table 2.3 reports, all three statistical methods - OLS, fixed effect and 
unbalanced random effect - produce quite similar results and support our 
hypothesis that Canadian provincial elections perform a function of neutralizing 
the national incumbent. The Liberal Party suffers greater electoral losses 
provincial elections when it also controls the federal government. 
2.5.2 Provincial to Provincial Elections 
So far our evidence is that with the latest provincial vote in federal 
elections held constant, a national victory for the Liberals predicts a major loss 
of about 7-12 points in the next provincial election. This loss, however, 
represents the change from the federal election to the next provincial election. It 
is not difficult to believe that the size of this loss exaggerates the actual penalty 
for being the party in power in Ottawa. If the federal outcome is an abnormally 
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sized Liberal victory or defeat, then the following provincial outcome may 
partially reflect a return to 11normal, 11 or ordinary regression to the mean. We 
need to sort out the actual penalty for federal control from the typical ebb and 
flow of partisan change. 
Toward this end we report a second analysis, where again the provincial 
vote for the Liberal party is the dependent variable. The independent variables 
are the Liberals' percent of the vote in the prior provincial election, plus the 
usual dummy for federal control. The specification becomes: 
where: 
Y1t = 130 + 131 X111+132 X2i1 + e11, (1 a) 
province I's votes for the Liberal Party during the provincial 
elections at time t. 
X1it-t province I's vote for the Liberal Party during previous provincial 
election ( t-~ 
X2it a dummy variable equal one during the periods of the Liberal 
majority government and zero otherwise. 
We expect coefficient 132 to be negative, which would correspond to the 
decline of the Liberal Party support between two consecutive provincial 
elections during the time when it controls the federal government. Before we 
proceed with cross-section time-series analysis, in order to ensure that data 
demonstrate consistent patterns, we estimate equation (1 a) for every province 
separately. Statistical analysis conducted separately for each province has an 
obvious limitation due to the low number of available observations. 
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Nevertheless, for all provinces the sign of coefficients ~2 at the dummy variable 
(which indicates the periods of Liberal majority) is negative, as predicted though 
estimates are not always statistically significant (see Table 2.4). 
As before, when pooling data across provinces we apply three. statistical 
models - OLS, fixed effect and unbalanced random effect. All methods produce 
similar and statistically significant results supporting the balancing hypothesis. 
In the periods of Liberal government the Liberal Party's support declines 
between consecutive provincial elections by more than 4 percentage points. 
The findings for OLS, fixed effects, and 11unbalanced random effects 11 are shown 
in Table 2.5. 
Our estimate of the size of the balancing effect has de.clined some, as 
our test has changed from the federal-to-provincial vote shift to the 
provincial-to-provincial vote shift. We observe that the Liberals gain about 4 to 5 
percentage points more provincially when the Conservatives control the 
government in Ottawa. Unlike the equation with the federal vote on the right-
hand side, the new results are well-buttressed against the possibility of 
regression to the mean. Because the provincial vote and the lagged provincial 
vote straddle the federal contest, each is equally likely to reflect the normal 
voting pattern of the province. 
2.5.3 Changes Over Time 
In the next test, we evaluate the hypothesis that the magnitude of 
electoral losses for the federal incumbent was changing over. time. The 
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standard method is to assume that the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables changed after the certain period of time and to perform 
the test of structural changes. In our case, we divide observations into two more 
or less equal subsamples- before and after the 1974 federal elections. To 
perform the test we rerun our analysis for the Liberal party with two subsets of 
independent variables - one for 1949-197 4 and another subset for 197 4-1996. 
The standard F-test was used to estimate structural change. For models 1 , 2, 
3, 1 a, 2a and 3a we cannot reject the hypothesis that coefficients on 
independent variables are the same in the two periods. 
2.5.4 Liberal Vote Gain by Party Control 
The clearest and simplest demonstration of a party-in-power effect is to 
regress the mean vote change on the winning-federal_-party dummy alone. 
Table 2.6 presents some findings. As column 1 shows, a Liberal federal victory 
implies a relative 5.0 percentage points decline in the Liberal vote from the 
provincial contest immediately before the federal election to the provincial 
·contest immediately after. This repeats our central finding that being the ruling 
party means further electoral suffering at the provincial level. 
Column 2 shows an exaggerated 12.9 point loss to the federal winner 
from the federal contest to the provincial contest. To highlight the exaggerated 
nature of this federal to provincial loss, column 3 shows that the winning federal 
party gains 6.9 points from the prior provincial vote to the federal contest. 
Winning federally means generally gaining over the previous provincial vote. 
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But the gain is not as great as the subsequent loss. The difference between the 
12.9 loss and the 6.9 gain of course approximates the 5.0 coefficient from 
column 1 - the estimated effect of the federal outcome on the provincial vote 
before-after change. 
Again, we must ask: is this really evidence of "balancing?" One rival 
hypothesis is that in general - not just in provincial elections - being the 
governing party is a negative political baggage. By this rival notion, to govern is 
to increase the prospect of losing the next election, whether provincial or 
federal. If so, we would see a pattern whereby the Liberals' national vote in 
federal elections would be a negative function of being in power. But 
interestingly, the national vote in Canadian federal elections is not statistically 
related to either the prior federal vote or (dichotomously) whether the party 
currently controls the Ottawa government. And, though not statistically 
significant, the party-in-power dummy actually predicts the province's next 
federal vote with a positive sign when the latest provincial parliamentary vote is 
controlled. 
To see this, return to Table 2.6, and observe column 4. For the equation 
of this column, the dependent variable again is the Liberal vote gain from the 
provincial to the next federal el~ction. This time, unlike for column 3, the dummy 
variable reflects party control during the run-up to the federal election, not the 
federal election winner. Although not statistical ly significant, the 
party-in-power dummy actually predicts the province's next federal vote with a 
positive sign. The coefficient indicates Liberal control means a three point 
Mikhail G. Filippov Political Competition in Federations 75 
Liberal gain. In other words, the previous provincial outcome underestimates 
the governing party's vote strength in the next federal election. 
Thus, the political decline that the federal governing party suffers in the 
provinces is limited t~ the prov_incial contests alone. This is similar to the U.S. 
case where midterm loss for the presidential party does not translate into 
political trouble at the next presidential election. The argument is not that the 
ruling party is punished for its governance (that depends), but that the ruling 
party is punished specifically in the provincial elections. 
2.5.5 The Time-Series of Party Control 
We have estimated the effect of the intervening federal outcome on the 
provincial vote for the provincial parliament. One intuition is that we should see 
an effect not only of the federal outcome but also a special effect of change in 
the federal outcome -- from Conservative to Liberal and back again. Over the 
time period covered by the data there have been only six switches of federal 
power, one lasting but one year. If .we restrict our attention to just these cases 
by our usual methodologies, the signs of the effects remain the same but the 
magnitudes decline slightly and the coefficients fall short of statistical 
significance. 
One naive model is that provincial electorates give the 11 in" party a single 
punishment shock upon assuming power that continues until it loses power in 
Ottawa. Our evidence supports a different model. Once in control in Ottawa, a 
party begins a progressive decline in its provincial fortunes. This decline 
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continues even as the party wins successive federal elections. The party's 
provincial decline is reversed only when it loses control of Parliament in Ottawa, 
and a resurgence begins. 
To see this, we performed an interrupted time~series design on the 
provincial vote, 1949-1996. First, we residualized provincial vote outcomes by 
regressing them upon province dummies and taking the residuals as deviations 
from the provincial means. We regressed these residuals on the time in years, 
plus the number of years (starting with 1957) of cumulative Conservative 
control. The regression is: 
Residual Lib. Vote= 7.43 -0.98(T) + 2.53(CT) + e 
(t) (7.49) (6.83) 
N= 127; Adj. R squared = 0.301; S.E.E. = 7.48 
where T is years since 1949 and CT is cumulative years of Conservative 
control. 
The negative coefficient for time indicates that when the Liberals control 
Ottawa, the provincial vote declines over time. The positive (and highly 
significant) coefficient for conservative control indicates that for every additional 
year of conservative control, the Liberal vote improves over the baseline decline 
under Liberal control. The positive coefficient for conservative control is higher 
in absolute magnitude than the negative coefficient for time. The positive 
differential indicates that the Liberals gain provincially during episodes of 
Conservative control. 
The see-saw line in Figure 2.3 reflects the prediction from the equation 
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predicting the residual vote from time and cumulative control. Each switch in 
control reverses the direction of the provincial trend. Most recently, the 1993 
Liberal victory has been followed by declining Liberal fortunes. 
2.5.6 Who Gains Votes? 
The next step in our analysis is to identify parties which relatively gain in 
provincial elections when the Liberal party controlled the federal government. 
By polling data for all provinces we estimate that during periods of the Liberal 
federal incumbency the Conservative party on average gains between 6.6 and 
3.4 percentage points (with t-statistics 2.7 and 2.2), controlling correspondently 
for the results previous of federal and provincial elections and including 
provincial dummy variables. However, the polled analysis conceals significant 
differences between different regions of Canada. For the western provinces 
alone the conservative gains are estimated to be lower and statistically 
insignificant - the federal control dummy variable coefficients are only 4.6 and 
1.9'( with t-statistics 1.3 and 0.8). On the other hand, in the eastern provinces 
the two models estimate the conservative party gains being between 7.4 and 
5.8 points (with t-statistics equal to 3.0 and 2.9). Recall, that for Quebec alone, 
based on 12 observations we found electoral losses of the Liberal party are 
between 7.6 and 8.9 points and statistically significant. However, the 
Conservative party did not directly compete in Quebec provincial elections 
until the 60s, but instead cooperated with Quebec based party Union Nationale. 
Moreover, in the 70s the electoral fortune of the Conservative party in Quebec 
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provincial elections sharply declined with the success of Parti Quebecois. 
Counting vote for Union Nationals as the vote for the Conservatives, we 
estimated their gains to be statistically insignificant. However, we also found 
that between 1970-1993 in provincial elections Parti Quebecois .gaifled extra 
8.8 points compared with the results of the previous elections in the periods of 
the Liberal federal control (with t-statistic equal to 2.2). 
We also found that in the east provinces the New Democratic Party 
suffered certain electoral losses (3.1 and 2.8 points) compared with the 
previous federal and previous provincial elections during the periods of the 
Liberal Party federal incumbency (t statistics equal to -3.1 and -2.7 
correspondently). The New Democratic Party also suffered certain losses in 
Ontario, but its estimator is not statistically significant. These observations 
suggest that two parties - the Liberal party and the New Democratic Party jointly 
suffer electoral losses in provincial elections during periods of the Liberal 
federal incumbency. In other words, the two national parties on the left from the 
center could suffer losses in provincial elections to parties on the right from the 
center when the Liberal party controlled the federal government. In order to test 
for such a possibility we, estimate equation (1 a) for the combined vote for the 
Liberal Party and the New Democratic Party and found that coefficient of the 
dummy variable is negative for all provinces, but Manitoba. More specifically, 
the magnitude of the losses is estimated to be 6.4 points (t=-1.8) for 
Newfoundland, 2.5 points (t=-0.7) for P.E.I., 4.2 points (t=-1.1) for Nova Scotia, 
8.9 points (t=-2.4) for New Brunswick, 9.6 points (t=-2.9) for Quebec, 8.9 points 
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(t=-2.5) for Ontario, 1.5 points of gains (t=0.7) for Manitoba, 5.1 points (t=-0.4) 
for Saskatchewan, 9 points (t=-1.1) for Alberta and 11 points (t=-2.1) for British 
Columbia. When we polled data for eastern and western provinces separately, 
we found no differences between two regions: dummy variable coefficients are 
- 5.0 (t=-2.8) for the eastern provinces and -5.2 (t=-2.1) for the western 
provinces (controlling for the fixed effects). And when we polled all provinces 
together, controlling for the fixed effects, we obtained the estimate of the 
dummy variable coefficient -5.1 (t=3.5)8• 
2.6 The Case of Germany 
In the following section we apply the approach used above in application 
to the case of Canada to compare the results of German federal and Lander 
elections. The fact of electoral losses in Land elections has been well 
documented by German scholars (Dinkel 1977; Fabritius 1978, for review of 
these studies in English see Gabriel 1989). According to the German scholars, 
"elections in the Lander serve increasingly as 'midterm' elections in national 
politics" (Gabriel 1989). It has been argued that all major transfers of power at 
the national level since 1949 have in fact been anticipated by developments in 
land-level politics (Conradt 1993). Political parties and media treat Lander 
8As before, the first model - the comparison with the results of the previous 
federal elections - produces higher estimates of the losses for the two parties, 
with no apparent geographical pattern. When run for each province separately, 
the coefficient of the dummy variable is negative for all provinces, but 
Saskatchewan. 
9 A German state is called a Land; the plural form is Lander. 
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elections as if they are very important by-elections for the federal parliament 
(Scharpf 1995). For example, the resignation of Willy Brandt in 1974 was 
related to poor SPD showings in Lander elections after 1972. The collapse of 
the Schmidt government in 1982 was preceded by losses in Lander elections. 
Conradt (1993) suggested that the volatility of party support in Lander elections 
is largely the result of campaign strategies adopted by parties, which have 
increasingly used Lander polls as tests of current support for national policies. 
Recently, Lohmann, Brady and Rivers (1997) compared several 
alternative hypothesis explaining the Land elections vote decline (party 
identification, retrospective voting, and moderating elections), and their study 
found that the data on federal and provincial elections between 1960 and 1989 
are consistent with all three alternatives. Below we analyze federal and Land 
electoral results between 1949 and 1994 by the same techniques that we used 
to analyze the Canadian data, in order to compare German electoral dynamics 
with the results obtained with regard to Canadian elections. 
The German federal system is traditionally described as an example of 
intrastate, cooperative, and consensual federal policy interactions and 
implementations. While nominally Uinder10 possess only limited jurisdictions in 
sphere of law and order, local government and cultural affairs, they are 
responsible for and effectively control the implementation in broad areas of 
federal policy ("joint tasks") on their territory. In other words, the German federal 
system concentrates legislative powers in the hands of the federal offices, 
10 There were 11 Lander until unification and 16 after. 
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leaving most administration and implementation functions to the Lander. 
While the first chamber of the federal parliament, the Bundestag, is 
directly elected in nation-wide elections, the composition of Bundesrat, the 
federal chamber of th.e parliament is not directly elected but controlled by the 
Lander' governments.11 Bundesrat has a veto power over legislation that affects 
the Lander.12 The Lander also play important role in elections of the president of 
the Federal Republic and in selecting the members of the federal constitutional 
court. In effect, national policy in Germany does require the simultaneous 
agreement of both a parliamentary majority supporting the federal government 
and a majority of votes of state governments (Scharpf 1995).13 The national 
government must promote and actually achieve a certain political consensus to 
implement federal policy.14 One consequence attributed to this fact is a certain 
lack of political innovation (Gabriel 1989), as political innovations can be 
expected only if an innovation-oriented federal government can exercise control 
110nly Land cabi_net members may serve as Bundesrat members (article 51 of 
the Basic Law). 
The Basic Law distinguishes between two types of legislation: consent bills and 
objection bills. No consent bill can be promulgated without the agreement of a 
majority of the Bundesrat. In this category fall constitutional amendments, 
legislation affecting state revenues and taxes, and the Lander's administrative 
capacity and sovereignty. Consent bills currently cover more than 50% of all 
legislation. For all non-consent bills, the Bundesrat's approval is not required; 
however, the Bundesrat has the right to raise an objection which can be 
overridden by a corresponding absolute majority in the Bundestag. 
Each Land votes as a block and the number of votes each Land possesses 
varies with population. The Basic Law guarantees each Land a minimum of 3 
votes and before unification votes per Land ranges from 3 to 5, after unification 
- between 3 and 6. 
14 Thus, in 1992 the Lander agreed to ratify Maastricht Treaty only after the 
federal government agreed to institutionalize and legalize procedures of their 
participation in EC making. 
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over policy implementation. 
During the first two decades in West Germany the parties controlling the 
federal government usually had a majority in Bundesrat. However, after 1969 
elections the social-liberal coalition government of Willy Brandt confronted 
Bundesrat in which land governments controlled by the federal oppositional 
parties had a majority. Opposition found it increasingly attractive to use its 
blocking majority in the Bundesrat on a wide variety of issues, and federal-land 
relations became highly politicized. They remained so, even after 1982, when 
the Christian-liberal coalition government again had the support of a majority in 
the Bundesrat, and especially when the social-democratic majority took control 
over the second chamber. Sometimes, under conditions of divided control it 
was necessary to 'bribe' opposition Lander to achieve the national policy 
objectives (Scharpf 1995). 
Mutual dependence of federal and Lander governments in policy 
selection and implementation forces local politicians, when they want to oppose 
federal policy or the way it is administered, to direct their criticism to their Land 
government, rather than to the federal government (Ordeshook 1996). 
Changing the composition of Lander governments could effectively modify 
policy. For example, federal nuclear energy policy was actively opposed by 
several "pro-green" Land governments at the state of implementation. 
With the exception of Bavaria, all Lander have unicameral legislatures 
with an executive responsible to it. Similarly to the federal government, coalition 
governments have been common in Lander. 
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As in the case of Canada, the hypothesis we test is that the federal 
parties suffer additional electoral losses when they control the federal 
government. We compare electoral returns of federal and Lander elections in 
Germany between 1946 and 1995 controlling for the federal incumbent party. 
During this period, 13 federal and 142 Lander elections were held. Again, for 
the purpose of testing the hypothesis, we identify those Lander elections that 
follow a federal election (fall in between the two federal elections). As a result, 
our data set includes 126 observations - from 12 to 15 observations per Land. 
2.6.1 Federal to Federal Elections 
In order to test our balance hypothesis, we combine cross section and 
time series data on electoral results in 1 O German Lander during federal and 
Lander elections between 1949 and 1995. Our dependent variable is defined as 
the percent of voters supporting the Christian Democratic Union (Christian 
Social Union) in Land I during the sub-national election at time t. The first · 
independent variable is the percent of voters supporting the CDU/CSU in the 
same Land during the preceding federal elections. The second independent 
variable is a dummy variable indicating periods of the CDU/CSU control in 
Bonn. The two independent variables taken together are supposed to be able to 
predict the magnitude of 'balancing', reflected in the independent variable. 
In accordance with our hypothesis, we assume that the CDU/CSU vote 
share in Land elections is positively correlated with the CDU/CSU vote in the 
same Land in federal elections but declines at the time of the CDU/CSU 
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Government, and our statistical specification becomes: 
where: 
(la) 
Land i's votes for the CDU/CSU the during the Land 
elections at time t. 
Land i's votes for the CDU/CSU during previous federal 
elections ( t -1). 
a dummy variable equal to one during the periods of the 
CDU/CSU governments and zero otherwise. 
Before we proceed with cross section, time-series analysis, in order to 
ensure that data demonstrate consistent pattern over time, we estimate 
equation (1) for every Land separately. Statistical analysis conducted separately 
for each province has an obvious limitation due to the low number of available 
observations. Nevertheless, for eight provinces the sign of coefficients at the 
dummy variable 132 (which indicates the periods of the CDU/CSU majority) is 
negative, as predicted and estimates are statistically significant in most cases 
(see Table 2.7). 
OLS results pooled data for federal and Land elections are reported in 
Table 2.9. Both 131 and 132 coefficients are statistically significant at 0.001 levels. 
According to the pooled OLS estimates when the CDU/CSU controlled majority 
governments, their losses in Lander amounted to 7.4 percentage points of the 
vote. 
In order to account for the time-series cross-sectional nature of the data 
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in our sample and the possibility of province specific factors unknown to us 
(captured by the error term) influencing provincial vote, we also apply the fixed 
effect technique where we assume that the factors which influence the 
relationship between the variables, but which are unknown (captured by the 
error term), are unique and constant for each cross-sectional unit. Our model 
then takes the form: 
(2) 
where (3i 1s are intercepts, different for each province i. 
Once again, we find that the party in government suffers electoral losses 
in subsequent Land election. Similarly to the case of Canada, we also report a 
second analysis, where again the Land vote for the CDU/CSU is the dependent 
variable but the independent variables are the CDU/CSU 1 percent of the vote in 
the prior Land election, plus the usual dummy for federal control. We expect 
coefficient (32 of the dummy variable be negative, which would correspond to the 
decline of the CDU/CSU support between two consecutive Land elections 
during the time when it controls the federal government. We again apply two 
statistical models - OLS and 'fixed effect.' All methods produce similar and 
statistically significant results supporting our hypothesis. Similarly to the 
Canadian case, we find evidence in support of the balancing effect, while our 
estimate of the size of the balancing effect has declined some, as our test has 
changed from the federal-to-Land vote shift to the Land-to-Land vote shift. We 
observe that the CDU/CSU gain about 4 to 5 percentage points more sub-
nationally when the SOU controls the government in Bonn. Equations for 
Chapter 2 Ideological Balancing in Elections . . . 86 
individual Lander are reported in Table 2.8. The findings for OLS and fixed 
effects are shown in Table 2.10. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The primary objective of this study was to conceptualize and evaluate on 
the basis of electoral data the balancing properties of provincial elections in 
Canada. We can now conclude that in Canada, like in other federal countries 
studied elsewhere (e.g., the USA and Germany), voters can balance and 
moderate the policy of national government by rejecting the party which is in 
power nationally the control over provincial governments. We find a very close 
relationship between the preceding national election and the subsequent 
provincial elections. Several statistical tests confirm that the incumbent party at 
the federal level loses votes in provincial elections. T_his result closely 
corresponds to the prediction of the "balancing" election model when adjusted 
to the specifics of Canadian political institutional environment. While in Erikson 
(1988, 1990) and Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) the balancing argument in ·the 
US context is made with respect to the executive-legislative policy interaction, in 
Canada these are the multiple orders of governments that can be shown to 
interact in the policy development, which in the non-concurrent system of 
elections is reflected in the cyclic patterns of federal-provincial voting. 
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Tables: 
Table 2.1. The Change in Vote for the Liberal Party Between Elections, 
by Province 
II 
Change in Vote between Change in Vote between 
Provincial and Previous Provincial and Previous 
92 











Newfoundland 1.7 -7.8** 1.7 -4.3 14 
P. E. Island 9.5** -4.2 2.3 -2.1 12 
Nova Scotia 2.8 -2.4 2.7 -4.7 13 
New Brunswick 13.3** -14.8** 4.3 -6.4 12 
Quebec 15.8* * -23.6* 3.9 -4.8 12 
Ontario 5.7* -19.6** 0.6 -0.6 13 
Manitoba 3.6 -16.1 ** 3.0 -6.4 14 
Saskatchewan 3.3 -2.3 7.1 -8.9 12 
Alberta 6.6* -22.0** 5.1 -5.0 12 
British Columbia 2.3 -18.0** 9.9** -11.0** 13 
Eastern Provinces 5.8** -6.3** 3.5* -4.1 ** 51 
Western Provinces 4.3* -15.6** 4.58** -5.8** 64 
All Provinces 6.0** -12.8** 3.7** -5.0** 127 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05 two-tail test. 
Note: Data are from the years 1949-96. The dependent variable is the 
change in the Liberal Party vote between provincial elections and the 
previous federal elections (column I) and between provincial elections 
and the previous provincial elections (column II) in percents. 
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Table 2.2 The Vote for the Liberal Party in Provincial Elections, 
by Province 
Provincial Vote for Dummy, 
Province Intercept the Liberal Party in indicated Number of 
previous Federal Liberal observations 
Elections Government 
Newfoundland 2.5 0.98** -7.72** 14 
Prince Edward Island 33.86** 0.42 -2.08 12 
Nova Scotia 25.3* 0.43 0.11 13 
New Brunswick 69.3* -0.39 -1.96 12 
Quebec 54.4* * -0.02 -7.76* 12 
Ontario 57.8* -0.59* -1.40 13 
Manitoba 7.7 0.84** -14.3** 14 
Saskatchewan 17.8 0.26 6.45 12 
Alberta 21.6* 0.12 -12.6 12 
British Columbia 14.9 0.30 -7.47 13 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05 
Note: Data are from the years 1949-96. The dependent variable is the Liberal Party 
vote in provincial elections (percent). 
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Table 2.3. The Vote for the Liberal Party in Provincial Elections 
pooled 127 observations 
Model 
Pooled OLS Fixed Effect Unbalanced 
Analysis Method Random 
Effect 
Method 
Equation (1) Equation (2) Equation (3) 
Intercept 3.79** Multiple 21.7** 
(2.3) (4.8) 
Provincial Vote for the Liberal 0.96** 0.39** 0.56** 
Party in Previous Federal (11.4) (3.3) (5.1) 
Elections 
Dummy variable equal 1 if -12.6** -6.84** -8.57** 
period of the Liberal (-5.7) (-3.2) (-4.2) 
Government 
Corrected R-square 0.51 0.68 N/A 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
Note: t-values are in parentheses. Data are from the years 1949-96. The 
dependent variable is the Liberal Party vote in provincial elections (percent). 
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Table 2.4. The Vote for the Liberal Party in Provincial Elections, 
by Province 
Province Intercept Provincial Vote for Dummy, Number 
95 
of 
the Liberal Party in indicated observations 
previous Provincial Liberal 
Elections Government 
Newfoundland 11.0 0.80** -3.1 14 
Prince Edward Island 35.5* 0.33 -1.1 12 
Nova Scotia 10.6 0.69** -1.9 13 
New Brunswick 61.3** -0.16 -5.4 12 
Quebec 64.7** -0.23 -8.9** 12 
Ontario 46.5** -0.21 -7.6** 13 
Manitoba 10.9 0.70** -6.0 14 
Saskatchewan 9.3 0.85** -5.93 12 
Alberta 16.7** 0.38 -6.2 12 
British Columbia 11.4 0.66* -7.2 13 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05 
Note: Data are from the years 1949-96. The dependent variable is the 
Liberal Party vote in provincial elections (percent). 
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Table 2.5. The Vote for the Liberal Party in Provincial Elections, 
Pooled 127 Observations 
Model 
96 
Pooled OLS Fixed Effect Unbalanced 
Analysis Method Random 
Effect 
Method 
Intercept 8.11 ** Multiple 8.92** 
(4.5) (4.5) 
Provincial Vote for the Liberal 0.87** 0.67** 0.85** 
Party in Previous Provincial (21.4) (8.9) (18.9) 
Elections 
Dummy variable equal 1 if -4.79** -4.37** -4.78** 
period of the Liberal (-3.5) (-3.2) (-3.5) 
Government 
Corrected R-square 0.79 0.79 N/A 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
Note: t-values.are in parentheses. Data are from the years 1949-96. The 
dependent variable is the Liberal Party vote in provincial elections (percent). 







Table 2.6. Liberal Vote Gain (Various Measures) 
by Party Control of Federal Government 
(1) (2) (3) 
Provincial Provincial Federal 
Election Vote Election Vote Election Vote 
Minus Prior Minus Prior Minus Lagged 
Provincial Federal Prior Provincial 
Election Vote Election Vote Election Vote 
3.7 6.2 -2.8 
(3.1 )** (3.6)** (-1.6) 
-5.0 12.9 6.9a 
(-3.5) (-6.2)** (3.1 )** 
.083 .238 .078 
127 127 104 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 













a. This shows 6.9 point Liberal provincial-to-federal gain in elections where the Liberals win 
the federal election. 
b. This shows 3.2 point Liberal provincial-to-federal gain in elections where the Liberals enter 
· in federal control. 
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Table 2.7. The Vote for the CDU/CSU in Lander Elections, 
by Land 
Lander Vote for Dummy, 
Land Intercept the CDU/CSU in Indicated Number 
98 
of 
Previous Federal CDU/CSU Observations 
Elections Government 
Baden 31.7 0.44 -8.5** 12 
Bavaria 7.9 0.9 -7.6** 12 
Bremen -6.0 1.2 -3.6 13 
Hamburg 49.7 -0.33 -4.2 13 
Hesse 2.7 1.0 -8.5** 13 
Lower Saxony 20.8 0.64 -10.0** 12 
North Rhine- 14.8 0.71 -5.9** 13 
Westphalia 
Rhineland-Palatinate 40.1 0.23 -5.6* 12 
Saari and 45.3 0.04 -9.3** 11 
Schleswig-Holstein 6.2 0.99 -9.4* 13 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05 . 
Note: Data are from the years 1949-95. The dependent variable is the 
CDU/CSU vote in Lander elections (percent). 
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Table 2.8. The Vote for the CDU/CSU in Lander Elections, 
by Land 
Lander Vote for Dummy, 
Land Intercept the CDU/CSU in Indicated Number of 
Previous Land CDU/CSU Observations 
Elections Government 
Baden 34.3 0.39 -6.8** 11 
Bavaria 33.7 0.46 -8.5 12 
Bremen 15.2 0.54 -3.1 13 
Hamburg 13.1 0.72 -5.5* 12 
Hesse 21.4 0.58 -8.6** 13 
Lower Saxony 19.1 0.63 -5.6** 12 
North Rhine- 25.5 0.44 -3.2 13 
Westphalia 
Rhineland-Palatinate 39.5 0.24 -4.7 12 
Saari and 49.4 -0.05 -9.8** 11 
Schleswig-Holstein 21.7 0.58 -5.1 13 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05 
Note: Data are from the years 1949-95. The dependent variable is the 
· CDU/CSU vote i·n Lander elections (percent). 
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Table 2.9. The Vote for the CDU/CSU in Lander Elections 
pooled 124 observations 
Intercept 
Lander Vote for the 
CDU/CSU in Previous 
Federal Elections 
Model· 
Pooled OLS Fixed Effect 
Analysis Method 






Dummy variable equal 1 if 






Corrected R-square 0.75 0.75 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
Note: t-values are in parentheses. Data are from the years 1949-95. 
The dependent variable is the CDU/CSU vote in Lander elections 
(percent). 
Mikhail G. Filippov Political Competition in Federations 101 
Table 2.10. The Vote for the CDU/CSU in Lander Elections, 
Pooled 122 Observations 
Model 
Pooled OLS Fixed Effect 
Analysis Method 
Equation (1) Equation (2) 
Intercept 13.9** Multiple 
(5.7) 
Lander Vote for the 0.74** 0.52** 
CDU/CSU in Previous (14.8) (7.7) 
Federal Elections 
Dummy variable equal 1 if -4.2** -5.7** 
period of the CDU/CSU (-3.7) (-5.0) 
Government 
Corrected A-square 0.70 0.73 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
Note: t-values are in parentheses. Data are from the years 1949-95. 
The dependent variable is the CDU/CSU vote in Lander elections 
(percent). 
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Figu~e 2.2. Provincial Vote for the Liberal Party in Provincial and Federal 
Elections during Liberal and Conservative Governments. 
Note: Zeros indicate years of Conservative government; ones indicate years of 
Liberal government. 
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Appendix: A Model of "Balancing" Elections in a Three-Party Contest 
By applying the logic parallel to that in section 2.4, it is easy to show that in 
a three party ·contest out-off center parties can suffer greater vote losses in 
provincial elections when they also win nationally. But the three-party balancing 
model results in less clear-cut conclusions about the dynamics of the vote of the 
centrist party. Much depends on the relative strengths of different parties in policy 
balancing and distribution of voters preferences. Thus, the results that we show 
here are conditional on certain combinations of parameter values and are to be 
viewed as illustrations of what is possible in terms of the interelectional vote 
dynamics, rather as predictions of what in fact is going to happen to the centrist 
party in any provincial election with a three party electoral system. It is the 
statistical test in the essay above that tells us which out of many possibilities 
materialize. Here our purpose is to show that the centrist incumbent's vote loss 
due to intergovernmental policy balancing is rationalizable in a three-party 
competition, as well as it is in a two-party contest. 
Once again, provincial voters sequentially vote for two governments - first, 
federal, and then provincial, where the choice in federal and provincial elections 
is out of three parties - D, L, and C. Party Lis located between D and C. Party 
platforms, as well as voters' ideals points, are located in a one-dimensional left-to-
right policy space, and voters derive higher utilities from policy outcomes nearer 
their ideal points. We assume that party platforms and the distribution of voters' 
ideal points in a province remains unchanged between federal and provincial 
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elections, but that the outcome of federal elections may change over time as many 
other provinces participate in federal elections. A party that wins an election 
unilaterally forms the government of that order, and its policy platform becomes the 
policy position of such a government. Finally implemented policy, however, is a 
weighed combination of the policies of federal and provincial governments. Parties 
L and C balance each other's policy in a symmetric way: when one controls the 
federal and another, the provincial government, the weight of the provincial 
incumbent in determining policy is J3. The third party, party D's ideal point enters 
the final policy equation with the weight of a, different from the corresponding 
weights of the two major parties. We want to show that it is possible that when L 
is victorious nationally, its vote shrinks relatively more in the following provincial 
election. 
First, consider the case when L wins nationally and voters choose between 
D, L and C in provincial elections to balance the policy. When L controls the 
federal government, Cs provincial government can deliver the balanced policy of 
the divided gover~men.t, L, GP = f3C + (1- /3)L. A cutpoint separating voters 
supporting the policy of unified L's control, L,LP, and those who prefer the policy 
of divided government L,CP is /3C+(1-/3)L+L = /3C+L(2-/3). On the other hand, 
2 2 
when L controls the federal government, the third party positioned to the left to the 
center, party D can propose the balanced policy L,DP = aD + (1- a)L with a cut-
point between the two policies of 
aD+(l-a)L+L _ aD+L(2-a) 
2 2 
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Therefore, if policy balancing takes place, the vote for the centrist party L 
equals 
F(/3C + L(2- /3))- F(aD + L(2-a))· 
2 2 
Alternatively, when party C controls the federal government, L offers the 
balanced policy C,LP = f3L + (1- {3)C, with a cutpoint between the supporters of 
party Land party Cat /3L+C(2-/3). While provincial victory of party Din this 
2 
case would lead to the balanced policy C,DP = aD + (1- a)C = a(D - C) + c , 
with a cut-point between party D and party L's voters at 
/3 (L - C) + c + a(D - C) + c . Therefore, L's provincial vote is: 
2 
F(/3L+ C(2- /3))- F(/3L+ C(2- /3)-a(C-D)). 
2 2 
The balancing will lead to the centrist incumbent's vote losses in provincial 
elections if: 
H'( /3C + L(2- /3))- F(aD + L(2-a)) < F(/3L+ C(2- /3))- F(/3L + C(2- /3)-a(C-D), 
2 2 2 2 , 
For example, for a uniform distribution of voters' ideal points, party L's 
vote in provincial elections declines due to its federal incumbency if 
/3(C-L) a(C-L) "'----""""-< . 
2 2 
As we assumed that party C is to the right from L, the above holds when a > f3 . 
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In application to Canada, the condition a > f3 means that the third party on the 
left, presumably, the New Democratic Party, can change the final policy in 
application to the province in a more radical way than any of the parties rotating 
in the national government. Notice, that this account of electoral losses for the 
centrist party in a three party-competition can be immediately extended to the 
case of multi-party competition by placing more additional parties on the 
extreme left or extreme right. 
CHAPTER 3. LONG-TERM CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATIONAL 
DETERMINANTS OF ALLOCATION OF FEDERAL FUNDS 
TO STATES: THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES 
3.1 Joint Unit-Center Bargaining Hypothesis in Application to the· 
American Case. 
3.1.1 The Hypothesis 
The spatial distribution of federal funds in the view of most political 
scientists is driven by the distribution of power within Congress among various 
state delegations and individuals. It has been argued that states with better 
institutional representation have an advantage in obtaining federal funds (Arnold 
1979). The impact of short-term advantages of institutional representation, such 
as the benefits associated with committee assignments, seniority, and leadership 
positions has been extensively analyzed (see Rundquist, Lee and Luor 1995; 
Stein and Bickers 1995). Much less attention has been paid to the broader and 
more long-term impact of representational differences. For instance, larger states 
may benefit from being represented by more numerous congressional 
delegations (Browning 1973). At the same time, as Arnold (1981) argues, smaller 
states have the advantage of being disproportionately represented in the Senate. 
In this chapter we analyze the empirical validity of Arnold's hypothesis and 
estimate the long-term benefits to smaller states in the distribution of federal funds. 
Our hypothesis in application to American federal organization is that states' 
representatives in the legislature interact with the nationally elected executive 
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center jointly. This institutional restriction makes the outcome of the congressional 
process the only possible request the 'center' can consider. Consequently, 
bargaining outcomes for states should be related to their bargaining weight in the 
legislature, with over-represented states favored in the reco'urse allocation. 
The number of congressmen and senators per million of state population 
is taken as a proxy for the long-term advantage of smaller states in legislative 
representation. We begin by showing that between 1966 and 1990 smaller states, 
indeed, consistently obtained greater per capita amounts of federal funds. 
Moreover, as the major portion of federal funds is distributed on the basis of 
congressionally approved allocation formulae, it is important to note that the 
formulae of the largest grants are based on criteria that favor smaller states. 
However, diagnostics indicates that a simple statistical analysis of the institutional 
determinants of the per capita distribution of federal funds to the states alone may 
produce unreliable results (see Appendix, Table 3.5, and also Uslaner 1976). In 
order to strengthen our conclusion against such a possibility, we also demonstrate 
a bias in favor of smaller states by comparing proportions of state budgets coming 
from federal money. We introduce and test a hypothesis that better represented 
states tend to obtain a greater proportion of their total revenue from the federal 
governmental sources. We find the analysis of states' revenue data for the period 
between 1966 and 1990 strongly supportive of this hypothesis. 
3.1.2 The Significance of Federal Transfers in the Well-Being of American 
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States 
Federal or central governments make transfers to governments of sub-
national level9 to assist them in funding their activities in many countries. For 
example, in Australia in the late BO's federal transfers to the states formed nearly 
50 percent of the states' total revenues; in Germany, Canada, Switzerland, and 
· Austria similar transfers constituted respectively about 16, 21, 27, and 28 percent 
of states' budgets (Costello 1993).1 In the United States, if estimated by 
comparable methods, federal transfers currently constitute about 20 percent of 
state revenues. 
The number of federal grants in the US started growing in the mid-60s, after 
Lyndon Johnson and the large Democratic majorities of the Eighty-ninth Congress 
(1965-66) increased grants-in-aid to states and communities in health, housing, 
manpower training, education, urban planning, and many other fields. In just two 
years the number of separate grant-in-aid authorizations increased from 221 to 
379.2 In 1973 the number of such programs neared 500, and reached a hi.gh of 
. 593 in 1993. However, one has to be careful interpreting these numbers. The 
ACIR compilation shows that in 1993 approximately 546 of the 593 grants were 
"micro programs," which, combined, received only about 10 percent of all federal 
1 Local governments in unitary countries are even more reliant on central 
governmental grants as a source of finance, comprising 50 to 60 percent of 
their total revenues. 
2U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Characteristics of 
Federal Grant-in-Aid Programs to State and Local Governments: Grants 
Funded FY 1993, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994, 
p.14. 
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aid dollars. Expenditures for federal grants were $8.3 billion ($44 per capita) in 
1963, $43.1 billion ($204 per capita) in 1973, and 166.9 billion ($647 per capita) 
in 1993. Medicaid, which has been the single fastest growing grant program, 
accounted for nearly 40 percent of total federal intergovernmental outlays in 1993, 
compared with 28.3 percent in 1989 and 14.0 percent in 1975. When highway 
programs and AFDC are added in, over half of all federal outlays to states and 
localities are accounted for. If these programs are not included, the growth rates 
for the remainder of federal domestic aid has not kept pace with inflation. 
Financial importance of federal funds for state b.udgets dramatically 
increased in the late 19501s. In 1955 federal grants accounted for 21 percent of all 
American states' revenues, and by 31 percent in 1960.3 For FY 1966-90, 48 
continental states received between 14.5 and 47.5 percent of their revenues from 
the federal government, with averages of 27.7 in 1966, 29.3 in 1976, and 23.8 in 
1990.4 
3.2 Previous Research on the Short-Term Distributional Benefits of Over-
representation 
3Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant 
Features of Fiscal Federalism, 1982-83 Edition (Washington: The Commission, 
1984), pp.120-121. 
4 The above averages are calculated as average unweighed proportions across 
states. Combined revenue from federal government constituted 25 percent in 
1966 FY (27.6 in 1976 FY, and 23 in 1990 FY) of the combined total revenue of 
the 48 continental states. 
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3.2.1 The 'Supply Side' Argument 
Most of the empirical work on variations in the distribution of federal grants 
to states (and federal spending more generally) has emphasized what Stein (1981) 
and Berch (1992) refer to as the political 'supply side.'. The hypothesis is based on 
both popular belief and formal theoretical argument, and stipulates that the spatial 
allocation of federal funds reflects the distribution of power within Congress among 
various state delegations and individual congressmen. Numerous studies test a 
version of the same hypothesis, namely, that the politically better-positioned 
members of Congress bring relatively more federal benefits to their states and 
congressional districts. This group of studies addresses the roles of committee 
membership (Ferejohn 197 4; Ritt 1976; Ray 1980; Anton 1989; Rundquist, Lee 
and Luor 1995), partisanship (Ferejohn 1974; Ritt 1976) and Thompson and 
Moncrief (1988) - at the state level, and seniority (Ferejohn 1974; Ritt 1976). Most 
studies find little connection between these characteristics and the distribution of 
federal aid. Moreover, almost all reports that find support for the 'supply side' 
hypothesis are based on the analysis of programs for which the Congress makes 
distributional decisions directly (as is the case with most formula-based grant 
programs).5 One of the major problems with the previous studies of formula-based 
5 Perhaps only one study of programs for which allocating authority is delegated 
to the bureaucracy (as in the case of project grants) unequivocally supports the 
conclusion that overseeing agency congressmen benefit from their committee 
membership. Plott (1968) shows, using expected-value analysis, that districts of 
members of the House Banking and Currency Committee have received twice 
the amount of urban renewal expenditures as one would expect, based on 
average levels of urban renewal nationwide. In particular, this study found that 
in 1964, while committee members comprised only 7.1 percent of the House, 
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grant allocations is that they usually ignore the properties of actual formal 
mechanisms employed by Congress to distribute these grants. In particular, most 
studies ignore the fact that allocation criteria tend to be stable over time. Once 
formulae are applied and federal projects are allocated to districts and states, the 
prolonged periods of steady flow of federal spending follow. Archer (1978) 
investigates the extent of incrementalism in federal allocations to states by fitting 
the simple model: an expenditure in a particular year as a function of the 
expenditure in the previous year. The coefficient of correlation exceeds .99 for all 
of his 15 assessments (in the fifteenth it was .976). Johnston (1980) compares 
spending in each of the states for 31 major federal programs between 1972, 197 4, 
and 1976, and in most cases finds correlation greater than .9. The overwhelming 
pattern, then, is the one of continuity in the spatial structure of federal spending. 
Ignoring this fact, most existing empirical studies analyze short cross sections 
(one or two fiscal years) and ignore the effect of incrementalism. The failure to 
recognize the differences between the allocation base and the increment also 
leads to model misspecifications, when most studies overlook the possibility that 
the previous distribution of federal funds or factors that caused it could have 
mandated the pattern of committee assignments. Testing this possibility, Ray 
(1977) was able to predict between 75 and 93 percent of freshman assignment 
requests to six House committees in the Ninety-second, Ninety-third and Ninety-
fourth Congresses on the basis of geographic distribution of federal spending in 
their districts received 25.2 percent of the URA's expenditures. 
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each committee•s area of jurisdiction and controlling for electoral insecurity and the 
existing committee representation of each freshman•s state party delegation. 
One way of dealing with these problems is to consider changes in the levels 
of spending as an institutionally influenced dependent variable. Several studies · 
examine the distribution of increments in federal spending rather than its absolute 
current levels (Rundquist and Griffith 197 4, 1976; Cook 1976; Ray 1976, 1980; 
Johnston 1980 and Berch 1992). The mostly negative results obtained in these 
studies probably reflect the fact that consistently greater increases in federal 
spending in some states or districts cannot be sustained for prolonged periods of 
time without producing visible biases in the overall allocation of funds. Others 
consider the allocation of new programs, ignoring the old ones (Ferejohn 197 4; 
Alvarez and Saving 1995). This approach, however, is strictly short-term, in that 
it does not consider the overall balance of 11new11 and 11old 11 programs in the total 
level of spending. For example, it is possible that new programs may be merely 
replacing the old ones. Analysis of new federal programs may be telling us how. 
new programs (or new names for them) are introduced, rather than how federal 
money is distributed. In addition, as information about new programs is not 
available immediately to all potential recipients, that fact alone may create a 
temporary bias in favor of some more active states or districts. 
3.2.2 The 'Demand Side' Considerations 
Another direction in the literature is to focus on a single-committee 
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jurisdiction or even a specific program. First of all, such an approach ignores the 
possibility of inter-committee logrolling and bargaining. Taking logrolling into 
account, congressional influence must be related to the total package of benefits 
received by states or congressional districts, not merely to the rewards under the 
immediate control of a constituency's representative. Moreover, the analysis of 
specific and often small programs conceals the full picture - whether well-placed 
legislators (their districts) benefit overall or only in narrow program areas 
compared to their less well-situated colleagues. 
The studies of distributional properties of small individual programs are 
further complicated by the fact that not all small programs are equally desirable to 
all constituencies. One serious problem with small grants is the compliance cost 
of federal regulation (Stein 1984). It has been argued that there is a break-even 
point, below which it makes no sense for a state to apply for a new federal grant. 
For example, Wright (1982) describes the New York State federal aid coordinator 
who refused to pursue a $2 million developmental disabilities grant because 11 it 
would have cost us more than two million . . . to do the things that were required 
as a condition for receipt of the funds." Fossett (1983) argues that local officials 
often decide not to pursue some federal grants because of uncertainty regarding 
the level and form of financing. In the event of funding cutbacks or significant rule 
changes, officials would be forced to choose between rising local taxes and 
reducing services, thus alienating either the local taxpayers or the recipients of 
federally funded services. 
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The understanding that there is no reason to assume that every state and 
locality puts forth the same effort to maximize federal aid that it receives stimulated 
studies of fed~ral allocation focusing more on the "demand" side. Muskin and 
Cotton (1969) analyzed 28 HUD grants available in FY 1966. They found that no 
state has made full use of all grants, although no state has allowed more then 
·seven of the grant allocations to go unused. Oppenheimer (1983) shows that a 
state's aggressiveness in the pursuit of federal funds is an influential factor in the 
outcome of the funding process. Grady (1987) concentrates on the role of the 
governor. Berch (1992) examines the change in federal aid to the states during 
1985 - 1987 (the period influenced by the 99th Congress). He finds that 
state-based variables, like the governor's experience in Congress, intrastate 
conflict, and Washington lobbying presence are helpful in explaining the rate of 
change in federal aid to the states. 
The controversy in the studies of the "demand" side of political benefits is 
whether congressional districts or whole states should be expected to benefit from 
. the actions of the members of Congress. All agree that electoral connections are 
district-based, but there is a variety of reasons why state level data may better 
reflect the distribution of federal funds. Rich (1989) argues that congressional 
districts may not reflect redistributional processes well because of failure of 
localities to apply for funds. For example, for a number of years many communities 
received little or no federal aid from some programs not because they lacked 
influential legislators, but because they did not want such federal aid. This was 
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especially evident among southern and suburban communities during the 1960's, 
who feared that acceptance of federal aid under the Urban Renewal program 
would require them to take action to address low- and moderate-income housing 
· needs within their jurisdictions (Rich 1989). Houston, for example, did not 
participate in urban renewal due to both its aversion to federal intervention as well 
as to the success of private redevelopment (Friedland and Wong 1983). Local 
governments also do not pursue funds from all federal programs, nor do they 
pursue the ones they do all with equal intensity. For example, in the 145 local 
communities that make up the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning 
Commission, 73 failed to apply for even one of the ten federal grants for which 
they were eligible (Stein 1979). Hale and Palley (1981) demonstrate that there is 
a good degree of variation in efforts of local officials to pursue federal funds. Rich 
(1985} shows that keeping a lobbyist in Washington is helpful to a locality's aid's 
chances. 
Rundquist, Lee and Luor (1995} present several additional arguments why · 
states should be taken as units of analysis and provide some empirical tests of this 
proposition. First, benefits to a particular district may spill over to adjacent districts. 
Second, state congressional delegations tend to work together and influence 
committee assignments. Congressmen may seek statewide offices. The state 
bureaucracy may be better able to communicate with the federal bureaucracy. 
Bickers and Stein, Rundquist, Lee, and Luor (1995) test and compare statistically 
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several hypotheses.6 While overall results are again "mixed," their analysis 
reveals that distributive politics seems to produce state-level benefits in some 
policy areas which are not associated with district-level benefits. 
Summing up, previous research suggests that.any analysis of patterns of 
distribution of federal resources should take into account: (1) the stability of the 
overall pattern of federal grants distribution across time, (2) possible "remoteness" 
of distributive effects that requires a longer period time-series data to estimate 
redistributive effects, and (3) a difference in efforts of states and localities to 
pursue federal funds, which also makes state-level data more suitable for the long-
term analysis. As far as the analysis addresses a long-term distributional patterns 
of federal grants, one needs to identify long-term factors that may affect the 
distribution. Finally, because the largest part of federal grants to states is 
distributed by the relatively stable formula criteria, formula allocation mechanisms 
themselves warrant closer attention as well. 
3.3 Congressional Formulae for Fund Allocation and the Bias in Favor of 
Small States 
While many studies look for evidence of redistributional effects and their 
political determinants, few examine the properties of actual allocation mechanisms 
used to distribute funds. It is, in fact, unclear how in practice individual politicians 
6 Based on the congressional and state-level data provided in Federal Domestic 
Outlays 1983-1990: A Data Book. 
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can systematically impact the redistribution of federal funds. In order to affect final 
allocations, Congress has to bias the general procedures used by the agencies in 
favor of specific constituencies. Thus, if the bias is to be found, actual allocation 
formulae and the principles behind them must reflect spatial redistributional intent. 
All federal grants can be divided into four major categories: general purpose 
revenue sharing grants, specific purpose block grants, formula-based categorical 
grants, and project grants. General purpose revenue sharing grants can be spent 
at the discretion of the recipient. Specific purpose block grants are available to all 
eligible recipients, but only for spending on particular programs designed by the 
federal government. Importantly, a significant portion of federal funds is distributed 
through relatively few programs. For example, in 1976 nearly 59 billion dollars was 
distributed as federal grants to states and local areas. As Table 3.1 indicates, the 
largest 12 programs accounted for $50.1 billion of total spending (based on 
Gonzales 1980). 
[Table 3.1 is about here]" 
The analysis of actual formulae for these 12 programs indicates, however, 
that no redistribution in favor of any particular individual state or congressional 
district can be systematically performed in compliance with those formulae (see 
Gonzales 1980 for a detailed discussion of the formulae). All these formulae are 
universal (i.e., uniformly applied everywhere) and are based on a limited number 
of factors such as population, per capita income, tax effort, or the relative size of 
urban and rural areas. In addition, the formulae are quite stable, and Congress has 
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often expressed unwillingness to amend them. Once a formula is established, the 
allocation criteria are altered only with great difficulty (Hale and Palley 1981 ). This 
means that with regard to about 85 percent of all federal funds, there is technically 
little opportunity for federal redistribution to favor individual states or districts on a 
year-by-year basis. In ·other words, a stable coalition of states or types of 
constituencies may benefit from one formula or another, but not any individual 
state or district. Therefore, with respect to a major share of federal grants, the 
long-term redistribution pattern can only result from the Congressional choice of 
a redistributive formula. 
It is also important to notice that in the case of project grants for which no 
formula allocation is specified by the Congress, theoretically bureaucrats can 
allocate funds at their own discretion. In practice, however, they often do the same 
thing as legislators, i.e., create their own long-term allocation formulae!. Hale and 
Palley (1981) argue that even though project grants are not distributed by 
legi~lative formulae, federal agencies tend to use their own administratively · 
determined formulae to distribute funds to each state or region of the country. For 
example, the Economic Development Administration (EDA) uses several basic 
factors to allocate its public works' grants: area size, population, the restriction that 
no single state can receive more than 15 percent of the total grant budget, and the 
criterion of at least one area project per state. Similar guidelines and restrictions 
are reported for HU D's administration (Hale and Palley 1981 ). 
There are plenty of descriptions of congressional fights over alternative 
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formulae. For example, the extension of the Community Development Block Grant 
(CDBG) Program in 1977 was an example of a well calculated strategy in 
designing a formula grant. The factors used in allocating $3.4 billion in 1978 CDBG 
funds were changed chiefly by substituting for 11housing overcrowding" with the 
"age of housing" (built prior to 1940) in a city. This formula revision heavily favored 
older industrial cities in the Northeast and North Central states at the expense of 
the newer, younger, and smaller cities in Southern and Western states. Arnold 
(1981) demonstrates the clear pattern of roll-call voting, between Northwestern 
and Midwestern congressmen versus those from the West and the South in the 
1977 vote on this amendment. Arnold (1981) also describes the formula fight in 
1979 for a new $1.35 billion block grant program for states, designed to help the 
poor to pay their heating bills. Congressmen from frostbelt districts were practically 
unanimous (93 percent) in their support of the formula that favored states with a 
colder climate, while congressmen from warmer states were equally united (96 
percent) in opposition to it. 
The adoption of revenue-sharing formulae in the early 1970's also reveals 
serious differences between the House and the Senate. In a unique compromise, 
the conference committee kept both formulae, and allowed each state itself to 
select a formula according to which it would be funded.7 The House five-factor 
formula rewards urban, populous states, while the Senate two-factor per capita 
7 See Beer (1976: 127-196) on the first point, and The 1972 Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac pp. 636-652 on the second, also Dommel (1974) pp.156-
164. For a full description of both formulae see (Reischauer 1975, Gonzalez 
1980). 
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formula is more favorable to smaller and rural states. Four of the five states 
receiving the most in per capita terms under the Senate formula would receive less 
than the medi~n per capita grants under the House formula. The coefficient of 
correlation between state population and allocation according to the Senate 
formula is negative (-.44), but positive for the House formula (.44). The smaller 
·states are more advantaged by the Senate formula as compared to the House 
formula. On average, the 24 smallest continental states were supposed to receive 
an equivalent of 119 percent of the U.S. average per capita allocation based on 
the Senate formula, but only 89 percent of the average based on the House 
formula. The bias in favor of small states is produced by the fact that one of the 
two components of the Senate formula - state per capita personal income - is 
lower in smaller states. The correlation between state per capita income and state 
population can also bias allocation of other major formula grants. In particular, the 
two largest programs - the Medical Assistance program (Medicaid) and Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) allocate funds to states based on the 
.formula which favors states with low per capita income (about 18 billion dollars in 
1976 FY). These programs provide matching funds for states to purchase medical 
services for eligible low-income individuals and families. Federal matching funds A; 
are determined on the basis of the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP). 
For each state i, 
100 - 45 x I Income; 12 
Income,,. 
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where Income; is the 3-year average per capita income for state i. Furthermore, 
A; must be no less then 50 percent but no larger then 80 percent of total state 
expenditures on the program. Rehabilitation Services and Support (0.9 billion in 
1976 FY) matching formula allocations were also based on a 3-year averag~ of per 
capita income.8 The bias in rates of reimbursement of state expenditures on 
Medicaid and AFDC in favor of smaller states continued over time. Thus, in 1988 
FY among the 24 continental states with the highest reimbursement rates only five 
states were medium size - New Jersey, North Carolina, Georgia, Indiana, and 
Tennessee. 
The analysis of major grant formulae suggests that at least two other 
programs may be biased in favor of small states: the Highway Research, Planning 
and Construction Grants and Construction Grants for Wastewater Treatment 
Works, together accounting for 11 billion dollars in 1976. Both these programs 
have a constraint that the minimum state allocation proportion should be 0.5 
percent. It means that small states with population less than 0.5 percent of the total· 
US population (0.5 percent of the US population according to the 1970 census 
constituted around one million people) must get more than their proportional 
shares of these programs' funds. Simple calculations show that as a result of these 
0.5 percent minimum allocation restrictions, states with population less than one 
million in 1976 gained at least 0.5 billion dollars extra compared to the allocation 
strictly by population shares. 
8 For more a detailed description of the formulae, see Appendix 3.1. 
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For the actual 1976 gains of small states over the average level in the 
overall distribution of federal funds, see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1 . 
[Figure 3.1 and Table 3.2 are about here] 
As the -data demonstrate, many small states obtained greater than average per 
capita shares of federal funds. Thus, the question arises about economic and 
political reasons leading to such a bias. The analysis of major formula-based 
grants suggests that smaller states could benefit more from federal grants because 
on average these states have lower per capita income. But this fact alone does not 
mean that these states would automatically receive preferential treatment in the 
distribution of federal grants. Even from the point of view of equalization of 
economic conditions across states, the per capita personal income criterium is only 
one of many alternatives. Moreover, such a criterion does not necessarily reflect 
the comparative financial needs of the states, especially if it is used in isolation, 
without controlling for the cost of living. It is essential that being in a minority in 
Congress, smaller states manage to see grant formulae legislation that leads to 
redistribution in favor of states with low per capita personal incomes. The 24 
continental states with the highest reimbursement rates for Medicaid expenditures 
in 1988 were represented by only 129 congressmen. It has been suggested, 
therefore, that the reason smaller states benefit more from federal grants is their 
better representation in the Senate (Arnold 1981 ). 
In fact, the history of adoption of the general revenue formula indicates that 
the Senate is more willing than the House to adopt formula criteria favorable to 
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smaller states. But will the bias in favor of smaller states remain when we also 
control for the economic conditions? To answer this question we provide a series 
of tests showing that smaller states indeed benefit more from distribution of federal 
funds, even after we take into account the differences in the per capita personal 
incomes across states. 
3.4 Bias in the Per Capita Distribution of Funds 
The analysis of actual formula allocations suggests that the major share of 
federal funds is distributed according to stable criteria that hardly can be changed 
by action of an individual congressman. Therefore, if there is any political bias in 
major formula grant allocation, it can be sustained only in favor of a group of states 
with a long-term advantage in congressional representation. The most persistent 
institutional difference among states exists due to the fact that smaller states are 
better represented in the Senate. If senators seek to get as much as possible in 
terms of federal money for their constituencies (states), then, because the 
bargaining power of smaller states is politically identical to the bargaining power 
of larger states, smaller states' senators should be able to secure for their 
constituents a higher per capita allocation of federal resources. Arguments in 
support of this hypothesis were first elaborated by Arnold (1981 ). Also, because 
small states have 11smaller11 needs in terms of total spending and, therefore, impose 
a lesser incremental tax burden on other states, we can expect that senators from 
smaller states would be more often included in coalitions when questions of non-
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universal redistribution arise than their larger-state counterparts. In addition, there 
is a theoretical possibility that incumbent presidential candidates may prefer to 
allocate more per capita federal money into states with the higher per capita 
representation in the Electoral College. In practice, pre$idential candidates usually 
concentrate their campaign resources on larger states, as they can contribute 
more to putting together a winning coalition in the Electoral College, while require 
essentially the same ''fixed" campaign costs. Clearly, an additional campaign trip 
to California potentially is more decisive than a similar trip to Alaska that could be 
taken instead. But this documented bias of campaign strategies in favor of large 
pivotal states may coexist with the presidential strategy of distributing federal funds 
to states on the basis of equal importance of each electoral college vote. 
Theoretically, the same amount of money could "buy'' more Electoral College votes 
in smaller states with higher per capita numbers of delegates. Because the 
President must work through Congress, actual presidential impact on the 
geography of federal spending has not been assessed empirically. The main· 
exception seems to be the analyses by Arrington (1969) and Wright (1973) of fund 
allocation during the New Deal in the 1930's. Arrington (1969) shows that the 
Roosevelt administration spent much more money per resident in the West than 
in the South, and wonders whether this was 
" ... Because the Southeast was not organizationally or fi'nancially prepared 
to match federal funds? Because blacks counted for something less than 
whites in appropriating relief funds? Because the South was safe in the 
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Democratic fold and did not need as much economic bribing?" (p.312} 
Our analysis of Arrington's data reveals also that small states obtained more per 
capita assistance from the Roosevelt administration than larger states. The 24 
largest states received on average $213, and smaller than medium size states 
$370 per capita in New Deal expenditures between 1933 and 1939. The ten 
smallest states on average obtained almost $502 per capita. It so happens that 
states with the higher per capita Electoral College vote have received more per 
capita federal funds during New Deal. The correlation between the per capita 
funds received by states and their per capita electoral college vote is equal to .8.9 
Each· additional electoral college vote (per million of population) provided on 
average $35.5 additional per capita federal funds to the state.10 
Whatever was the reason in the 1930's to provide more per capita federal 
assistance to smaller states, the tendency persisted over time. As Figure 3.2 
demonstrates, smaller states (defined as states with fewer than eight 
congressional representatives) obtained more per capita federal funds in every 
year between 1966 and 1990. 
[Figure 3.2 and Tables 3.3 and 3.4 are about here] 
Table 3.4 reports the correlation between per capita federal funds received 
9This conclusion, however, is subject to the same methodological criticism as 
we mentioned in section 3.1 with regard to building a hypothesis around the per 
capita data. We return to its discussion latter. 
10 t-statistic equals 8.99, 48 observations, data for per capita funds are taken 
from Arrington (1979), Table 3.2. Wright (1973)'s estimate of impact of 
variation in electoral votes per capita is lower (near $27) due to inclusion of 
explanatory variables. 
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by continental states and the number of state congressional (both in the House 
and the Senate) representatives per capita. It was between .61 and .76 during the 
period. Moreover, the inclusion into the regression (with state per capita revenue 
from federal sources as a dependent variable) of an additional independent 
variable - the state per capita personal income - in all but two years during the 
· period does not improve the fit of the model. This result corresponds to that of 
Atlas et al. (1995) who report a significant positive correlation between per capita 
representation in the Senate and the net federal spending received by states. 
While a year-by-year analysis strongly supports the hypothesis that better 
represented states receive more per capita revenue from federal government, 
such analysis may be compromised by certain econometric problems that we 
preliminary mentioned· before. Uslaner (1976, 1977) argues that it may be 
inappropriate to use per capita data on both sides of the equation. The fact that 
both dependent and independent variables are related to the size of the state's 
population can potentially distort statistical analysis. Uslaner (1976) divided 
· several series of completely uncorrelated randomly generated numbers by a 
variable he called 'total population' and, as a result, the new 'per capita' variables 
became highly correlated. Other series of highly correlated variables became 
unrelated to each other after being adjusted into the 'per capita' values. In our 
case, one can argue that a collection of randomly generated variables with values 
bounded by actual annual minima and maxima of federal funds transferred to any 
single state, when divided by actual state populations, could be highly correlated 
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with the inverses of state populations. In fact, a series of 250 randomly generated 
samples based on the assumption that federal funds were allocated to states 
randomly (actual amounts of transfers were drawn from uniform distributions) 
produced a correlation between the per capita 'federal funds' and the im(erse of 
state populations greater than .8 in most cases (Table 3.5). As the per capita 
representation is highly correlated with the inverse of total state populations, it is 
not surprising that similar results are obtained when we regress the 'per capita' 
randomly generated amounts of federal transfers on the per capita representation. 
Thus, Uslaner's (1976) argument that it is inappropriate to use per capita values 
simultaneously as dependent and independent variables directly applies to the 
analysis of the per capita federal funds distribution as a function of congressional 
representation. Therefore, we must respecify the statistical test intended to 
measure a possible bias in favor of better represented states in a way that would 
allow us to avoid the per capita measured variables at least on one side of the 
regression equation.11 
In addition, the analysis of differences in states' per capita revenue from 
federal sources assumes that all states are equally interested in higher per capita 
government funds in general, and federal funds in particular. But more 
conservative states may prefer overall smaller government than liberal states. In 
11 One can suggest to consider a model with a dummy variable corresponding 
to smaller states. In fact, Figure 3.2 reproduces such analysis by showing 
differences in per capita federal funds distributed to smaller and larger states 
for every year between 1966 and 1990. However, it is obvious that such dummy 
is highly correlated with inverse of total population. 
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conservative states relatively smaller per capita revenue from federal sources may 
be a consequence of state policy to limit the role of government and not go for the 
matching grants. In other words, conservative states may demonstrate lower 
'demand' for available federal funds. While year-by-year estimates of conservatism 
are not available, application of an aggregate index of ideological conservatism 
(Erikson, Wright, and Mciver 1993) suggests that between 1976 and 1988 more 
conservative states indeed obtained less per capita federal funds (see Figure 3.4). 
Therefore, we also need to take into account differences across states in the 
overall role they grant the government. 
3.5 The Test 
Difficulties resulting from the use of the per capita variables and from the 
need to control for the scope of the state's governmental activities are not 
intractable. Instead of comparing the states' per capita revenue from federal 
government, we can analyze the share of state revenue coming from federal 
sources. This variable does not depend on the size of the state's population. It also 
provides some control for differences across states in the scope of governmental 
activities, as it indicates the relative importance of federal funds. On the other 
hand, we may expect that prosperous states with potentially higher revenue base 
would rely less on the federal government in financing state activities, assuming 
that own-source state revenue increases proportionally with increase in personal 
income. Fossett (1983) argues that unless local electoral officials have pressing 
reasons to do so, they will not pump large amounts of federal money into local 
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operating budgets because of the high uncertainty associated with federal aid. 
Funding cutbacks or changes in regulations may leave officials with more 
claimants than they can satisfy with local funds. But wealthier states also have 
greater fiscal capabilities to meet matching requirements imposed by many federal 
programs. Therefore, the overall issue of how the state's wealth is related to the 
proportion of federal funds in state budget becomes unclear and warrants 
empirical examination. It turns out that states with higher then median per capita 
incomes indeed have lower proportions of their revenue coming from federal 
sources. But if our bargaining hypothesis holds and it is true that in the long run 
smaller (better represented in the Senate) states are consistently more successful 
in obtaining federal funds, and therefore, their officials are more certain that the 
higher flow of federal funds will continue, their proportion of state revenue coming 
from federal government should be higher. In other words, in the long run small 
states may restructure their revenue sources in favor of federal governmental 
sources reflecting their stronger bargaining status. · 
In order to test this hypothesis, we need to combine cross section and time 
series data. In this study we consider data for 48 continental states for twenty-five 
years (1966-90), a total of 1200 observations. The dependent variable, proportion 
of total state revenue financed from federal sources, varies between 14.6 and 47.5 
percent for different states during the period. The first independent variable is the 
number of state representatives in Congress (House and Senate) per million of 
state population. The range of this variable is between 1.6 and 9.4. The second 
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independent variable is state average per capita personal income adjusted for 
inflation. The range of real per capita personal income (in 1983 dollars) is between 
$5,470 and $17,900. 
where: 
We, thus, estimate the following general model_: 
= 
= 
state Is proportion of revenue financed by the federal government, 
(percent): 
.::Hutt::. neveuue suppueu uy reuerui uuverrtmerit 
100 x ~~'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
State. Total Revenue 
the combined number of congressmen and senators representing 
state I per one million of the population in period t : 
State; Number of Congressmen plus two Senators 
State; Total Population 
state Is average per capita income in period t. 
In order to ensure that the data demonstrate a consistent pattern over time, 
we first estimate equation (1) separately for every year between 1966 and 1990. 
As Table 3.6 reports, regression analysis for almost every year produces 
statistically significant estimates for coefficients on the political representation 
variable. Year-by-year regressions estimate that during 1966-90 states with an 
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additional representative in Congress (per million of population) had a higher 
proportion of state revenue coming from the federal government (between 2.71 
and 0.95 percentage points for every extra representative). In our view, this result 
suggests that we. may pool annual cross sections to obtain more precise 
estimates. 
There are several statistical methods that can be applied to cross-section 
time series (panel) data (Judge et al. 1988, Hsiao 1986, Dielman 1989). The first 
step in all methods is to perform an OLS estimation of the model. In our case, all 
OLS coefficients are statistically significant (see Table 3.7). This means that the 
hypothesis that proportions of state revenues from the federal government were 
greater in better represented states (controlling for differences in real per capita 
personal income) is supported. 
Further improvement can be achieved by taking into consideration specific 
effects for particular states and including state-specific 11dummy11 variables to 
account for those effects. This approach assumes that the fraction of state revenue 
that comes from federal sources is proportional to the level of state representation 
and per capita personal income, and is influenced by some state-specific factors 
which we cannot observe. We also assume that, while these factors are specific 
for each state, they are constant (''fixed") within each state across time. By 
introducing state-specific dummy variables, we can control for the impact of these 
fixed factors (Judge et al. 1988 pp.468-469; Hsiao 1986 pp. 29-32). Our model 
now takes the form: 
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where 13i 's are intercepts for each state /. 
The· r~sults of this analysis are reported in Table 3.7. Briefly, we find the 
impact of representation on the proportion of state revenue from federal sources 
statistically significant at the .001 level. Each additional representative in Congress 
(per million of population) leads to a 2.2 percentage point increase in the 
proportion of state revenue from the federal government. At the same time, an 
additional $1000 in state per capita personal incomes reduces the proportion of 
federal funds in the state budget by 1 .1 percentage points.12 
Another way of analyzing time-series cross-sectional data is to build a 
model on a slightly different set of assumptions. Once again consider the 
specification ( 1 ) : 
but now, instead of assuming that 131 is fixed for all states, assume that they are 
independent random variables with a mean 131 and variance cr2 w Therefore, .each 
intercept can be expressed as: 
where 
12 We also test the hypothesis that all intercepts are in fact equal. If the 
intercepts for different cross sections (countries) are different, then the simple 
OLS estimators may be misleading (see Hsiao 1986). The usual method for 
testing the hypothesis that all intercepts are equal is to contrast the residual 
sum of squares from a restricted (all intercepts are set to be equal) model with 
an unrestricted model - a version of an F-test. Based on this F-test, we can 
reject the null hypothesis that all intercepts are equal at the .001 significance 
level. 
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E[ µi] = 0, 
E[ µ21] = a2µ, and 
E[ µi µi] = 0 for I * j. 
It is further assumed, that µi's are uncorrelated with eit 's, i.e., E( µieit) = O . 
Our initial model now becomes 
Y11 = ~o + ~1 X1n + ~2 X211 +( µ1 + eit), 
where ~o is a common intercept for all observations and µi's are 11 random 11 
intercepts for each cross-sectional group of observations. It is easy to show that 
for each cross-sectional unit the composite disturbance vector has mean zero. The 
structure of these variance-covariance matrices is such that for a given cross-
sectional group, the correlation between any two error terms in different time 
periods is the same. Note that the correlation is also assumed to be constant for 
all cross-sectional units. In our case, cross-sectional units are states, and to justify 
the model's assumptions, we may think of the problem in terms of some 
exogenous shocks leading to long-term changes in distribution of federal funds, · 
such that impacts of these disturbances remain constant over time. 
Because the variance-covariance matrix in the above model is not a scalar-
identity type, the assumptions of the OLS model are violated. As long as we allow 
the random effect assumptions, OLS is not an efficient estimator. Instead, we must 
use the generalized least squares estimator, which takes into account the form of 
variance-covariance matrices Vand <P (Vis a diagonal element of <P): 
~ = (X' <cp-1xr1X'cp-1y. 
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In practice, of course, V and <P are unknown, but we can use information 
obtained from the fixed effect model to estimate <P. First, from the fixed effect 
model we calculate an estimator for 0 26 • Then we calculate the means of our 
variables for each cross-sectional group and do the OLS for the means. 
Regression on these means allows us to estimate o2w With estimators of 0 26 and 
a2 µ at hand, we construct an estimator for V and <P, transform our data, and obtain 
the GLE (for more details see Judge et al. 1988, pp.486-487). 
As we report in Table 3.7, the random effect model also supports our 
hypothesis that the fraction of state revenue financed by the federal government 
is proportional to the state representation and per capita income. The random 
effect model estimates that states with an additional representative have a 
proportion of state revenue from the federal government higher by 1 .9 percentage 
points. An additional $1000 in state per capita personal incomes reduces this 
proportion by 1.19 percentage points. Thus, we can conclude that all statistical 
models support. our hypothesis. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Given the institutionalization of federal bargaining over the allocation of 
funds in the US primarily as one negotiated first among all unit representatives, 
with the outcome presented to the nationally elected executive ('center' by our 
definition), here we test and confirm a hypothesis that representationally based 
bargaining strength of federal units should systematically translate into (moderate) 
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distributional benefits. Briefly, even in the presence of economic controls, the 
proportion of state revenue coming from the federal government over time is 
higher in smaller (better congressionally represented) states. 
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Data Sources: 
[1] State Revenue: Governmental Finances and State Finances. Department 
of Commerce, Bureau of Census, various years. 
[2] Implicit Price Deflater for State and Local Government Purchases of Goods 
and Services: The National Income and Product Accounts and Survey of 
Current Business, various years. 
[3] Personal Income, Population: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, various years. 
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APPENDIX 3.1: Analysis of Selected Fund Distribution Formulae in 1976 
A1: Aid to Families With Dependent Children 
States can choose the highest of the two numbers calculated by different 
formulas: 
1) RI = 1A + FP(B-A), where 
6 
A = min[l8Nm, (Pm +PFc)], 
B = min [Pm' 32N m] + min [PFC' lOONFC], and 
]. 
FP = 100 - 50(-1 ) 2 , but 50% :s; FP :s; 65%. 
lus 
Where the notations mean the following: 
Ii and lus the 3-year average per capita income for state I and for the 
U.S. as published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis; 
numbers of recipients receiving money payments, and 
children receiving foster care; 
Pm and PFC - allowable money payments, and payments for foster care; 
FP federal percentage of reimbursement. 
2) R2 = FMAP (Pm + p FCO) ' where 
l. 
FMAP = 100 - 45 (-1 ) 2 , but 50 % :s; FMAP ... = 83% 
lus 
(FMAP stands for federal medical assistance percentage). 
A2: Highway research, planning and construction 
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For primary highway systems the formula is: 
2 A. 2 R. 2 D. 1 UR. 
- ( 
1 
) + - ( L 1 ) + - (-L 1 ) + -( L 1 ) , but greater than .5%, 
9 ""''A. 9 R. 9 D. 3 UR. L.J I I I I 
where the notation mean: 
Ai - area of state; 
Ri - rural population of state from the Census of Population; 
Di - rural delivery route mileage and intercity mail route mileage certified 
by Postmaster General; 
URi - urban population for places of 5000 or more, Census of Population. 
For interstate system (resurfacing, restoration and rehabilitation) the formula is: 
M. L ' ; but with the minimum state allocation of .5%, where 
Mi 
Mi - lane miles in use five years or more from state's inventory of interstate 
system. 
For high-hazard locations and roadside obstacles, the allocation formula is: 
3 P. · 1 PM. 
-(""' 
1 
) + -( L 1 ), but not less than .5% per state, where 
4 L.Jpi 4 PM; 
Pi - total population, Census; 
PMi - public road mileage, state inventory. 
This program is systematically biased in favor of small and compact states 
because of a high minimum threshold for federal allocation to states. 
A3: Construction grants for wastewater treatment works 
General policy: Funds are distributed based on population and need, but no state 
shall receive less than 5% of the total funds. 
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House formula: 
Nai Nbi P; 
Hi= .5 L + .25 L + .25~, where 
Nai Nbi LtP; 
Napi, Nbi, and Neil - three components of need, determin~d on the basis 
of 
a) severity of pollution problems; 
b) existing population affected; 
c) need for preservation of high quality waters; 
d) the state's opinion about priority needs, 








100% " Set Si2 = Sil [ '°' ] , so that Lt Si2 = 100%; 
Lt Sil 
Check Si2 ~ .5%, V i; 
. P. Nci 
Check si2 ~min["' ' L ] ' vi; 
Lt pi Nci 
Check Si2 > .75(.0110) , V li; 
100% " Set si = S;2 [ L si
2
], so that Lt si2 = 100%. 
Compromise formula: 
1 I A. = -H. + 1-S .. 
I 2 I 2 I 
Chapter 3 Long Term Representational Determinants of Allocation ... 146 
Tables: 
Table 3.1. 1.976 Annual Budgets of the 12 Largest Federal Programs 
Program title 
Medical assistance program (Medicaid) 
AFDC 
General revenue sharing 
Highway research, planning and training 
Comprehensive employment and training 
Construction grants for wastewater treatment 
Social services for low-income recipients 
Community development block grants 
Educationally deprived children 
Rehabilitation services and facilities 
School assistance in federally affected areas 

















(83% of the 
total) 
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Table 3.2. Per Capita Levels of Federal Funding for Small States in 1976 
State Population Per Capita Gains 
Wyoming 0.38 454.71 260.05 
Vermont 0.48 358.13 163.46 
Delaware 0.59 211.75 17.09 
Nevada 0.62 218.71 24.05 
North Dakota 0.64 238.5 43.84 
South Dakota 0.68 260.5 65.84 
Montana 0.75 309.49 114.83 
New Hampshire 0.83 174.67 -19.99 
Idaho 0.83 234.25 39.59 
Hawaii 0.89 335.67 141 
Rhode island 0.94 248.57 53.91 
Maine 1.07 237.59 42.93 
New Mexico 1.16 241.38 46.72 
Utah 1.24 267.07 72.41 
Nebraska 1.54 186.97 -7.69 
West Virginia 1.84 264.28 69.62 
Arkansas 2.16 219.95 25.29 
Note: Gains are calculated as differences between the average for 48 continental states per 
capita and the state average. The national average is $194.66 in 1976 dollars. 
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Table 3.3. Average Per Capita Revenue Received from the Federal 
Government by Smaller1 and Larger2 States 
Year Smaller States Larger States 
66 291 178 
67 297 194 
68 306 203 
69 301 211 
70 309 220 
71 338 244 
72 349 270 
73 367 292 
74 333 271 
75 350 283 
76 380 298 
77 381 304 
78 392 310 
79 377 310 
80 393 312 
81 384 311 
82 330 279 
83 328 276 
84 332 289 
85 347 301 
86 360 316 
87 356 309 
88 355 310 
89 368 313 
90 379 325 
1 States with 1 O or less Electoral College Votes 
2 States with more then 1 o Electoral College Votes 
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Table 3.4. Correlation between State Per Capita Revenues Received from 





























3 State Electoral College vote divided by state population 
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Table 3.5. Correlation between Randomly Generated State Per Capita 
'Revenue' from Federal Sources and State Representation per 
Million Residents4 
Year Minimum Maximum Average 
r2 r2 r2 
66 0.53 0.88 0.76 
67 0.6 0.91 0.75 
. 68 0.8 0.92 0.85 
69 0.77 0.92 0.85 
70 0.8 0.9 0.84 
71 0.64 0.85 0.74 
72 0.68 0.81 0.76 
73 0.62 0.86 0.76 
74 0.78 0.92 0.83 
75 0.65 0.73 0.7 
76 0.73 0.89 0.84 
77 0.84 0.9 0.88 
78 0.55 0.87 0.78 
79 0.76 0.89 0.82 
80 0.71 0.87 0.78 
81 0.71 0.85 0.76 
82 0.72 0.84 0.78 
83 0.67 0.9 0.79 
84 0.7 0.85 0.78 
85 0.72 0.88 0.78 
86 0.63 0.82 0.69 
87 0.72 0.79 0.76 
88 0.55 0.81 0.68 
89 0.67 0.89 0.76 
90 0.72 0.88 0.81 
Note: Ten Series of ''Values of State Revenue from Federal Sources" are randomly generated 
(based on uniform distributions with actual minimum and maximum values of State Revenue 
from Federal Government) for every year between 1966 and 1990 as the limits are then divided 
by actual state populations. 
4 State Electoral College vote divided by state population 
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Table 3.6. Effect of Per Capita State Representation and Per Capita 
Personal Income on Proportion of State Revenue from Federal 
Government, between 1966 and 1990 FY 
Year Constant Representation Income Corrected 
per million per capita R-sguare 
66 36.07 2.27 -1.9 0.48 
-7.685 -4.06 ( -4.10) 
67 37.97 2 -1.91 0.43 
-6.96 -3.37 ( -3.59) 
68 36.92 1.8 -1.71 0.47 
-8.74 -4.28 ( -4.06) 
69 35.09 1.87 -1.63 0.45 
-7.78 -4.05 ( -3.75) 
70 39.96 1.42 -2.02 0.43 
-8.7 -3.04 ( -4.51 ) 
71 44.32 1.25 -2.24 0.39 
-8.78 -2.77 ( -4.59) 
72 39.14 1.38 -1.72 0.37 
-8.65 -3.46 . ( -3.69) 
73. 38.19 1.71 -1.64 0.4 
-8.52 -4.8 ( -3.48) 
74 38.48 1.41 -1.7 0.42 
-9.22 -4.65 ( -4.10) 
75 40.67 1.29 -1.79 0.41 
-8.13 -3.28 ( -3.74) 
76 39.44 1.97 -1.77 0.46 
-8.14 -4.6 ( -3.94) 
77 40.52 1.96 -1.88 0.59 
-10.29 -5.76 ( -5.26) 
78 43.18 2.01 -2.14 0.61 
-11.48 -5.55 ( -6.25) 
79 43.57 1.57 -2.07 0.54 
-12.31 -4.53 ( -6.44) 
5 t-statistics 
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Table 3.6 (continued) 
Year Constant Representation Income Corrected 
per million per capita R-square 
80 44.33 1.67 -2.08 0.48 
-10.41 -4.21 ( -5.53) 
81 37.89 1.5 -1.42 0.33 
-9.36 -3.35 ( -4.15) 
82 36.68 0.88 -1.38 0.27 
-9.52 -2.13 ( -4.13) 
83 37.05 0.8 -1.43 0.33 
-10.69 -1.71 ( -5.25) 
84 34.75 0.91 -1.32 0.28 
-9 -1.85 ( -4.16) 
85 37.49 0.63 -1.43 0.28 
-9.01 -1.15 ( -4.57) 
86 36.86 0.67 -1.27 0.35 
-11.19 -1.47 ( -5.33) 
87 37.53 0.74 -1.39 0.42 
-10.48 -1.41 ( -5.66) 
88 33.73 0.88 -1.1 0.36 
-9.48 -1.76 ( -4.56) 
89 31.42 1.22 -0.97 0.38 
-9.21 -2.31 ( -4.32) 
90 32.75 0.89 -0.96 0.32 
-8.72 -1.67 ( -3.94) 
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Table 3.7. Regression Estimates of the Shares of State Revenues6 from 
Federal Sources to Total State Revenues (Percent) for 48 
























6 Based on State Government Finances, different years. 
7 T-statistics. 
8 Multiple intercepts. 
9 State Electoral College Vote divided by state population. 
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Figure 3.1. Difference between the National Average and the State Per 
Capita Allocation of Federal Funds in 1976. 
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Per Capita Federal Funds in 1966-1990 
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Per Capita Federal Funds in 1976-90 
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Note: Conservative States are States with higher than average index of conservatism (Erikson, 
Wright and Mciver 1993). 
CHAPTER 4. ASYMMETRIC FEDERAL BARGAINING IN A NEW 
FEDERATION: THE CASE OF RUSSIA 
This chapter addresses the development of the political system in 
Russia as it is affected by the asymmetric bargaining nature of Russian 
federalism. The analysis is built on the theoretical argument offered in Chapter 
1 - namely, that the problem of federal stability is a problem of federal 
bargaining over equilibrium selection. We argue that economic, constitutional, 
and electoral developments are to a large degree accountable for pushing 
Russia toward the predominantly bi-lateral institutionalization of federal 
bargaining which contributes to deepening of economic and political 
polarization among Russian regions. 
In particular, we show a connection between the regional patterns of 
voting and several types of asymmetries among the ft?deral subjects in Russia. 
The asymmetries can be sub-divided into three major categories. First, there 
are asymmetries caused by the unevenness of preexisting economic conditions 
of the regions. Second, there are adjustments in economic circumstances of 
regions caused by the ongoing manipulation by the center of economic policies 
with regard to them. And, third, the asymmetries affecting regional vote are 
further enhanced by the bargaining process, in which some members of the 
federation emerge as winners at the expense of the others. 
In the introduction we noted that an alternative approach especially 
popular among economists is to identify the federal problem as a problem of a 
public good provision, and, therefore view federalism as a form of a public 
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good. Federalism as a public good is potentially beneficial for participants, but 
they may have incentives to ''free ride." Therefore, the model of federalism as a 
public good suggests that federal stability requires sufficient incentives for 
. participants of the federation to overcome the ''free rider'' problem. 
We, however, argue in Chapter 1 that even if federal arraignments are 
beneficial and there are sufficient incentives to keep a federation together, and 
even if the ''free rider'' problem is solved, such a federation nevertheless can 
collapse. We base our argument on the problem of equilibrium selection. 
Arguably, in each federation there could be many potentially stable at the 
implementation state, thus, equilibrium federal arraignments. But while there 
are many potentially stable federal arrangements, each specific equilibrium 
could be more or less favorable for a particular participant. When there are 
multiple equilibria and they are not all equivalent, participants would try to 
select the best one from their own point of view. We argued also that it is the 
process of equilibrium selections that constitutes federal bargaining. Each 
participant of federation has incentives to move the federation to a new 
equilibrium and change federal arrangements to its own benefit. However, 
once the decision is made and the allocation is chosen that would be an 
equilibrium in the continuation game, it could be followed by a prolonged period 
of federal stability. The problem is that in the presence of many potential 
equilibria, participants may fail to reach any of them if they fail to coordinate 
their actions. 
The two conclusions from the Chapter 1 are relevant to the development 
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of federalism in Russia. First, federal bargaining is an ongoing process, an 
essential element of politics in any federation. Some regions would always try to 
move the federal system to a different equilibrium allocation, if only allowed. 
Therefore, the equilibrium seleetion through federal bargaining must be 
institutionalized and restricted. In particular, constitutional arrangements must 
guarantee that at least one equilibrium allocation is chosen. Second, the most 
dangerous period for federal stability is when the process of federal bargaining 
starts or is reopened. Even a stable and efficient federation can collapse if its 
participants for some reason start renegotiating federal arrangements, for 
example, by amending the federal constitution. The most dangerous period of 
the federal history is the first few years since its inception, the initial federal 
bargaining. 
In 1997 the Russian Federation was still in the process of initial federal 
bargaining. The federal center and Russian regions were seeking to establish 
new principles of federal integration. In 1991-1992, when political and 
economic reforms were just starting the danger of disintegration of Russia 
was real: several republics and regions declared independence and threatened 
to secede from the federation. The federal "solution" offered for Russia at the 
time was the development of a highly asymmetric federalism where different 
regions and republics would face different cost and benefits of federation and 
would have different economic and political rights. Moreover, these 
asymmetries were allowed to develop endogenously, through bargaining. 
Currently, the status, the position of each region in the federation, is the result 
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of continuous bilateral negotiations between it and Moscow. The federal 
center (federal executive) sign special treaties with regions, where both sides 
define on an ad hoc basis some resolutions for issues of property rights, natural 
resources, tax collection, and fiscal transfers. 
In this chapter we analyze in details the process of federal renegotiation 
in the new Russian Federation and identify economic and political incentives 
both for the federal center and the regions to continue renewing the process of 
federal bargaining. We argue that in Russia federal bargaining in its current 
form creates a highly asymmetric and potentially unstable form of interactions 
between the federal center and regions. As regional economic success 
strongly depends on successful bargaining with the federal government or on 
the personal ability of a regional leader to secure economic benefits for the 
region, and as Russia develops into a federation based on bilateral bargaining 
and negotiations between the federal government and republics (regions), it 
affects the development of its new party system, in particular, parties' regional 
electoral strengths. Thus, in section 4.4 we formulate and evaluate several 
hypotheses connecting Russian federal economic policy to its forming party 
system. As there inevitably were winners and losers in the economic reform, the 
traditional positions of regions in relative economic standing were drastically 
upset, further increasing regional inequalities while transforming former 
'winners' into current 'losers.' This affected the political choices of political elites 
and electorates in those regions. Looking at the data from the 1991-1996 
elections, we show that the winning or losing status of a Russian region 
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impacts both the character and the dynamics of its electorate. In particular, 
regions that are losing economically respond well to national parties that 
promise a stronger center and 'fairness' in the allocation of economic 
resources. At the same time, we observe the growing strength of regional 
parties and political movements that offer themselves as representatives of the 
narrow interest of a particular region or territory. 
Our analysis also offer an explanation for the clearly regional pattern of 
the communist victories in Russia. Communists, ideology aside, are a national 
party advocating strong central government and equalization policies through 
governmental transfers to disadvantaged regions. Our argument allows to 
explain the absence of strong - in terms of their electoral support - national 
parties in the democratic camp. Indeed, it appears that the only national force 
confronting the communists is the integrated national-regional incumbent 
governmental organization. 
In this chapter we also address the claim that regional governors deliver 
votes in exchange for favors from the center. Such claim has acquired a status 
of almost axiomatic truth among the students of post-communist Russia, which 
fact effectively places federal bargaining in the center of Russian political 
process. Here we mostly reenforce this claim. In this chapter, and especially in 
section 4.5.1, we analyze different explanations of the regional leadership's 
ability to 'deliver' votes in elections. These explanations require us to assess 
the specific circumstances in which regional electorates found themselves 
following the abrupt dissolution of the Soviet Union, the role which Russia as 
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one of the USSR republics played in bringing first the federal issue and then 
the federal conflict to the forefront of the Soviet politics and a strongly 
differentiated regional impact of the economic reform. We argue, that regional 
electorates did not have to be originally divided by any preexist~nt partisan 
affiliations but could be simply responsive in national elections to the 
coordinating efforts of their regional leaders. 
On the whole, we show that in the contemporary Russian Federation 
federal bargaining strongly affects regional economic conditions, while 
economic conditions are closely related to the regional vote. Therefore, 
growing differentiation among regions, both as a result of the work of unleashed 
market forces and of the process of federal bargaining further widening 
inequalities leads to increasing political polarization among Russian regions. 
Some regions become strongholds of the pro-democratic and pro-reform 
forces, while others move further in the pro-communist direction. One can 
argue that such political polarization may contribute to regionalization of major 
political parties and create serious problems in the future for the federal 
stability in Russia. 
4.1 The Background of the Participants of Russian Federal Process: 
Federal Conflict at the Time of Russian "Formative" Elections 
Three groups of factors combined to bring federal bargaining to the 
forefront of Russia's political and electoral agenda and to make voters 
sincerely responsive to the strategic leadership of regional politicians: the 
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increase of regional inequalities in the course of the market reform, questioned 
initial legitimacy of the federal form in Russia, and the attempts of the branches 
of the national government to attract support of the regions by concessions 
when they confronted each other in the constitutional conflict of 1992-1993. 
At the time of collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation was 
. composed of both ethnic autonomous republics and Russian regions. 
Historically, autonomous republics were administratively more independent 
from Moscow than the regions, although both republics and regions depended 
on Moscow for all kinds of economic benefits and resources. In the Soviet era, 
the extent to which a region was "well-supplied" and prosperous, depended to a 
significant degree on how often the oblast's leader had been able to see the 
General Secretary or some other Politburo member in charge of economic 
issues (Gershaft 1996). Another factor was the presence on its territory of large 
industrial enterprises, with their well-connected directors (Smirnyagin 1996). 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet autonomous 
republics in Russia became its 21 'ethnic' republics, joined in a federation with 
57 'Russian regions' (55 oblasts and krais, plus the two federal cities, Moscow 
and St. Petersburg), and 11 autonomous regions (oblast and krais). The 
autonomous regions, also 'ethnic,' are located within 'Russian regions' and, in 
practice, are subordinated to their 'host' region economically and politically. The 
only exceptions to-date are the influential and resource-rich Yamal-Nenets and 
Khanty-Mansy, autonomous regions, which possess on their territories more 
than 90 percent of all natural gas and 40 percent of Russian oil resources. 
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Formally, as stated in article 6 of the Russian Constitution, all subjects of 
the Russian Federation are equal. The only constitutional difference between 
republics and other subjects is that republics shall have republican constitutions 
. while all other subjects shall have regional charters. Moreover, according to the 
Constitution (article 66 part 5), the status of the region can be changed to 
republican. In practice, though, Moscow fiercely opposes any such 
transformation. Only in 1991, several autonomous okrugs (Adygey, Altay, 
Karachaevo-Cherkassk and Khakhassiya) were allowed to update their status 
and were declared republics. But when in 1993 Sverdlovsk regional leaders 
attempted to change their region's status by pronouncing the so called Ural 
republic, the governor was immediately dismissed by Yeltsin. Similarly, 
attempts of Yamal-Nenets and Khanty-Mansy autonomous regions to upgrade 
their status have so far failed. 
4.1.1 Economic Reform and a Jump in Regional Disparities 
Hussian regions, whatever the claims of official Soviet propaganda, 
were never all equal, politically nor economically. The reason lies not so much 
in diversity of geographic conditions, size, population, or availability of natural 
resources. Those differences, although significant, were quite comparable or 
even less pronounced than corresponding differences among the countries of 
the European Community (Hanson 1996). Rather, the 'strategic' (as much in the 
military as in the economic sense) placement of monopolistic industries of 
different kinds and at different level of technological advancement into the 
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regions further deepened the underlining inequalities, making some areas of 
the country economic hostages of the planned socialist economy. 
Distribution and redistribution of economic resources was a key element 
of the socialist economy in the USSR. The stated objective· of the planned 
. . 
economy was the achievement of maximum economic efficiency at the level of 
the whole country (whatever were the criteria for pursuing efficiency) through 
the manipulation of all national economic resources. Regional social and 
economic development was always a lower priority than the goals set for the 
national economy. Until the reform, however, the inequalities were somewhat 
'smoothed' by means of direct economic transfers and redistribution, but the 
main channel of federal subsidies to the regions remained support for 
individual industries, rather than grants to the regions themselves. The reform 
made much of the redistributive flows impossible, both for the reasons of 
market-oriented economic policies, and, not less importantly, because the 
democratic complement of the reform made resource extractions from 'donor' 
regions or industries less feasible. During Russia's economic transformation the 
interregional variance in per capita real incomes has increased, and gaps 
between regions have widened (Hanson 1996). 
Among the most important economic factors that contributed to the 
increasing economic polarization among Russian regions were those leading to 
the long-term structural changes in the Russian economy (Polishchuk 1996). To 
achieve maximum efficiency by means of the concentration of industry, whole 
regions were developed monoindustrially (e.g., the republics of Central Asia), 
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and were often exclusively controlled by the military-industrial complex (such as 
the Urals). Many industrial companies in those regions were unprofitable and 
heavily subsidized by the government, and therefore whole regions were 
dependent on federal subsidies. It was estimated that in the USSR only 4 out of 
15 Soviet republics - Russia, Belorussia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenia - were net 
donors (Mikhailov 1997).1 Population mobility among regions was also driven by 
the non-market criteria, and occurred more or less in the planned order, with 
the socialist state tightly controlling the migration of labor within the country by 
issuing strict residency requirements and through planned allocation of funds 
for new housing construction.2 Non-market allocation of industries and 
population in the former Soviet Union became a major problem once market 
reform started and the scope of the state involvement into economy was 
reduced. Reduction of state subsidies combined with the 'release' of prices put 
dozens of regions on the edge of financial collapse. Moreover, the Russian 
federal government not only reduced financial help to regions and cut federal 
purchases, but effectively imposed many new financial obligations on regional 
economies. 
Prior to reform, state enterprises were in part responsible for providing 
10f course, such terms as "profits" or "subsidies" have a limited information 
value in a non-market economy where input and output prices are selected by 
the planner. 
2 ln general, population mobility was quite low. For example, in 1994 58 percent 
of population of the Russian Federation lived in one place from birth and 
another 30 percent lived in one place for more than 1 O years. 
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social benefits to the employees and their families. They paid for child care, 
schooling, medical care, street cleaning, recreational activities, and built 
housing and fulfilled other social and entertainment needs of their workers. 
Once privatized, companies had to terminate the funding of such unproductive 
activities and the bill was transferred to regional administrations (Wallich 1994). 
Regional input in all governmental expenditures rose from 35 percent in 1992 to 
65 percent in 1994. Thus, in 1996 regions were forced to find money to cover 
88 percent of state medical expenditures, 80 percent of all educational costs, 
and 70 percent of the cost of social services. Currently, republican and regional 
governments collect 50 percent of all taxes, but account for 70 percent of all 
government spending. As the financial burdens of the regions increase and the 
economics declines continues, more regions become dependent on federal aid. 
It is estimated that 25 regions were net donors in 1994, whereas by 1996 this 
number was reduced to 14 regions, and only 10 regions remained in 1997. 
Already in April 1997, Vyacheslav Mikhailov, the Nationalities and Federal 
Relations Minister, reported to the Parliament that "only nine territories of the 
Russian Federation are economically self-sufficient and act as donors, with the 
remaining 80 being dependents. 113 
In the first quarter of 1997 the largest sum of taxes to the federal budget 
were paid by Moscow (22%), Khanty-Mansy (8,3%), Moscow blast (4%), Yamal-
Nenets (3,6%), St. Petersburg (3,5%), Samara blast (3,4%), Sverdlovsk blast 
3RIA, April 22, 1997 
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(3%), Perm (2,7%), Tatarstan (2,9%) and Bashkortan (2,6%).4 
Hanson (1996) shows that there were two categories of 'winners' -
regions that tended to experience smaller falls in real per capita income than 
the rest since 1989 (the last year when the economy officially g!ew). These 
were (1) the leading natural resources holders, and (2) the leading financial or 
gateway regions that mediate Russia's booming trade with the global economy 
(e.g., Moscow). However, in order to benefit the region, natural resources must 
be ready for immediate extraction as seen from examples of less fortunate 
Kamchatka and Sakhalin. 
Successful regions share a key characteristic: a relatively high per capita 
inflow of foreign currency. Differences across the regions in the per capita 
inflows of foreign currency account for about a third of the variance in their 
residents per capita real incomes. The creation of joint ventures, for example, 
was the main method of investment in the early 1990s. Most of them became 
trade intermediaries and are concentrated in Moscow (82.6 percent). Officially, 
Moscow 'absorbed' 46.6 percent of all investments in 1996, St. Petersburg - 5.6 
percent, Tatarstan - 5.8 percent, and Western Siberia - 5.1 percent. Unofficially, 
Moscow Mayor Luzkov estimated that the city received 2 billion dollars annually 
in foreign companies' investments and another 5 billion in domestic investments 
(Kobyakov 1997). 5 
4AFI, April 28, 1997 
5Moscow, being the most prosperous region of the Russian Federation 
precisely because of its status of the capital city, nevertheless receives 5 
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It is not the case that regional differentiation has as its cause differences 
in policies adopted by regional leadership. Some regions have pursued 
economic reform more enthusiastically than the others, but such differences did 
not translate into tangible divergence in economic indicators. Ulyanovsk, the 
birthplace of Vladimir Lenin, is one of the clearest examples of resisting the 
. reforms, where price control and export control policies were imposed within the 
region. Nearby Nizhny Novgorod region, on the other hand, had a reformist 
reputation from the very beginning of reform (Hanson 1996). A look at the data, 
though, reveals that the two regions are not far from each other in their actual 
involvement in regulating prices. Pro-communist Ulyanovsk regulates prices of 
44 products, reformist Nizhny Novgorod, of 38. Meanwhile, the living standards 
in Ulyanovsk region are estimated to be higher than in Nizhny Novgorod.6 For 
many regions, the current economic situation is determined by factors beyond 
their control. Too often regional economies suffer from the fact that giant 
enterprises on their territory produce non-competitive products and lack 
investments for technological restructuring.7 
percent of the financial resources designated as support for needy Russian 
regions as a compensation for the "additional cost of performing as the capital 
city." 
6 "Analysis of development of the Russian regions in 1992-1995" TASIS 
European Commission. Brussels. Belgium. 
7For example, in pro-reform Samara, the largest Russian car manufacturer, 
AutoVaz, which provides factory orders for more than 400 companies affecting 
the jobs of 2 million people across the country, has made huge losses for 
several years in a row despite the increase in production, sales, prices, and 
tariff protection by the state. 
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The change in relative economic conditions that 'losers' perceive as 
unfair contribute to the push for the renegotiation of the terms of federal 
relations in Russia. Some departures from the old standards of treatment by the 
center were necessitated by the technological reasons in view of their 
increased responsibilities. Once the federal center became unable to maintain 
previous level of financial flow to the regions, it was forced to give them greater 
independence in utilizing regional economic resources and incrementally 
adjusted their relations with the federal budget. But as different regions had 
different economic opportunities and needs, the adjustment of regional rights 
was necessarily asymmetric, with some regions receiving more rights than 
others. Once the asymmetries were noticed, they became the precedent that 
justified negotiations and bargaining between regions and Moscow. Such 
bargaining started in 1990-1991 in the form of lobbying with Moscow 
bureaucracy. However, bargaining quickly assumed a political form and 
became the central aspect of Russia's political process. 
4.1.2 The Initial Criticism of the Post-Soviet Federal Arrangements 
The most immediate political factor that made the renegotiation of 
federal and regional rights so easy to open was the lack of legitimacy of the 
federal form in general. Russia's leading national politicians themselves were 
main contributors to the loss of legitimacy by federal institutions. Attitudes 
toward the federal form were formed in public discourses over the organization 
of the Soviet Union, in which Russia's national leaders actively participated. As 
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Russian politicians publicly denounced the value of federal relations within the 
Soviet federation, and sought to prove Russia's 'exploited' status in it, they 
insisted on the renegotiation of terms with Moscow through the Soviet Federal 
Treaty, and finally orchestrated the Byelovezhskii Agreement that dissolved the 
USSR. They then paved the road for regions and republics within Russia to do 
the same when Russian federalism, in turn, moved to the forefront of the 
political agenda. 
Russia's republics started demanding the revision of federal terms using 
the rhetoric borrowed from the Russian government itself - the prevailing idea 
was that a new democratic federation must be a voluntary union where each 
participant has the right to decide how extensive its sovereignty would be. Once 
Russia declared its sovereignty (from the Union), Russia's ethnic autonomous 
republics followed the suit (Tararstan, on August 30, 1990, Kalmykia - in 
September 1990). At a time when the Soviet government was still trying to 
reach a consensus on a new Federal Treaty for the USSR, Russia began 
preparing a· Russian Federal Treaty. Indeed, the first attempt at such a treaty 
was rejected by the republics in January 1991, almost a year before the 
dissolution of the USSR. By then, being 'tough' with the. center was already 
recognized by republican leaders as behavior advantageous from populist 
point of view, which could be expected to help win votes in future electoral 
campaigns. 
4.1.3 Constitutional Conflict within the National Government 
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The third factor contributing to the intensity of federal renegotiations in 
Russia and to the strongly bilateral form of those negotiation was the political 
struggle between the different branches of the national government over their 
respective constitutional prerogatives. In fact, the first use of the 'regional card' 
was made in 1990, when politicians in Russia, in order to weaken the Soviet 
government of Mikhail Gorbachev, lent political support to Chechen nationalists 
and were instrumental in promoting the candidacy of Chechen's future 
president, Dudaev, who would go to war with Russia in 1994. With the same 
goal in mind, Yeltsin, in August 1990 incited the Russian republics and regions 
to "take as much sovereignty as you can stomach." And in 1992 - 1993 both 
Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament, already deeply in conflict with each other 
over the power division in the future Constitution, each sought to secure the 
support of Russian regional leaders in their fight for institutional influence. 
Weakened by internal conflict, the central government could not or did not want 
to enforce federal laws in the regions, especially if it meant turning the region 
into a supporter of its constitutional rival. Taking full advantage of the 
confrontation in Moscow, more than a third of the subjects of the Russian 
Federation withheld their contributions to the federal budget in 1992-93 and 
demanded special tax regimes or new federal subsidies for themselves. 
The most valuable 'asset' in the fight between the president and the 
parliament at the time was the support of the leaders of the ethnic republics. 
Being empowered to block constitutional changes, ethnic republics secured the 
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special attention of the federal government.8 The Federal Treaty itself, as it was 
adopted in 1992, legitimized the preferred status of ethnic republics (even 
though in most republics ethnic Russians constitute a majority of the 
population), and to further strengthen the support of ethnically based republics, 
overepresentation of the republics was initially written into the presidential 
. constitutional draft prepared in Summer 1993 in competition with the draft of the 
specially appointed parliamentary commission9 (Sharlet 1994). 
The Federal Treaty of 1992 reflected the bargaining strength of 
republics. In fact, it was a series of treaties, of which the first was signed 
between the center and 18 republics (Tatarstan and Chechen-lngushetiya 
refused to sign). Only after that and with stronger limitations on subjects' rights, 
treaty with the krais and oblasts, and one with the autonomous districts 
followed. However, the strong asymmetries in the federal subjects' status 
incited resistance from the regions, and, following the violent resolution of the 
intra governmental conflict in September-October 1993, the final constitutional 
draft equalized all subjects of the federation, stipulating as a concession to 
republics' claims that federal subjects may sign special treaties with the federal 
government and negotiate special status for themselves within the federation 
8For example, Solnick (1995) estimates that in 1992-93 the president issued 
favorable decrees (ukazy) and governmental resolutions (postanovleniia) that 
specially addressed the needs of 18 of the 21 republics (excluding Chechnya), 
but only 14 of the 57 oblasts and krais. 
9 The republics were promised fifty percent of all seats in the Council of 
Federation, the upper chamber of the parliament. 
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on an individual basis. 
4.2 Deepening of Regional Asymmetries Through Bilateral Bargaining 
Between the Center and the Units 
In 1994, in accordance with its promise, the Yeltsin administration began 
signing treaties with ethnic republics, that covered the issues of republics' 
constitutions, procedures for governors' selection, and specified fiscal revenue 
allocation mechanisms. The deepening of asymmetries led the administrations 
of many federal units to demand their own federal treaties as soon as possible, 
but only seven 'ethnic' republics managed to sign treaties with Moscow prior to 
the December 1995 parliamentary election (Solnick 1995). The Yeltsin 
administration, however, continued handing out treaties to units after the 
election as well. Immediately following the election four 'Russian' regions were 
awarded power-sharing agreements. Fifteen more power-sharing agreements 
were singed during the presidential campaign - between March 20 and June 13, . 
1997 ,· and Khabarovsk region was promised such an agreement after the 
election. Posing as the builder of a new, stronger Russian state, Yeltsin argued 
that power sharing agreements had already proven themselves as the basis of 
new federalism in Russia, which, he said, was founded on the principle of 
granting the regions ''the independence they can handle ... within the 
framework of the constitution."10 
100MRI Daily Digest May 27, 1996 
Chapter 4 Asymmetric Federal Bargaining in a New Federation 176 
Interestingly, after signing the first in a series of the pre-election power 
sharing treaties (with the Komi Republic, on March 20, 1997), the government 
issued a warning that the signing of such treaties might be brought to a halt if 
the Communists woti the June presidential election, since·the latter supported 
nationalization of property and strong federal control over regions. The 
Communists presidential candidate, in fact, never expressed any negative 
opinions about power-sharing agreements during the campaign, though some 
parliamentary deputies from the Communist party and other non-governmental 
parties, including such notables as the Federation Council Speaker Yegor 
Stroev and ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, blamed the power-sharing 
treaties for widening inequalities among regions. 
In May 1997, the top officials from the 17 regions that belong to the so-
called Siberian Accord issued a special declaration asking Moscow to stop the 
practice of power-sharing agreements and granting special privileges to some 
regions. In October 1996, representatives from six 'black earth' regions asked 
the State Duma to pass a law defining the legislative and executive rights of 
federal subjects, complaining that "those who came first earned more rights," 
ref erring to the 26 republics and regions that had already negotiated 
power-sharing treaties with the federal government. Boris Nemtsov, the 
governor of Nizhni Novgorod region, expressed an opinion that while he sees 
nothing bad in regional lobbying, there must be no separate agreements 
granting some regions privileges and subventions while other regions which 
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fulfil their financial obligations properly are actually discriminated against.11 The 
only problem with this statement is that Nemtsov's region had already signed its 
own special power-sharing agreement with the center. Of course, one can 
protect one's constituents interests in two ways: by securing special favors for 
one's own region, and by preventing the others from doing the same. To 
attempt both is a dominant strategy. Understandably, then, some regional 
leaders openly expressed their disagreement with the practices of bilateral 
power-sharing treaties, but nevertheless negotiated them for their regions. In 
addition to Nemtsov in Nizhnii Novgorod, the Rostov Head of Administration 
Vladimir Chub and the head of the legislature Alexander Popov were on record 
for a long time expressing the view that power-sharing agreements would lead 
to the eventual collapse of the federation. But once their neighbors from 
Krasnodar Kray negotiated a deal with Moscow in January 1996, Rostov 
leaders were forced to start preparing their own treaty, which was signed on 
June 11, 1996.12 Similarly, the governor of Samara region announced that in 
principle he was against the practice of signing bilateral treaties, but this did not 
prevent him himself from obtaining in July 1997 one of the best deals in the 
federation to-date, comparable only to the ones signed with Tatarstan and 
Barshkostan ethnic republics.13 
11 RIA November 11, 1996 
12Segodnya, N34 01.03.96 
130ne case is known when a governor has refused to sign the draft power 
sharing agreement between his republic and the Russian Federation. The 
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The next step in the exchange between the federal government and the 
regions' leaders took place during the summer of 1997, when power-sharing 
treaties were singed with the administrations of Bryansk, Vologda, Magadan, 
Saratov, Chelyabinsk, and Samara regions. Presidential representative Sergey · 
Shakhray claimed on th~t occasion that the signing of new power-sharing deals 
was a positive move in the direction of equality among all Russian regions. 14 
Such proclamations, though, fail to withstand even minimal criticism: some 
regions definitely got better deals than others. Certain power-sharing treaties, 
and especially the amendments to the treaties, are kept classified to avoid 
inter-regional rivalries, including the 13 (originally, 17) secret amendments to 
the last treaty with Samara. In the latter case, the public could only learn that 
after the president spent his three-week vacation in Samara region, he and 
governor Titov signed treaty, that gave Samara slightly fewer rights than the 
breakaway Chechen republic, assertive Tatarstan, and diamond-rich Yakutia, 
but more than other subjects of the Russian Federation. 
Despite the limited information about the power-sharing agreements, 
there exists anecdotal evidence of their contents and economic consequences. 
For example, on the third anniversary of the power-sharing treaty between the 
reason, however, was not the principle disapproval of the treaties practices, but 
the desire to further better the terms. Newly elected in Khakassiya, governor 
Aleksei Lebed (general Aleksandr Lebed's brother) refused to sign the draft 
treaty negotiated by his predecessor, arguing that he would need to study the 
experiences of other republics and regions that have signed similar agreements 
before preparing a new draft of his own. 
1411 Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 11 No.141; 08-01-97 
Mikhail G. Filippov Political Competition in Federations 179 
Russian federation and Bashkorstan, Mansur Ayupov, the Secretary of State of 
the Republic, admitted that all positive developments in the republic economy 
were due to the republic's special relations with the federal center. According to 
Ayupov, on the basis of the Treaty, the republic signed 22 agreements which 
specify the allocation of property, terms of access to foreign trade, the issues of 
agricultural development and others areas of interest. Bashkortostan is one of 
the few members of the Russian Federation which, under the treaty of sharing 
the terms of reference and prerogatives of August 3, 1994, has been given the 
right to independently carrying out international ties in the sphere of economics, 
science, culture and sports. If it were not for foreign trade, the economy of 
Bashkortostan would find itself in a difficult situation, because the republic, just 
as all of Russia, is facing the acute problem of non-payments and a shortage of 
cash. Barter in economic relations reaches almost 80 percent, but in 1996, 
Bashkortostan delivered 2.5 billion dollars' worth of goods to the world market, 
which is comparable with the republican budget. Mineral products account for 
61.4 percent of exports, and chemical and oil-chemical products, for 32 percent. 
Bashkorstan was allowed to retain all excises on oil and other mineral 
resources (the only other republic with such rights is Tatarstan). The per capita 
monthly gross national income in the republic now exceed $2,400, which put 
the republic in the 25th place in the world. Bashkorstan occupies the third place 
in Russia's housing construction, accounts for a tenth of the gas supplies to the 
countryside, and builds every eleventh kilometer of Russian roads. It has free 
urban transport and spends tens of billions of rubles on social needs. A third of 
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the republican budget is spent on the agrarian sector while the republican 
government chose not to pursue privatization, preserving both collective and 
state farms. The republic does not receive anything from the federal center but 
pays taxes. In fact, the taxes it pays are reduced, presumably, because the 
republic does not send money to the Center for financing the federal programs 
.on its territory.15 During the first six month of 1997 the republic paid 2.2 trillion 
rubles in federal taxes.16 At present, the republic is proposing additional 
agreements (seven new drafts) concerning the judicial system, the activity of 
the procurator's office, conscription, and other issues. 
Another success story, with respect to negotiations with the center is 
Sacha Republic, which produces estimated 98 percent of Russia's diamonds 
and over 26 percent of Russia's gold. In 1993 Russian diamond sales earned 
approximately 1.5 billion dollars and according to unofficial estimates, the 
annual per capita income in this republic approaches $24,000.17 In 1996, Sakha 
managed to build almost twice as much housing per capita than the federation 
average, despite the extreme Arctic climatic conditions.18 The 'special' 
relationship of Sakha with Russia dates back to the time before the collapse of 
15 RIA, February 18, 1997. For instance, the republic leadership explains, "a 
certain sum from the value added tax, which the republic must transmit to the 
State Budget, is left to us for financing ecological programmes. Part of other 
taxes also remains in our republic to ensure the activity of federal institutions." 
RIA, February 18, 1997. 
16"Nezavisimaia Gazeta," No.141 08-01-97 
17 Kommersant-Daily, November 11, 1996 
18RIA, December 17, 1996 
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the Soviet Union. In 1990, Sakha (Yakutia) withheld diamond shipments to then 
the Soviet government of Mikhail Gorbachev, prompted by Yeltsin's promise to 
give Sakha greater control of its resources, and, the republic's president, 
. Nikolaev, very publicly restarted shipments of diamonds and gold to Moscow 
once Yeltsin was firmly in control of Russia. In early December 1991 Nikolaev. 
handed Yeltsin a 241.7 carat diamond named 'Free Russia' to celebrate both 
Russia's independence and the transfer of Sakha's resources to Russia. Soon 
after that, Yeltsin decreed that Sakha would be allowed to sell 10 percent of its 
diamonds independently. In the meantime, led by its chairman Ruslan 
Khasbulatov, the Russian parliament, rivaling with the president, sought to 
convince Sakha's leaders that it, too, endorsed Sakha's right to profit from its 
resources and its economic sovereignty.19 More specifically, Khasbulatov 
pledged that he and the parliament would support Sakha's right to sell a portion 
of its diamonds and to work toward a bilateral agreement delineating Sakha's 
economic rights in its relations with Russia. He also alleged that ''the present 
government of Russia does not fully take into account the peculiarities of the 
regions in its actions' and was at times precipitating crises.1120 Yeltsin quickly 
offered Sakha more tangible returns than mere promises of the support in 
parliament. On March 31, 1992, a new agreement was announced which gave 
19Kempton, Daniel R. 1996 "The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): The Evolution of 
Center-Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation." p.5 
2°Kempton, Daniel R. 1996 "The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): The Evolution of 
Center-Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation." p.5 
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Sakha the profits now from 20 percent of its gem diamonds and all of its 
industrial diamonds. On June 29, 1995, the Sakha Republic signed a treaty 
which stipulated the devolution of powers and functions between the federal 
government and the Sakha Republic. Currently, the republics pays virtually no 
taxes to the federal budget but, at the same time, received 2 billion dollars as a 
zero interest federal credit in 1996.21 The tax deductions from the diamond 
industry have become the foundation of the Sakha budget, accounting for more 
than 50 percent of its revenues. In 1996 no diamonds were transferred to 
Moscow; on the contrary, Moscow transferred diamonds valued at around 1.5 
billion dollars from state stocks to Sakha.22 
4.3 Multilateral Bargaining 
Solnick (1995) suggests that, in addition to "placating restive regions" by 
means of the treaties, the center may have also weakened the coordinating 
mechanism that had permitted the republics to act collectively since 1990. If 
Tatarstan or Sakha, for instance, derive their special benefits from bilateral 
treaties rather than from their republic status, then perhaps they will be less 
willing to incur costs of defending the interests of other republics. In fact, the 
21 Kommersant-Daily, November 11, 1996. 
22However, according to Sakha officials, the federal side is not yet fulfilling the 
signed agreements fully - in 1996, only 30 percent of the budgetary money 
reached the republic. In particular, it is not fully financing the mining of its 85 
percent share of the republic's gold. This slowed down the production from 31 
to 30 metric ton. RIA Novosti, March 24, 1997. 
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Chairman of the State Council of Sakha republic has already suggested that 
special agreements may be needed in the future to regulate the relationships 
among groups of subjects of the Russian Federation. 
So far Moscow has successfully opposed all attempts to create regional 
alliances, such as the proposed Far East Republic, Ural republic, Altay republic 
(including a part of Buryatyiya), Mountain (Gorskaya) republic, Volga, or 
Russian republics. However, extra governmental territorial political alliances 
have proven to be much more successful. In 1996 there were at least nine 
territorial associations uniting regional elites. Most federal subjects belonged to 
one of nine: the Northwest Association, Russia1s Central Area Association, the 
11Black Earth11 Association, the Association of Northern Caucasian Regions, the 
11Big Volga11 Association, the Urals Regional Association, the 11Siberian Accord 11 
Association, the Far East Association, and the 11Council of Donor Regions. 11 
Activities of all those association are focused on promoting regional 
representation and lobbying regional interests in the. federal government. 
The Russian Federation, we can now say, is entering a new stage of 
11 regionalization. 11 This is not a 11parade of sovereignties11 like that of 1992, when 
many regions raised the possibility of seceding from the Russian Federation 
and each region bargained for better terms for itself. Now regional elites do not 
raise the question of secession; instead, they seek additional powers from the 
center. The role of numerous regional associations may become much more 
profound in the event of any potential political crisis in Moscow, and especially 
in any new constitutional conflict between the President and the Parliament. In 
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such a conflict the sides, once again, would be forced to rely on the support of 
regional elites, by giving them new confessions from the center. That would 
create strong incentives for 'collective' bargaining on the part of regions' elites, 
who are now much better organized than in 1991-1992. 
4.4 Reaction to Regional Asymmetries in Electoral Choice of Russian 
Regions 
In this section we evaluate our hypotheses connecting economic 
conditions in Russia's regions and its forming party system. As we argued 
above, there are winners and losers in economic reform and federal bargaining 
and that the traditional positions of regions in relative economic standing are 
drastically upset, further increasing regional inequalities and transforming 
former 'winners' into current 'losers.' This process affected the political choices 
of political elites and electorates in regions. Looking at official data from the 
1991-1996 elections and official economic statistics published by Goskomstat, 
we show that the winning or losing status of a Russian region impacts both 
the character and dynamics of its vote. In particular, regions that were losing 
economically as well as the ones that were losing politically, in terms of lack of 
success in federal bargaining, responded well to communist parties that 
promise a stronger center and 'fairness' in the allocation of economic 
resources. 
The phenomena that requires explanation is the clearly regional pattern 
of the communist victories in Russia. Preferences expressed by voters in 
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regions across the Russian Federation over time seem to be remarkably stable. 
Regional returns of all elections since 1989 are correlated to such a degree 
that most regions can be easily divided into the pro-reform and pro-communist 
blocks. While the electorate's choices changed over time, with the plurality of 
Russian voters supporting Zhii-inovsky in December 1993, Communists in 
December 1995, and Yeltsin in 1996, such changes occurred as proportional 
shifts so that in all elections the "conservative" regions continue to be relatively 
more conservative than those supporting the pro-democracy camp. Based on 
such observations, political geographers proclaimed the so called "Red Belt'1 of 
regions surrounding Moscow and to the south of the 55th parallel (Kolosov, 
Petrov and Smirniagin 1990, Slider et al. 1994; Orttung and Parrish 1996). 
Observing a remarkable stability of aggregate electoral returns at both 
regional and district levels, some analysts argue that, since 1991, Russian 
voters have been divided into three fairly stable blocs - pro-reform, anti-reform, 
and the center. The center, is a diverse mixture combining protest voters, 
nationalists, and voters (such as the Women of Russia's supporters) who 
simply want stability (McFaul 1996). Supporters of such a view acknowledge 
that these three groups could be quite stable at the macro level, but not 
necessarily at the individual level. In fact, individual level studies reveal 
significant volatility of voters' choices. Thus, Wyman (1997) finds that there is 
a persistently high degree of volatility within the electorate, with voters shifting 
from one camp to another between elections. This implies that the ideological 
preferences of Russian voters are not sufficiently stable to provide an 
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explanation for the observed stability in regional choices. In addition, as some 
regions still move across voting blocks, one may want to find factors behind 
such electoral dynamics. More importantly, the idea of stable electoral 
preferences and the separation of Russian regions into stable pro-democratic 
and pro-communist camps failed to predict the outcomes of regional elections 
.of governors, where it turned out that voters' choices appeared quite 
independent of "ideology" (Smirniagin 1996). The "Red Belt" phenomenon, in 
other words, happens to be less pronounced in regional elections, with 
democrats winning in pro-communist regions and communists successful in 
some relatively "pro-democratic" oblasts. 
In what follows, we argue that economic and political circumstances in 
which the residents of Russian regions find themselves are the factor that can 
explain a significant portion of variation in regional support for the Communist 
party. More specifically, the origin of the "Red Belt" lies in such individually felt 
economic conditions as the magnitude of direct economic losses suffered by 
the population at the beginning of reform and gains (losses) after the reform 
started, and such political factors as successful conclusion of power-sharing 
treaties with Moscow and of the region's success in federal bargaining. Some 
electorally relevant differences among Russia's regions were inhered from the 
previous regime; others are direct results of current economic policies. When 
we control for such economic and political conditions, we find that previous 
electoral patterns, no matter how strong a predictor other scholars find it, 
becomes only marginally important in explaining the variation in regions' 
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support for the communists. For example, once we control for regional 
conditions, the distribution of regional support for the head of the communist 
party Gennadii Zuganov in the second round of the 1996 presidential elections 
becomes practically independent of the support for the Communist party in 
the December 1993 parliamentary elections. The importance given in the 
literature to the role of ideological preferences (or the "traditional conservatism" 
of Russian voters in some regions) is also questioned by the fact that when we 
control for regional conditions, we find no additional impact of the degree of 
urbanization on the regional vote for the Communist party in 1993, and even 
the inverse (!) relation in December 1995 elections. Previous studies claimed 
that 60-70 percent of the Russian "political geography11 could be explained by 
just one factor - the share of the urban population (or the share of people with 
higher education, which almost perfectly correlated with the degree of 
urbanization). Specifically, the electoral superiority of the democrats and the 
centrists over the leftists was claimed to be directly proportional to the share of 
the urban population in·a particular administrative district or federal territory 
(Smirniagin 1996). Controlling for the regional conditions we find that such 
influence disappears (Orttung and Parrish 1996). 
The importance of economic factors and region's bargaining standing in 
determining the level of support for the Communist party and, therefore, for the 
pro-government and pro-democratic parties as well, indicates the possibility 
for national and local politicians to influence regional electoral choices both by 
bilateral negotiations and by attempting to manipulate regional economic 
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conditions. As we argued above, regional economic success in the Russian 
Federation strongly depends on successful bargaining with the federal 
government or on the personal ability of a regional leader to secure economic 
benefits for the regio·n. Thus, geographic voting patterns in Russia could be 
greatly influenced by the shifting outcomes in bargaining between regional and 
federal governments. 
4.4.1 Initial Economic Conditions, Lost Safety-Nets and Communist 
Support 
One of the most severe of all losses that the Russian population suffered 
due to reform was the loss of life-time savings as a result of inflation. Due to 
unequal distribution of economic resources across Russia's regions, 
opportunities to protect savings varied across regions. Moreover, the level of 
savings was different across Russia and in most cases those savings were 
forces by impossibility to buy a product at the local market or as safety-nets. For 
example, iri 1992 urban population on average earned 6961 rubles and spent 
6544, while rural population earned 6611 rubles and spent only 5221 rubles.23 
In urban areas, and especially in large cities, people did not have to rely on 
personal savings to enjoy the benefits of the old economic system, traditionally 
paid for by the rest of the country: better health care, access to education, and 
23"Living Conditions of Russian Population" Official Report. 1996. (Uroven 
Zhizni Naseleniya Rossii. Goskomstat. Officialnoe lzdanie. 1996.) Moscow 
1996. 
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superior supply of consumer goods. 
The economic reform introduced by Yegor Gaidar in early 1991 included 
as one of its essential components liberalization of previously state regulated 
prices. After their deregulation, consumer prices increased enormously. Even 
according to official statistics, the minimum survival level rose by 33,700 
percent between 1990 and 1993 - from 62 rubles to 20,600 rubles. While 
salaries, pensions and other incomes were partially adjusted to high inflation, 
no adjustment was made to adequately compensate for the devaluation of 
personal savings. In 1991 the population held 372.3 billion rubles in the 
official state savings bank (Sberbank) - more then 3,300 rubles per adult, or 
six average monthly salaries. Moreover, it is widely believed that in Russia a 
large portion of savings is held in cash, not in bank accounts. The third form in 
which significant savings were kept was a variety of "insurance" policies - in 
essence, accumulation accounts paid to the beneficiary either at the time of an 
'event,' e.g., marriage, or upon reaching a certain age. All such savings were 
effectively lost as a result of price liberalization. 
Unfortunately, no official statistics are available to directly compare 
losses of personal savings across Russian regions. We use a substitute 
measure instead. In April 1991 , after the Soviet government raised some of the 
still controlled prices, saving accounts in Sberbank and State bonds were 
indexed by 40 percent. In 1991 we also observe that the rate of new savings 
(in Sberbank and in State bonds) sharply increased as compared to 1990 - on 
average, from 7.5 to 19.6 percent of all incomes. Ironically, on the eve of price 
Chapter 4 Asymmetric Federal Bargaining in a New Federation 190 
liberalization, the Russian people deposited almost one-fifth of their annual 
incomes into Sberbank saving accounts.24 One can only speculate about the 
motives for holding money in saving accounts before the expected price 
liberalization. Perhaps many hoped that the government would continue 
indexation and believeq that price increases would be limited as was promised 
by virtually all Russian liberal economists (e.g., Gaidar, Yavlinskii, Popov). 
Perhaps, for many it was the only way to safeguard at least a part of their 
lifetime savings, as consumer goods quickly disappeared from the shops and 
hard currency was difficult to purchase outside large metropolitan areas. 25 
At the same time, more than 10 percent of all incomes in 1991 resulted 
from indexation. If we suppose that indexed money was not withdrawn from 
saving accounts, then in 1991 there should be a positive correspondence 
between the savings rate and previously accumulated savings. This 
correspondence would be even stronger if those with higher accumulated 
savings also had a higher general propensity to save, and were ready to make 
relatively higher new savings in 1991. But even if new savings were a fixed 
portion of incomes across all individuals, people with higher accumulated 
24Russia's Statistical Yearbook 1995. Moscow (Rossiiskii Statisticheskii 
Ezhegodnik. Goskomstat. 1995.Moskva. 
25There was also a significant (from 19.2 billion or 5 percent of incomes to 81,4 
billion or 9.8 percent of incomes) increase in the rate of cash holdings between 
1990 and 1991. At the same time, savings in Sberbank increased by more 
than 156 billion rubles or by 72 percent - from 216 billion in 1990 to 372 billion 
in 1991. With indexation explaining only the 40 percent growth over the 1990 
level, the rest is a result of new deposits. 
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savings prior to 1991 had to have a higher saving rate in 1991 as a result of 
indexation. Therefore, we can use the observed savings rate in 1991 as a proxy 
for the amount of previously accumulated savings and, thus, as a proxy for 
losses suffered by individuals after the price liberalization. For the 1991 
calendar year the Russian State Statistical Committee reports saving rates for 
the 77 "first-level" federal subjects of the Russian Federation (republics, 
oblasts and krais), while separate data are missing for Khakasiya and 11 lesser 
autonomies which are located within oblasts and krais. Using this data we test 
the hypothesis that regions where population suffered the greatest losses of 
savings would demonstrate distinctive voting patterns in December 1993 and 
thereafter elections. Those with substantial savings prior to 1991, who then lost 
them to inflation, may be more disappointed by the reform and less willing to 
support pro-reform parties. Consequently, we expect to find a positive 
correlation between the losses in savings and the vote for the Communist Party. 
In fact, using the rate of savings in 1991 as a proxy for lost savings, we 
do find a significant impact of this variable on the vote for the Communist party 
in December 1993 elections and in the subsequent elections as well. Figure 
4.1 shows the rate of saving in 1991 and the vote for the Communist Party in 
December 1993. The correlation between the two variables is .72, which 
increases to .83 when Dagestan, an evident outlier, is excluded.26 
26Perhaps the population of Dagestan kept most of their money in cash, or, 
perhaps, other regionally specific factors influenced the vote there in 1993, as 
well as in later elections. For example, no one thus far could explain why in the 
1996 Presidential election much fewer Dagestani voters (in absolute terms) 
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The rate of saving in 1991 is not any less significant in explaining the 
support for the Communist party in December 1995 and the vote for Zuganov 
for presidency in 1996 (Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4). The correlation between the 
rate of saving and the vote for the Communist party in December 1995 is .7}, 
while in the presidential election it is .72 for the first round and .57 for the 
. second. Notice that correlation between the vote for the Communist party in 
December 1993 and the same vote in December 1995 and in the presidential 
election is .75, .78 and .49 respectively (for the sample of 77 "first-level" 
regions). It suggests that the impact of lost savings on the vote in 1995 and 
1996 is too great to be dismissed as an artifact of the "ideological" correlation 
with the 1993 vote. The loss of savings explains the vote for Zuganov in the 
second round of the 1996 presidential election better than does the vote for the 
Communist party in December 1993 (r = .57 versus r = .49). More important is 
that the impact of the rate of saving on the vote for the Communist party in 
December 1995 and for Genadii Zuganov in 1996 remains both meaningful in 
magnitude and statistically significant when we control for the results of 
December 1993 elections in the multi-variate analysis. For example, when we 
regress the December 1995 vote for the Communist party on its vote in 
December 1993 and the rate of saving in 1991, we find that each additional 
voted for the communist leader Zuganov in the run-off than did in the first 
round, despite the significantly increased turnout between the two rounds (only 
401,069 votes for Zuganov out of 879,723 valid in the second round, or 46.6 
percent, versus 511,202 votes out of a total of 787,110 valid in the first round, 
or 64.9 percent). 
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point of the rate of saving corresponds to a .56 point increase in support for the 
communists. 
4.4.2 Additional Controls 
Returning to the analysis of the 1993 data and before we reject the 
sociological-historical "Red-Belt" hypothesis, we should control for several other 
socio-economic characteristics of regions (Table 4.1 ). First, the opportunity to 
protect personal savings by buying consumer goods was not equal across 
regions, and we may expect that in regions where there were relatively more 
goods to buy or "invest in" in 1991, the communist vote would be lower. In order 
to compare the supply of consumer goods across regions, we look at retail 
growth between 1990 and 1991 and find that the support for the Communist 
party in December 1993 was, indeed, lower in regions with relatively greater 
opportunities to buy consumer goods in 1991. Another available measure of 
the supply of durable consumer goods that could serve as a reasonable 
investment of savings is the number of personal cars per capita. The number 
of cars sold in a region depended only on the quantity of cars, centrally 
supplied, but not on the income distribution, as in every region the demand 
greatly exceeded supply.27 Again, we find that regions that were better supplied 
with personal cars as a way to protect savings from inflation tended to vote less 
for the communists. 
271t is a safe assumption that car sales in 1991 did not vary by regions due to 
variations in demand in the view of widespread shortages. 
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Once the loss of savings occurs, we can expect that an economically 
active population would recover from the shock quicker than retirees who 
have no hope of restoring their life-long savings. Correspondingly, the 
proportion of economically active population should be inversely related to the 
vote for the communists. As Table 4.1 reports, the data support such an 
assertion. 
In addition, as the economically active population finds new opportunities 
to earn incomes, the relationship between savings and support for reform 
eventually must become positive. Once price stabilization takes place and 
consumer goods become available, the higher saving rates in some regions 
should correspond to the stories of relative economic success and the 
increasing economic well-being of the population. In other worlds, at some 
point higher saving rates should become a predictor of lower support for the 
communists. In fact, the data reveal that higher saving rates in 1992 still led to 
higher communist vote in December 1993, but that higher savings in 1993 
contributed to the reduction of communist support. One should remember that 
in 1993 private companies started to offer the population a variety of attractive 
investment opportunities, promising quick fortunes. When calculating the 
savings rate for 1992 and 1993, we combine savings in Sberbank and all other 
reported savings outside state banks, as the last part became the largest part of 
total savings. In 1992 the population saved only 337.7 billion or 4.8 percent of 
incomes in saving accounts and 1006.9 billion or 13.9 percent of incomes as 
cash both in rubles and foreign currency, while in 1993, 4859.2 billion (6.2 
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percent) were saved in bank accounts and 13836.3 billion (17.3 percent) in 
cash (including 7409.5 billion rubles in foreign currency). 
As a result of the reforms, the population suffered not only direct 
economic losses, but also a severe decline in social benefits, while the 
magnitude of the decline was different across regions. As noted earlier, to 
reduce government spending, Moscow reformers stopped financing social 
programs in the regions with the hope that local and regional governments 
would cover the deficit. Also where many social benefits had been previously 
provided by industrial companies, after privatization such companies could not 
afford social spending at the old level anymore. As a result, social benefits 
became the responsibility of local and regional governments and depended 
greatly on their economic resources. Unfortunately, the only consistently 
available regional statistics reflecting the decline in provision of social benefits 
is the level of available hospital facilities per capita, which fell by 6 percent 
between 1991 and 1993. It turns out that in regions. with smaller decline in 
availability of hospital facilities (which were still mostly free of charge for the 
population) per capita, we find lower support for the communists in December 
1993 elections. We find no effect of urbanization on the vote for the communist 
in 1993 when controlled for regions' economic conditions. 
4.4.3 'Economic' Strategies in Electoral Campaigns 
In December 1995, Russian voters chose among 43 parties. The 
Communist party obtained a plurality of the vote, while its support across 
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regions varied between 5.3 and 53 percent. As we argue above, over a half of 
variance can be explained by differences in initial economic conditions in 
regions expressed through the magnitude of losses of life-time savings, or, 
more precisely, are related to the savings rate in 1991. By the time of the 1995 
parliamentary election, ~ussian living standards continued to deteriorate, 
further increasing differentiation among regions. 
The government chose to control inflation by delaying payments of 
wages and pensions. In 1995, 19 percent of all earned wages was paid with a 
delay. In December 1995, the reported amount of overdue wage payments 
amounted to 141 percent of average monthly wages per worker. Forty 
thousand large and medium-size companies (with more than 200 employees) 
reported delays in wage payments.28 Delay of payments is a strong reason to 
believe that the official statistical reports of salaries, wages and pensions do 
not reflect actual changes in economic circumstances of the population. 
Reported are not the actually paid salaries, but some accounting quantities 
adjusted to the rate of inflation when they "get on the books," and not when 
they are actually paid out. The strategy of delay must be recognized as a 
brilliant macroeconomic tool for eliminating the "inflationary pressure" on the 
economy. Russian voters, though, refused to reward such a strategy during 
December 1995 elections. Promised but not paid salaries and wages provided 
insufficient incentives to support the government. 
280fficial data by Goskomstat: "Osnovnye Socialno Economicheskie 
Pokazateli," January-April 1996. Goskomstat. Moscow. 1996. 
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The Russian government did attempt to reduce the amount of delayed 
payments in the end of 1995. While the amount of delayed payments had been 
growing throughout the year, in December 1995 unpaid wages declined on 
average by 1 .41 percent. This small decline was cleverly allocated a·cross 
regions, so that in some regions arrears declined while in others they 
increased. For example, in Moscow Region wage arrears were reduced by 27 
percent, and in Tatarstan, by 34.5 percent. But in lvanovo oblast they grew by 
16 percent, in Samara, Ulyanovsk, and Belgorod oblasts - by 14 percent, 13 
percent and 9 percent respectively. It is fair to say that the decline in wage 
arrears in the end of 1995 was a net change, a tip of the iceberg of a 
pre-election game of redistribution, and not surprisingly, such a move made a 
difference for the distribution of the vote for the Communist party. Multivariate 
analysis indicates that each percentage point of a decline in arrears (with the 
maximum decline of 46.9 percent and the maximum increase of 54 percent) 
reduced the regional vote for the communists by 0.18 percentage points (Table 
4.2). Also the support for the communists was stronger in regions with larger 
numbers of companies delaying wage payments, as on December 1 , 1995 
(adjusted for the population size of the regions). 
Similarly to what we observed in 1993, the communist vote was lower in 
regions with a higher proportion of economically active population. The data on 
regional consumer price indexes became available for the first time in 1995 and 
we find that regions with higher real income growth during 1995 (adjusted for 
the regional consumer price index) had lower vote for the Communist party 
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(Table 4.2). 
Our comparison across regions is based on the official reports and, 
thereby, suffers from many problems related to the low precision of national and 
regional data. Knowing the limitations of the Russian data collection, we hope 
that errors in our data are not significantly and systematically biased for some 
. particular regions. At the same time, underreporting of personal incomes is 
probably uneven across regions, while household subsistence food production 
is not counted in the income figures and also varies in importance. It makes 
sense for us to double check the conclusions on the basis of another measure 
- an assessment of economic conditions in regions implicitly made by the 
deputies of the State Duma when they decide how much federal support one or 
another region should receive. At least officially, the federal budget allocates 
support to regions based on criteria of 11need 11 and 11especially urgent need. 11 
While the actual allocation of money to regions has almost nothing to do with 
the budget sums approved by the Duma, we can take the intended allocation of 
federal funds to "especially urgent need" as a proxy for economic conditions. 
Higher levels of planned allocation (compared to the region's population) 
should correspond to worse economic conditions and, therefore, to higher vote 
for the Communist party. Data support such an assertion (Table 4.2). 
Surprisingly, when we control for the economic conditions discussed 
above, we find that the degree of urbanization is negatively correlated with the 
communist vote, which goes contrary to the conventional academic wisdom! It 
turns out that the rural vote is more pro-government and pro-democratic than it 
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should be given the economic conditions. 
Finally, controlling for the pattern of previous support for the 
communists, and perhaps, for the LDPR in 1993, we improve our statistical 
. model only a little more. Previous electoral choice explains the mere additional 
7 percent of the total variation of the vote for the Communists across regions in 
December 1995. 
4.4.4 The 1996 Presidential Elections 
Our analysis indicates that as in 1995, lost savings, growth in incomes, 
and unpaid salaries and wages affected the 1996 presidential election. While in 
the first month following the 1995 parliamentary elections incomes fell sharply, 
in the following months, especially in February, March and April, nominal 
incomes and wages grew steadily - the government took some extraordinary 
and very expensive measures to finance such growth.29 Hussian regions 
reacted predictably- the faster incomes grew, the lower was the vote for 
Zuganov. In April 1996, billions of rubles were distributed among regions to help 
industrial companies pay debts and raise wages. Of course, on average real 
wages (adjusted for inflation) went down. But interregional differences were 
significant: in some regions the decline was more then 12 percent, while in 
other regions the growth in real wages reached 6 percent. We can only 
29Such as selling 4.4 billion dollars of foreign currency reserves and issuing 
official tax deductions on more than 30 trillion rubles. It has been estimated 
that state debt rose by 20 billion dollars during the six months of electoral 
campaign (lllarionov, Segodnia, No.110, 06/25/96). 
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speculate about the extent to which these differences resulted from Moscow's 
policies versus regional economic policies, but growth in real wages strongly 
reduced the regional vote for Zuganov. The April 1996 billions were money well 
spent by the government. As Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show, each point of growth in 
real wages decreased the vote for Zuganov by more than a point, both in the 
first and the second round of the presidential election. 
As nominal incomes and wages were growing in the first months of 
1996 (along with Yeltsin's popularity in public opinion polls), Russia 
experienced an enormous increase in overdue wages and salaries. By the 
beginning of June 1996, the government alone was directly responsible for 
overdue payments in the amount of 4, 190 billion rubles. In addition, firms 
owed 22,865 billion rubles in wages. Total overdue wages were more than 
twice (27,055 billion) what was owed at the beginning of 1996 (13,380 billion). 
Across regions, arrears rose by around 120 percent in Orel and Kursk oblast 
and by 363 percent in Moscow. If raising incomes before the 1995 elections 
was but a mean of political campaigning, then after elections there should have 
been no money to pay and we would expect to find a correspondence between 
pre-election income growth and growing arrears. And, perhaps, regions with 
higher wages would suffer more from delays in payments. It is also natural to 
find larger arrears in regions with troubled industries, as indicated by a decline 
of the index of industrial production and by the level of their debts to other 
economic agents. This economic reasoning is supported by data, with one 
exception - the growth in arrears is lower in regions with higher levels of 
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overdue debt to creditors.30 Perhaps the government decided to pay its share 
of debt to workers in the troubled areas where companies could not afford to 
pay their bills. But, interestingly enough, in regions voting for the pro-
democratic parties (such as Yabloko, Russia's Democratic Choice, 'Forward 
Russia' and Our Home is Russia) wage arrears were higher. An additional 
percentage point of the pro-democratic support in 1995 corresponded to an 
increase in arrears growth of 3 points (Table 4.5). Was it accidental that higher 
than average growth in wage arrears occurred in Moscow, Moscow Region, St. 
Petersburg, Lenigrad Region, Yaroslavl, Vologda and Murmansk Oblasts -
regions, where, judging by the previous elections, support for Yeltsin was 
guaranteed? In areas with higher than average growth of arrears in 1996, only 
5.4 million voters supported the CPRF in December 1995, while in areas with 
the lower growth, almost 1 O million. Notice also that the effect of growing 
arrears on the vote for Zuganov is counter-intuitive - slow growing arrears were 
paralleling the nevertheless higher vote for the communist candidate.31 
30 At the beginning of 1996 the overdue wage arrears constitute around 5-15 
percent of the total overdue debt to creditors. The overdue debt, in turn, was 
around 50 percent of the total debt. 
31The government helped regions financially up to the last days of the 
campaign. For example, seven days before the first round of the elections, the 
Finance Ministry began implementing the Russian President's decree on aid to 
regional budgets for teacher's salaries. As was immediately reported by the 
Presidential Office, funds from the Federal budget were transferred to 17 
regions: Arkhangelsk, Bryansk, Republic of Mordovia, Ulyanovsk, Stavropol 
Territory, Republic of Daghestan, Kurgan, Aginsky Buryatia, Irkutsk, Primorye 
Territory, Murmansk, Tver, Penza, Krasnoyarsk Territory, Sakhalin, Kostroma, 
and Kursk. Almost all of these regions in the past supported opposition parties 
and the pattern of voting in the presidential election may have been smoothed, 
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4.4.5 'Political' Variables - Direct Impact of Asymmetries in Federal 
Bargaining on Regional Vote. 
Above we argued that one of the forms federal bargaining currently 
takes in Russia is negotiation of power-sharing agreements. We argued that 
the power-sharing agreements put regions in unequal status, where having a 
treaty with Moscow can be viewed as a region's success in bargaining. Another 
indication of "bargaining success" is proportion of regional investments financed 
by the federal government. We control the results of the 1996 presidential 
elections for both variables - the dummy variable indicating signing a power-
sharing agreement between Moscow and the republic or region and the 
proportion of all regional investments financed by Moscow (Table 4.4 and 4.5). 
It turned out that the fact of having a federal power-sharing agreement is 
significant in explaining the second-round (Yeltsin versus Zuganov) results. 
Controlling for other variables, the support for Zuganov in those regions was 
lower by 3.8%. The federal investments in region suppressed Zuganov's vote 
in both rounds. 
Thus, "losers" in the bargaining process (not differently from the "losers" 
in economic terms) tend to support the communist challenger. If we compare 
the vote for Zuganov in the run-off elections with his vote in the first round of 
the 1996 elections, in the first round (when other candidates were present), 
but was not reversed: in the first round Yeltsin lost to Zuganov on the average 
of 5 percent there, while he won by 4 percent elsewhere. 
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Zuganov won more votes than Yeltsin in 11 out of 21 republics and in 30 out of 
55 krais and regions, while in the second round Zuganov won only 7 republics 
and 25 krais and regions. In six of the republics - Dagestan, lngushetia, 
Kabardino-Balkariya, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, North Osetiya, and Tararstan -
Zyuganov actually lost thousands of votes between rounds. 
Our hypothesis is that Zuganov's vote increase between rounds depends 
on the regional economic status and the short term quick-term economic 
improvements shortly before elections. We measure the regional status by the 
following variables - nominal income growth and consumer price increase 
compared to the 1994 level and the percentage of taxes left in the region.32 
Short-term effects of economic policy are measured by decline in wage arrears 
in May-June 1996. In addition, we control for the regional "ideology'' by 
including into equation the first round vote for other than Yeltsin alternatives to 
Zuganov - General Lebed, nationalist Zhirinovsky and democrat Yavlinsky. 
The results are reported in Table 4.6. Once again we find that the reduction of 
· 
32ln addition to power sharing treaties, Moscow has also negotiated a variety of 
revenue sharing agreements. As a rule, in Russia all taxes are collected locally, 
after which the regions send to Moscow a certain ,percentage of collected taxes. 
At the same time, a share of taxes is sent back to the regions in the form of 
fiscal transfers. Both the tax shares and the amount of fiscal transfers are 
subject to negotiation. For example, in 1995 the proportion of tax revenues sent 
to Moscow varied from 0 percent in Yakutia to 55 and 60 percent respectively in 
the Yamalo-Nenets and Khanty-Mansi autonomous okrugs. At the same time, 
each region's reliance on federal subsidies as a percentage of their budget 
receipts from federal budget ranged between .2 percent in Bashkorstan and 0.4 
in St. Petersburg to 81.6 percent in the Koryak autonomous okrug and 78.7 
percent in Tuva. Estimated per capita net balance of financial flows varied in 
1994 between + 1393000 and -2833000 rubles and in 1995 between +9480000 
and -6677000 rubles (see Table 4.7). 
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wage arrears corresponds to distribution of pro-communist vote in regions. As 
we would expect higher nominal income growth reduced Zuganov's gains, 
while higher inflation increased them. Finally, the higher the proportion of taxes 
Moscow allowed the region to keep, the lower the Zuganov's gains between 
rounds. 
4.5 Searching for the Mechanism Connecting 'Bargaining' Variables 
with Regional Vote 
To the extent to which federal influences (e.g., economic aid specific to 
the region and bilateral treaties) are implementations of some bilateral 
agreements, the mechanism behind their influence on regional vote involves 
the effort on the part of regional elites of delivering their side of the 'bargain.' 
Behind the coefficients on out independent variables in section 4 of this 
chapter, then, among other things there are efforts of regional administrations 
to mobilize and direct regional vote. 
4.5.1 Regional Elites: Can They 'Deliver' Votes 
Many factors combine to enable regional elites to deliver their part of the 
political bargain, providing the center with much needed political and electoral 
support. Below we consider the four most important factors - (1) weak or 
practically non-existent regional legislatures and local governments, (2) low 
level of national party activities in the regions, (3) the relatively high political 
and electoral popularity of regional elites enjoy; and (4) their effective control 
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over the local media. In many regions these factors reenforce each other. 
The confrontation of 1992-1993 between Yeltsin and the Parliament 
resulted not only in the constitutional increase of presidential powers. Another 
. group of winners were regional governors. In exchange for their loyalty, the 
governors' powers were significantly extended following Yeltsin's order to 
dissolve all regional Soviets - regional bodies of legislative power. Although 
some legislatures resisted, eventually all were replaced. Many governors 
enjoyed a long period (some over a year) without having to bother with a 
legislature. Governors were able to manage carefully the process of electing 
new regional parliaments. About a third of the deputies elected to the post-1993 
legislatures were officials appointed by the governors - in particular, heads of 
rayon administrations and officials from the regional administrations. 
Consequently, few regional legislatures seriously challenge their governor's 
authority, although there are some notable exceptions as in Kemerovo (Zlotnik 
1996). The Kremlin also allowed governors to restrict the prerogatives of local 
bodies of power and to dismiss many elected mayors (e.g., in Nignii Novgorod, 
Vladivostok, Izhevsk). At the same time, with the continuing collapse of the 
federal economic system, Moscow gradually lost control over giant industrial 
enterprises whose managers, in· Soviet time, were often the informal 'czars' of 
the regions and whose popularity within the regions, if anything, went up. 
Finally, because of the policy of delegating the burden of provision of formerly 
federal programs to regions, most federal bodies of power in regions fell under 
financial and administrative control of regional governors. 
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Public opinion polls estimate that on average the regional bodies of 
power enjoy relatively high levels of popularity, at least when compared with the 
federal government (correspondingly 35 and 15 percent in 1996).33 The 
evidence is ample that some regional leaders enjoy such high levels of 
popularity and so fully control their regions that all attempts of the federal 
government to remove them from office have failed. Thus Yeltsin had tried twice 
to dismiss the governor of Irkutsk, Nozhikov, but he refused to step down and 
successfully rallied broad support within the region to protest Moscow's actions. 
Nozhikov's relations with Moscow changed after he supported Yeltsin in his 
showdown with Khasbulatov, and as a part of his reward, Nozhikov was allowed 
to hold an election, which he won in a landslide. Yeltsin did dismiss the 
governor of Sverdlovsk, Rossel, for trying to create a Ural Republic, but Rossel 
remained the most popular politician in the region and was soon elected head 
of the regional legislature. Subsequently, Rossel was elected governor (in 
August 1995) and became a strong supporter of Yeltsin's reelection. Another 
dismissed governor, of Novosibirsk, Mukha, was among the few heads of 
provincial administrations who overtly opposed Yeltsin's dissolution of the 
parliament. When his replacement, an appointed governor Ivan lndinok asked 
Yeltsin to authorize regional elections in December 1995, relying on support of 
the government party "Our Home Is Russia," contrary to Moscow expectations, 
33"Pre-electoral Situation in Russia: Sociological Study" by the sociological 
Center of the Moscow State University. December 6-15, 1995. National News 
Service. 
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Mukha defeated lndinok by a margin of more than 140 thousand votes (466,292 
to 321,782) in the runoff election.34 The list of stories about clashes with the 
center followed by electoral successes in the regions would also include 
governors of Chelyabinsk (Sumin, who won 1993 elections only to be 
imm~diately dismissed by Yeltsin), Bryank (Lodkin, dismissed by Yeltsin in 
November 1993), Primorsky Kray (Nazdratenko), Ulyanovsk (Goraychev) and 
Tula (Starodubtsev). 
In addition to the electoral advantages coming with the position of the 
'best protector of our region's interests,' the secure position of many governors 
could be explained by their belonging to the network of the old nomenclature 
elite. A recent sociological study of elites in Russia shows that the proportion of 
nomenclature in all elite positions to be the highest (82.3 percent) among 
regional elites (as opposed to 75.0 percent in the presidential circle, 74.3 
percent in federal government, and 61.0 percent in business elites).35 In recent 
regional elections, virtually all candidates, regardless of their current ideological 
position, belong at some point of their career to the top nomenclature. And 
while it is true that only 19 of 47 governors who ran were reelected in 1996, in 
most cases incumbents lost to someone else from the midst of the same cadre 
of elites - to a former governor, the Chairman of the regional Soviet, or a 
member of the Council of Federation (directly elected for 1993-1995 to 
34Sovetskaya Sibir', December 28, 1995; Zlotnik 1996. 
35Kryshtanovskaya, Olga "Financial Oligarchy in Russia" (Financial Oligarchy in 
Russia), Izvestia, January 10, 1996, p. 5. 
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represent regions). In fact, the circle of elites is so well defined that in some 
regions both the government and the communist opposition were forced to 
endorse the same candidates (Khabarovsk Kray, Khanty-Mansiyskiy okrug, 
Komi-Permiyatskiy okrug). 
Pro-reform and p_ro-government political parties in Russia do not have 
adequate regional or territorial organization. In most cases, the local democratic 
movement is represented by few dozens (Smith 1997). A typical study 
conducted in 1994 in Primorskiy Kray counted 20-30 members of Russia's 
Choice and a few dozen members of other pro-democratic parties among 1.5 
million voters (Kirkov 1995).36 As a result, the political activities of these parties 
in practice are restricted to Moscow, St. Petersburg, and a few other major 
cities. The only way of personally (i.e., not on the television screen and from 
Moscow) reaching voters in small towns and villages for those parties is 
through cooperation with local authorities and regional industrial managers. 
Only 2.5 percent of registered parties even tried to nominate their own 
candidates in the 1996 regional elections, and among 70 elected regional 
executives (counting the 1993, 1995 and 1996 regional elections), only ten 
officially ran under a party label. In regional legislative bodies, on average only 
14 percent of deputies are elected from parties,37 and only 5 percent of all 
36ln 1995, there were 300 members and 'supporters' of Russian Choice party in 
Kaliningrad region and 175 in Voronezh region. For more information about 
specific regions, see "Russian Political Almanac,"1995, by McFaul and Petrov. 
37The share of party affiliated candidates is much higher in regions using mixed 
- majoritarian and PR electoral systems, such as in Sverdlovsk, Kalinigrad, 
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nominated candidates in local elections had party labels.38 
4.5.1.1 Control of the Regional Media 
The 1996 presidential campaign has proven that the federal government 
firmly controls national publications and electronic media. By some estimates, 
Yeltsin accounted for 75 percent of all election coverage in the print media and 
90 percent of television coverage.39 However, regional leaders fully control the 
regional mass media, especially news broadcasts and the press. A few days 
before the first round of the presidential election, Aleksei Frolov, a Russian 
regional media expert, said: 110ur regional mass media are in the hands of local 
governments. As mayors and governors still control access to paper supplies 
and state subsidies for the impoverished local newspapers, the fate of the 
[federal] election in the regions [will depend] on the views of the local 
leadership.1140 People in the regions prefer to read local newspapers rather than 
national ones for several reasons. First, the Moscow dailies are rarely available 
and more expensive than local papers, with prices sometimes four or five times 
higher. Second, the national media is perceived as being too closely tied to 
politicking in Moscow. As a result, readers there now clearly prefer regional 
Tuva, Mari-El, and Saratov. 
3811Nezavisimaia Gazeta," No. 132, 07-19-97. 
39Komsomolskya Pravda, April 30, 1996. 
40Nivat, Anne "The Vibrant Regional Media" Transition Volume 2, Number 21, 
18 October 1996. 
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coveraQe.41 
Regional bosses do not even try to conceal the tight connection between 
the regional media and regional governments, unlike the more image-conscious 
national media. In Orenburg region, for example, by the start of the 1996 . 
presidential campaign the oblast's Committee on the press decided to become 
a co-founder of practically every regional and local newspaper.42 Later, at the 
summer 1996 editors' meeting for regional newspapers, representatives from 
the regional administration hinted openly at the need to uphold the interests of 
the presidential candidate who is kind enough to supply the region with 
subsidies.43 Similarly, in Sakhalin the local authorities openly insisted on a 
media bias towards Yeltsin. In Tyumen region governor Leonid Roketskiy after 
meeting with Yeltsin announced his intention to support the incumbent and 
demanded that the press take his side. The largest local paper "Tyumenskaya 
Pravda" was known for its pro-opposition bent, and the pro-Yeltsin 
administration first threatened to withhold funding, attempted to change the 
paper's leadership, and tried to auction the paper.44 Finally, the paper was 
rewarded nearly a billion rubles in subsidies and its anti-Yeltsin ardor cooled 
41 "Regional Press Fights Political Control," Transition, vol. 1, no. 18, 6 October 
1995. 
42 Choice of the Regions. Issue no.3 May 28, 1996 
43 Choice of the Regions. Issue no.5 June 10, 1996 
44Choice of the Regions. Issue no.1 May 6, 1996 
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noticeably.45 In Samara, the regional governor Konstantin Titov attended 
uninvited meetings reserved for the top editors of the regional press. The 
majority of Samara local newspapers took an active part in the presidential 
election campaign in June 1996 and almost all supported the incumbent. 
Unsurprisingly, most of them, like the largest daily "Volzhskaya Kommuna," are 
entirely financed from the regional budget.46 
The financial leash in 1996 forced even some clearly pro-communist 
local newspapers to pretend to back the incumbent. For example, in the 
southern part of Krasnoyarsk region, where a majority of voters are strongly 
opposed to Yeltsin, district newspapers were forced to avoid the subject of the 
election altogether. The newspapers, financed by the regional administration 
but having a strong oppositional orientation, limited themselves to publishing 
numerous 'letters from ordinary citizens' where those ordinary citizens spoke 
critically of the reform and the Yeltsin government.47 
4.5.1.2 Governors' Help in the 1996 Presidential Election 
During the 1996 presidential campaign, Yeltsin viewed the support of the 
regional governors as a key element in his reelection strategy (Hanson 1996). 
The majority of the 89 regional leaders had been appointed by Yeltsin himself, 
45Choice of the Regions. Issue no.2 May 20, 1996 
46Nivat, Anne "The Vibrant Regional Media" Transition Volume 2, Number 21, 
18 October 1996. 
47Choice of the Regions. Issue no.5 June 10, 1996 
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with the number of those democratically elected prior to the presidential election 
administrators totaling 15 in the republics and 20 in "Russian regions."48 That 
regional leaders work hard to build their own political and electoral base and 
bargain with the center for better terms does not preclude them from political 
cooperation with the incumbent president, but, actually, requires it as a form Of 
reciprocity. Besides, both political and economic pressures were applied to 
ensure their cooperation. In January 1996, an anonymous report (ostensibly, 
prepared by the presidential administration) was leaked to the press.49 The 
report recommended that Yeltsin replace several governors who would 
probably have done little to aid Yeltsin's reelection. Four governors from the list 
were, indeed, later dismissed. 
Among the most effective economic instruments for a quick pre-election 
repair of a region's economic situation was the system of tax exemptions and 
direct financial assistance. In February 1996, Prime-Minister Chernomyrdin 
signed a decree on special 'treasury tax exemptions' for regions, and until the 
end of the campaign only the officially issued by the government tax deductions 
constituted more then 30 trillion rubles (more than 5.5 billion dollars). And while 
in July 1996 the total sum of unpaid taxes in the Russian economy was more 
than 60 trillion rubles, calling the outcry of the official press, around 80 percent 
of those were officially delayed payments, either according to this decree by the 
48Most of then elected governors were incumbents originally nominated by 
Yeltsin. 
49Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 26, 1996 
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government or according to the additional presidential decrees defraying tax 
payments for specific regions in specific amounts. At the same time, trillions of 
rubles were distributed to the regions directly as assistance (lllarionov 1996). 
The government helped regions financially up to the last days of the 
· campaign. For example, seven days before the first round of the elections, the 
Finance Ministry began implementing the Russian President's decree on aid to 
regional budgets for teacher's salaries. As was immediately reported by the 
Presidential Office, funds from the Federal budget were transferred to 17 
regions: Arkhangelsk, Bryansk, Republic of Mordovia, Ulyanovsk, Stavropol 
Territory, Republic of Daghestan, Kurgan, Aginsky Buryatia, Irkutsk, Primorye 
Territory, Murmansk, Tver, Penza, Krasnoyarsk Territory, Sakhalin, Kostroma, 
and Kursk. Almost all of these regions in the past supported opposition parties 
and the pattern of voting in the presidential election may have been smoothed, 
but was not reversed: in the first round Yeltsin lost to Zuganov on the average 
of 5 percent there, while he won by 4 percent elsewhere. 
Overall, 77 of the 89 regional leaders publicly came out in support of 
Yeltsin. Only the Kareliya republic's Victor Stepanov, Novosibirsk region's Vitalii 
Mukha, Tambov region's Aleksander Ryabov, and Ulyanovsk region's Yurii 
Goryachev were openly members of the opposition block (Orttung and 
Parentskaya 1996).50 And only one (Ryabov, Tambov oblast) stood openly 
500ut of the four, only one - Ulyanovsk governor Govyachev - faced re-election 
since, and was considered an unquestionable favorite. 
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against Yeltsin.51 Even Novosibirsk's Mukha, known to be pro-communist, was 
careful not to declare his support for any candidate. In his turn, Yeltsin 
rewarded Novosibirsk's governor with a medal of honor. Konstantin Kanterov, 
the editor of 11 Novaya Sibir', 11 muses about this act: "ls this a gesture of respect 
from the country's leade~? Respect for a governor once removed from office by 
the President himself and since re-elected? Is it a change in the attitude toward 
Novosibirsk Oblast, traditionally considered communist? Or is the President's 
attention an attempt to gain the governor's support? In contrast to the governors 
of Krasnoyarsk and Omsk, he has yet to come out in favor of Yeltsin.1152 
Presidents in Russia's 21 ethnic republics were the most effective in 
getting their constituents to vote for their chosen presidential candidate. In the 
first round, Yeltsin won more votes than Zyuganov in 10 out of 21 republics. In 
the second round Yeltsin won in 14 republics. In six of the republics -
Dagestan, lngushetia, Kabardino-Balkariya, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, North 
Osetiya, and Tararstan - Zyuganov actually lost thousands of votes between 
rounds. On average, Zuganov gained only 2.5 percent between the two rounds 
in 21 republics with the elimination of other contestants from a runoff, but 10 
percent in the rest of the country. 
Between the two rounds of election, Yeltsin's emissaries made a number 
of 'raids' on the electorally 'unfavorable' regions. After one of these meetings, 
51 Segodnia. No.95 06.01.1996. 
52Choice of the Regions. Issue no.5 June 10, 1996 
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Murtaza Rakhimov, the president of Bashkiria, gathered the local heads of 
administration together and told them that if their rayons supported Zyuganov 
the second time around, it would be a sign of their own 11professional 
incompetence," which would lead to the appropriate 11organizational 
conclusions 11 [orgvyvody], i.e., they would be fired (Zhukov 1996). The president 
of the republic also claimed that he personally visited 54 districts of the republic 
between the balloting to make sure that voters understood 11the essence of the 
processes under way in the country11(0rttung and Parentskaya 1996). Before 
the elections, Rakhimov publicly announced that he himself would vote for 
Yeltsin as a reliable partner who granted the republic its sovereignty.53 
In Tatarstan, the results of the first round seemed to have taken 
republican authorities by surprise. Immediately after speaking on "Tatarstan" 
television, presidential aide Rafael Khakimov emphasized that during the next 
five years it would be very important for the republic to build a civilized 
relationship with Moscow and other regions, and to develop a legal basis for 
Tatarstan's sovereignty. That is why, as Khakimov put it, 11it makes a difference 
who will be Russian president for the next five years." 54 The head of the 
republic's State Council Likhachev, noted in a television appearance, that while 
government officials were prohibited from participating in electoral advertising, 
those citizens who hold democracy dear could not remain aloof from the 
53Choice of the Regions. Issue no.4 May 30, 1996 
54Choice of the Regions. Issue no.7 July 1, 1996 
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forthcoming second round. In fact, local observers considered it sensational 
that villages which traditionally supported President Shaimiyev ignored his call 
to vote for Yeltsin in the first round. In analyzing these results, the local media 
claimed that the nonpayment of salaries and pensions was the main reason for 
Yeltsin's first round defeat.55 
Overall, the Russian Federation's ethnic republics in the end supported 
the incumbent. Yeltsin not only secured quantitative increase in support 
between the two rounds of the 1996 vote, but also a large qualitative change 
from the previous presidential. Most of these republics voted in 1991 against 
Yeltsin. This change include references to electoral fraud, especially in 
. Degestan and Tatarstan, and the weekend scheduling of the first round, which 
could have led many urb~n voters to miss the balloting in favor of a weekend in 
the country. But while both can plausibly account for some of the dynamics, the 
magnitude of the shift is too big and universal to allow us to ignore the 
tremendous campaign effort of regional leaders generously encoraged by 
federal money. 
The governors of the largely ethnically Russian regions and krais were 
not as effective in delivering votes as their republican counterparts. In the first 
round, Yeltsin won 25 of the 55 krais and regions, and improved his total to 30 
by the second. In the first round, among "Russian" regions, Yeltsin received the 
highest share of votes in Moscow City, Sverdlovsk oblast (Yeltsin's home 
55Choice of the Regions. Issue no.7 July 1, 1996, see also Segodnia. 
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region) and somewhat surprisingly in Perm oblast, which never before was in 
the first rank of democratic strongholds. In the second round, the "leaders" 
were again Moscow, Sverdlovks, St. Petersburg and Perm. The governor of 
. Perm, G. lgumnov, explained that "the oblast voted not so much for Yeltsin 
but for the regional government. 1156 The notorious Primorskii Kray case, though, 
was the most interesting and widely publicized. In both the 1993 and 1995 
parliamentary elections, Primorskii Krai voted heavily for Vladimir Zhirinovsky's 
Liberal Democratic Party. However, the Krai's charismatic governor Yevgenii 
Nazdratenko, elected in December 1995 with a 90 percent landslide, published 
an article, 11Why I became a Yeltsin Proxy," in the local newspapers and started 
active campaigning on Yeltsin's behalf. Yeltsin finished first in the krai with 
significant leads in both rounds. In Kaliningrad, the outcome of the first round 
also came as a surprise, since the local tradition of supporting the communists 
was broken for the first time. In Samara, Konstantin Titov removed three rural 
administrators in rayons where Zyuganov had done well in the first round and 
managed to boost the Yeltsin vote by almost 300,000 between rounds (Orttung 
and Parentskaya 1996). 
The fact that Yelstin did not perform well in some traditionally pro-
communist regions should not lead us nevertheless to overlook the efforts of 
the regional governors to promote his candidacy. In Voronezh, for example, 
governor Kovalev required that all rayon leaders announce their preferences for 
56National News Service, November 14, 1996 
Chapter 4 Asymmetric Federal Bargaining in a New Federation 218 
president; while in the local media he argued that despite the present day 
hardships, voters should understand the disastrous implications of a communist 
victory. In response, 12 rayons officially declared their support for the 
incumbent president.· Kovalev was also on record giving the regional electorate 
clear recommendations ·for whom they should vote before the December 1995 
parliamentary election.57 But in both cases the majority of voters in the region 
favored the opposition. 
The governor of Bryansk region, Barabanov, also actively but 
unsuccessfully campaigned for Yeltsin in 1996. The regional press ("Bryanskii 
Rabochii") even claimed that the governor had been warned by a member of 
the President's staff that he would loose his position if he failed to deliver the 
required votes.58 Both Kovalev and Barabanov were dismissed shortly after the 
elections, ostensibly for other reasons. The Kostroma governor Arbuzov was 
more efficient in the campaign. Yeltsin's campaign there was headed by his 
first deputy, who even managed to launch a special presidential radio channel, 
employing the best local journalists~ 59 In the first round, the mostly pro-
communist region voted slightly in favor of Zuganov (28.5 versus 28 percent), 
but in the second round Yeltsin led (49.8 versus 42.7 percent). The federal 
government faithfully stood behind Arbuzov in the subsequent December 1996 
57 Choice of the Regions. Issue no.3 May 28, 1996 
58 Choice of the Regions. Issue no.5 June 10, 1996 
59 Choice of the Regions. Issue no.3 May 28, 1996 
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regional election, but he lost in a runoff to the communist candidate with 30.7 
percent of the vote. 
In general, in two-thirds of the regions the majority of voters supported 
the same candidate (Yeltsin or Zyuganov) that their regional governor backed 
(Orttung and Parentskaya 1996). In turn, by the beginning of September 1996 
President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin announced their support of 
43 incumbents and 4 rivals in the regional elections that followed the 
presidential election, of whom only 19 succeeded. Elections of governor in 
some regions, according to Leonid Smirnyagin of the Presidential Council, 
reversed well-established electoral trends. Unlike past parliamentary and 
presidential elections, the governor's races were not fought and won on the 
basis of 'ideological' concerns. The anti-Moscow rhetoric that was an important 
weapon in past regional races (when such elections had proceeded in an 
uncoordinated manner prior to the presidential election race) became much 
less pronounced. Now, nearly every contender tried to prove that "he could pry 
open all Moscow doors," and it became apparent that local constituencies 
regard the ability of a candidate to ''wresf' money or privileges from Moscow as 
more important than their ability to wage a "die-hard" war with the Russian 
capital.60 
Among successful and strong challengers, almost all had previous 
experience with electoral campaigning, had worked in old Soviets or regional 
60Rossiiskie Vesti, December 3, 1996. 
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legislature, or were members of the Federation Council between 1993 and 
1995. All these characteristics suggest that the key elements of electoral 
success were a candidate's experience in running for office and his personal 
reputation as an 'insider' able to protect regional interests in bargaining with 
Moscow. 
4.5.2 The Hypothesis of Stuffed Ballot-Boxes: The 'Mechanical' Delivery 
of Votes 
The wide-spread practices of political exchange between the federal 
and regional governments significantly increased the political role of regional 
elites. This fact has led some observers to believe that many such elites fully 
control political competition in their regions by willfully manipulating electoral 
outcomes to deliver their part of the 'bargain' with Moscow. In particular, 
serious allegations were made in 1993 that regional leaders falsified the 
referendum vote to secure the approval of the Constitution in exchange for 
future political favors from the federal government and for the sake of their own 
reelection. 
4.5.2.1 Methodological Problems of Revealing Electoral Fraud in 
Russian Elections 
The results of Russia's first competitive party-based elections and 
constitutional referendum of December 12, 1993, have been subject to 
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considerable dispute in terms of allegations of widespread falsification of 
ballots. According to one observer, Alexander Sobyanin, who served at the time 
as one of Yeltsin's political analysts and the representative for the Russia's 
Choice party on the Central Election Commission, no fewer than 9.2 ·million 
ballots were falsified to favor communists, nationalists, regional leaders, and 
Yeltsin's constitution. Unsurprisingly, the "formal" report of such allegations in 
March 1994 received worldwide notice. Daily /svestia called it "political 
dynamite" and the U.S. media (LA Times, Washington Post) prominently 
reported the claim that more than 15 percent of the ballots were falsified and 
that turnout had not exceeded the 50% threshold required to render Russia's 
constitutional referendum legitimate. 
Despite the notoriety they received in the mass media, these allegations 
have been largely ignored by political analysts, vis-a-vis the absence of any 
independent attempt to verify or disconfirm them. This is unfortunate not only 
because such allegations cast a cloud on the legitimacy of Russia's infant 
constitutional structures or because, as seen in the aftermath of the December 
1995 Russian parliamentary and the 1996 Presidential elections, they 
encourage losers to attribute their electoral failures to trickery and fraud. In fact, 
Sobyanin argued that at least 12 million ballots were falsified in the December 
1995 election, as well as several million votes in the Presidential elections and 
the following regional elections (Sobyanin and Suchovolsky 1996, Sobyanin 
1996; Sobyanin 1996a, Kagarlitsky 1996). Even if such allegations of massive 
electoral fraud would not be confirmed by facts, they still seriously damage 
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the public perception of electoral process in the country. It is unfortunate also 
because it would be useful generally to develop methods for detecting fraud 
when an election's administration cannot be observed directly. Russia is not the 
only country in which the remoteness of polls and the authority of regional 
politicians make it difficult for neutral observers to monitor elections. However, 
.unlike the commonplace cries of 'foul' uttered by losing politicians, Sobyanin 
and his colleagues not only argue for the existence of extensive fraud, they also 
propose several methods for detecting that fraud using aggregate election data. 
It is important, then, that those methods be given closer scrutiny than they have 
heretofore received. 
Insofar as the specifics of the Russian case are concerned, the general 
acceptance of allegations of fraud is unsurprising. First and most suspiciously, 
official election returns for the December 1993 election have never been 
published except at a level of aggregation (regions and Duma election districts) 
that precludes reanalysis. Second, given the brief period between Yeltsin's 
announcement of the 1993 election and the actual balloting (less than two 
months), neutral observers had little time to organize any effective oversight. 
Third, given the stakes of the election, control of both chambers of the national 
legislature and adoption of a new federal constitution, even cautious observers 
would have to look for the star in the east to believe that fraud did not occur at 
some level. 
Claims of large-scale fraud also make sense in that they point to a 
seemingly logical logroll that benefitted a wide cross section of political actors. 
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Rather than under-count the votes for specific candidates, the asserted fraud 
consisted largely of adding ballots in a way that benefitted most of those who 
were positioned to contest the election's legitimacy: communists and 
nationalists, whose share of seats in the Duma were increased by the 
fraudulent ballots, regional bosses whose positions in the Federation Council 
were secured by those ballots, and Yeltsin and his coterie of reformers, who 
required the additional official turnout to legitimize voter approval of their 
strongly pro-presidential constitution. In addition, one need not presume the 
existence of any well-organized conspiracy. Regional or sub-regional-level 
officials, anxious to satisfy their bosses, would have a clear incentive to 
"facilitate" the election of those bosses to the Federation Council and to play a 
possibly unwitting hand in facilitating the implementation of the logroll. 
The failure to reassess this analysis, though, was precluded by more 
than the unavailability of data or by an unwillingness to assume that Russian 
elections could be free of significant fraud. The original report, including its 
methodology, has been published in a form that only hints at technical details. 
Although most Russian papers reported its conclusions, none explained the 
method, and Western readers could find only a brief description of it in an 
article translated and published 'in 1994. Fortunately, more recent publications 
(Sobyanin 1995, Sobyanin and Suchovolsky 1995, Sobyanin and Myagkof 
1995, Myagkof 1996, and private conversations) have filled in some technical 
gaps and provided the data employed in the original analysis. Thus, our goal is 
to reexamine that methodology and to compare the main characteristics of 
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Russia's December 1993 elections with those in various Western and newly-
formed East European democracies. 
Our reassessment leads largely to a series of negative conclusions. 
Although we cannot preclude the possibility of fraud in precisely the form 
suggested by these scholars, even if we assume for the moment the general 
validity of the method, we cannot confirm the conclusion that nine million or 
more ballots have been added to the count. Moreover, even if fraud took 
precisely in the suggested form, the methodology employed is ill-equipped for 
detecting that fraud and for measuring its magnitude. In offering these 
conclusions, the rest of this section is organized as follows: Section 4.2.2 
reviews the original method used by Russian scholars in calculating the 
magnitude of fraud. Our core conclusion there is that the 'anomalies' in the data 
that they take as evidence of fraud may be little more than the logical 
consequences of a political competition and a country's electoral laws. Section 
4.2.3 focuses on the constitutional referendum and party-list voting and the 
'anomalies' cited in the relationship between turnout and support for the 
constitution and pro-reform parties. Here we conclude that these anomalies are 
little more than the consequence of an 'ecological fallacy' - an unsuccessful 
attempt to use aggregate data to reveal information about individual 
characteristics and choices. We show that measuring fraud based on 
aggregate data in·the case of the party-list balloting is confounded by the fact 
that both turnout and political conservatism appear to correlate with a third 
variable - whether an election district is urban or rural. Moreover, in case of the 
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constitutional referendum, within-region patterns correspond closely to the 
patterns Sobyanin cites as 'normal.' Section 4.2.4 offers some concluding 
remarks. 
4.5.2.2 The First Estimate of Electoral Fraud 
Although any number of stories can be told as to how fraud was 
implemented in December 1993 (Orttung 1995, Sobyanin and Suchovolsky 
1995), as well as in December 1995 (Maximov 1995, Sobyanin and 
Suchovolsky 1996, Stolyarov 1996), Sobyanin's allegations are based less on 
first hand observation and more on the discovery of various 'anomalies' in the 
election returns - the 'fingerprints' left by those who added ballots to the total or 
otherwise manipulated summary election returns.61 Two sets of fingerprints are 
offered as evidence, and both warrant close scrutiny since each is advertised 
as a method for detecting fraud when first-hand observations are unavailable. 
The original method of calculating the magnitude of electoral fraud relies on 
an adaptation of a 'universal law• relating the rank of objects according to some 
criterion to the value that criterion assumes for each object. For example, 
consider city population. Suppose we order cities from most to least populous, 
letting R(/) be city fs rank and P(/) its population. Then if we take a diverse 
enough sample, it is by now demographic folklore that the relation between R 
61There were, in fact, surprisingly few eyewitness accounts of serious electoral 
violations. After 1993 elections 19 complaints were lodged formally against 
district electoral commissions, 5 of which were upheld by the courts; and only 1 
against the Central Electoral Commission, 1 of which was upheld by the court. 
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and P will correspond approximately to the equation 
R(QP(Qb =A 
226 
where b and A are constants. Notice now that if we take the log of both sides of 
this equation, we get 
logR(Q + blogP(Q =log A (1) 
which is merely the equation for a straight line. That is, if we let y = logR(Q and 
x = logP(Q, K = log(A)/b and B = 1/b, our data should be consistent with the 
following expression: 
X= K- By (2) 
Expression (2) captures attention because it appears to apply to a 
diverse range of phenomena, including, for instance, the populations of various 
species and the rank of industrial firms as measured by gross annual sales. As 
a consequence, numerous researchers have sought to justify this expression as 
a law-like generalization. And here, insofar as our research concerns the 
number of voters who vote for different political parties, the most relevant study 
is Simon (1955) and ljiri and Simon's (1974) analysis of firm size. Together, 
these studies show theoretically that if the growth rate of firms is independent of 
size, if there is free entry of new firms at the bottom of the market, if smaller 
firms are no more likely to disappear through bankruptcy or merger than larger 
ones, and if the resources of firms that fail are distributed among surviving firms 
independently of size, then expression (2) will approximately describe the size 
distribution of firms in an economy. 
If we transpose ljiri and Simon's model to political party competition, 
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expression (2) should describe the relationship between the rank of a party and 
the strength of its support - provided that assumptiQns equivalent to ljiri and 
Simon's hold, such as that larger parties have no advantage over smaller ones 
in their ability to. attract new voters, that all parties have the same likelihood of 
merging with someone else or of disappearing altogether, and that wholly new 
parties can freely enter the competition. Deviations from expression (2), then, 
would arise if any one of these assumptions is invalid -- if something other than 
a wholly stochastic process describes the mechanism whereby parties grow, 
merge, dissolve, or emerge.62 
The argument the authors of the method offer is that the reason why 
expression (2) fails to describe Russia's aggregate electoral statistics is the 
non-random element of vote fraud. In fact, the assertion that 9.2 million ballots 
were fraudulently added to the total is based on the assumption that all 
deviations from a linear relationship can be attributed to fraud. The method 
suggested to estimate how many ballots were falsified is to calculate the 
magnitude of deviations from the predicted straight line passing through the two 
parties with 'known' electoral support by taking all deviations from linearity as 
produced by such fraud. 
Ignoring for a moment the assumptions that underlie the application of 
62 Currently, Professor Taagapera from University of California, Irvine, is 
working on the project aimed to predict the vote distribution of party shares 
based on key features of electoral system such as district magnitude. Grofman 
(1997) compared the performance of three alternatives models of party shares 
to predict distribution of votes in 1993 and 1995 Russian Parliamentary 
elections. 
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expression (2) for estimation of electoral fraud, we must notice that there are 
severe practical problems associated with this analysis. Suppose that fraud is 
sufficiently great so as to change the rank order of parties. In this case the 
deviation from linearity would not indicate the magnitude of ·fraud. To be able to 
estimate the magnitude of electoral fraud, we must know at least the following a 
priori: 
the true rank order of the parties; 
the parties that did not benefit from fraud; 
the 'relevant• parties. 
Insofar as Russia 1993 parliamentary elections is concerned, Sobyanin 
implicitly or explicitly supplies us with the requisite assumptions: all electoral 
fraud in the 1993 Russian party-list Duma elections favored communists and 
nationalists, in the 'true' electoral results the Russia1s Choice party ranked first, 
and all but the smallest two or three parties are relevant to the analysis. Armed 
with these assumptions consider Figure 4.5, which uses officially reported 
national totals. However, rather than merely draw a straight line between 'RC1 
and 'UN, we need to move 'RC 1 horizontally to the left and the LDPR 
horizontally to the right to accommodate the assumption that Russia's Choice 
actually ranked first. The resulting straight line suggests, then, that Zhirinovsky 
(LDPR) benefitted the most from fraud, the Communists (CPRF) next, Yabloko 
third, and the Agrarians (APR) fourth. If we assume, moreover, that without 
fraud the Communists would have ranked fourth, behind the Women of Russia 
party (WoR), and that the Agrarians would have ranked behind Yabloko, we 
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would conclude that Zhirinovsky's vote was doubled by the addition of 
approximately 6 million fraudulent ballots, that the Communists gained 2 million 
votes, and that the Agrarians gained nearly 2 million -- for a total of 
approximately 10 million fraudulent ballots. 
The difficulty here is the ad hoc nature of the assumption that the 
. primary beneficiaries of fraud were communists and nationalists. But even still, 
this assumption sometimes leads to strange conclusions when we look at the 
88 separate regions (oblasts and republics) that participated in the election. 
Instead of generating a coherent picture, the application of expression (2) to 
each region separately results in a range of inconsistent and seemingly 
incoherent conclusions as to who benefitted and who lost from fraud. Most 
importantly, 51 of 88 regions give no evidence of fraud - virtually straight lines 
describe the log-log relationship among the first six or seven ranked parties. 
Only by assuming that the LDPR or Communists actually ranked second can 
we infer fraud in any form, in which case, of course, it is not expression (2) that 
allows us to detect fraud, but our a priori assumptions. 
Because we must know a priori who benefitted from fraud and the true 
rank order of the relevant parties, the application of expression (2) to other 
elections cannot be an all-purpose methodology for detecting fraud. But even if 
we believe we know these things, there is an additional difficulty with the 
proposed methodology. Specifically, there are good theoretical reasons for not 
assuming that expression (2) is anything more than something that applies only 
under very special circumstances. For example, if we look once again at the 
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relationship between firm size and rank, we would not find a linear fit but 
instead a concave curve in which mid-sized firms are larger than predicted or 
large and small ones smaller than predicted. In their analysis of this fact, Simon 
and ljiri (1974) note that two things can explain this 'distortion' -- smaller firms 
that are more likely than larger ones to be absorbed by mergers and larger 
firms that hold an advantage when it comes to growing through mergers and 
acquisitions. Hence, if we move back to the political realm, Simon and ljiri's 
analysis suggests that things other than fraud can move the picture away from 
a linear relationship -- the inherent advantages of larger parties to raise funds 
and advertise, an unwillingness on the part of voters to support smaller parties 
with little chance of winning seats, and the desire on the part of established 
politicians to be on the list of a viable party rather than on a list that has little 
chance of passing the 5% threshold for representation. 
ljiri and Simon's analysis is consistent with what we find in Russia. In 
virtually every region, the graph of party strength and rank is strongly concave if . 
we include those parties that failed to surpass the 5% threshold. Such parties 
exhibit a sharp drop off in support so that all but the smallest ones lie above a 
straight line connecting the strongest and weakest parties. This fact is 
important. A considerable literature suggests that different electoral systems 
exert different pressures on politicians and voters to form, consolidate, vote for, 
and dissolve parties (see, for example, Duverger 1954, Rae 1971, Lijphart 
1984, Taagepera and Shugart 1989, Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994). That is, 
the electoral system itself exerts a systematic (i.e., non-stochastic) influence on 
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the number and size of parties and we cannot assume a priori that this 
influence induces a linear relationship between rank and size. It also follows 
that as a political system matures, any theoretically predicted deviations from 
linearity will become· more pronounced as the processes of merger, dissolution, 
and acquisition described by ljiri and Simon begin to operate fully. 
To illustrate our argument, consider the West German elections - a 
country with an electoral system that differs from Russia's only in some details 
(albeit important ones). A nearly linear relationship between rank and size of 
parties holds in 1949, but that by 1965 we can detect a step-function 
relationship in which the two strongest parties are approximately equal in 
strength, the third and fourth ranked parties are approximately equal, and the 
two smaller parties are decidedly weaker than the rest (Figure 4.6). This pattern 
maintains itself in 1976 and 1987 except that in 1987 there are three parties at 
the second level. Thus, in West Germany at least, we need to assume either 
that the assumptions supporting expression (2) became less valid as the 
political system matured or that maturity led to greater fraud. A similar pattern 
holds in Israel, which also utilizes a single national district constituency for 
elections to its lower legislative chamber, the Knesset (Figure 4.7). 
We conclude that, although it likely that a stochastic model of voting and 
party competition can be developed that parallels Simon and ljiri's (1974) 
theoretical analysis of firm size and that predicts a linear relationship between 
party rank and party support in accordance with expression (2), fraud is only 
one potential cause of deviations from such a prediction. As the data from West 
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Germany and Israel suggest, the electoral system itself establishes incentives 
among candidates and voters that, over time, move a system away from 
linearity. Moreover, even if we accept the argument that expression (2) applies 
only to newly emerging democracies - to political systems 'out of equilibrium' -
the application of this expression requires a number of ad hoc assumptions that 
need independent validation. In this respect, perhaps the most critical 
assumption is that we must know whether fraud was extensive enough to alter 
the rank order of the parties and we must know the pre-fraud order. If 
expression (2) can be used at all, it can be used only after these things are 
established, which, of course, defeats the original purpose of its general 
application. In short, attempting to infer and then quantify fraud using 
expression (2) is at best a tenuous undertaking and at worst, wholly misleading. 
4.5.2.3 Electoral Fraud and Turnout 
Although the initial estimate of the scale of electoral fraud rested 011 the 
application of expression (2), subsequent analyses (Sobyanin 1995, Sobyanin 
and Suchovolsky 1995, Myagkov and Sobyanin 1995, Myagkov 1997) sought 
additional evidence from various patterns in the relationship between turnout 
and support for parties, candidates, and the constitution. And although 
searching for patterns that might be labeled 'anomalous' was difficult because 
Russia has never officially published district level electoral statistics for the 
December 1993 elections, the research group has compiled rayon-level results 
for a subset of regions that encompasses about 800 rayons in 23 of 88 regions, 
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accounting for 30.6 million votes, or approximately 28.8% of the electorate.63 
The search for specific occurrences of electoral falsifications on the 
basis of the turnout analysis has as an underlying foundation an assumption 
that local officials added 9.2 million fraudulent ballots to insure elections of the · 
regional leaders,64 which ballots were also at the same time marked for 
communists and nationalist parties and against the constitution. Assuming that 
turnout was falsified, the group then argued that one would find certain 
distortions of the 'normal' pattern of turnout. 
To illustrate the rationale of this approach, consider a hypothetical 
district during the constitutional referendum and imagine that we can count 
votes at different points in time during the election day. If we find at some point 
that a half of all eligible voters had already participated in the elections and a 
certain number of votes had been cast "for" the issue and the reciprocal number 
is "against," we may reason that latter in the day, as more voters come to the 
polls, both the above numbers will increase. Although the increased turnout 
may produce more voters who vote "against," we would expect some of the 
additional turnout to contain voters who vote "for." It would be unusual and 
suspicious to find that after some point in time all additional votes were cast 
. against the issue. These scholars argued that they were able to show that, in 
63Although the data is unofficial and generated at the rayon level by aggregating 
data supplied by members of local electoral commissions, comparison of these 
data with official results reveals no significant discrepancies. That is, the reports 
of local officials and the Central Electoral Commission appear to be consistent. 
64 Something that was a conclusion in the rank-size part of their analysis 
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fact, all or almost all "additional" (in excess of the 'normal' turnout) voters in 
December 1993 had voted against the constitution and against the pro-reform 
parties. In a similar way the group also claimed that they could show that almost 
all additional voters in 1995 voted for the communist party or Zhirino"vsky.65 
Of course, no one had any means of directly counting the number of 
"additional" voters and identifying their choices. Instead, an attempt was made 
to estimate the number of "additional" voters from the reported turnout and 
aggregated electoral results for different districts. More specifically, Myagkov 
and Sobyanin (1995) regress the percentage of eligible voters who voted in 
support of the constitution E 1 and the pro-reform parties Eretonn 
66 on the turnout 
in different districts (rayons) T. Comparing turnout and vote in 786 districts, 
they find that there is a weak, sometimes negative correlation between turnout 
and the percent of eligible voters who voted in support of the constitution or the 
pro-reform parties, but at the same time a strong positive correlation between 
turnout and the percent of eligible voters who voted against the constitution and 
for the opposition. According to Myagkov and Sobyanin (1995), the negative 
correlation between turnout, T, and the percentage of eligible voters who 
supported the constitution, (or the pro-reform parties) reveals that "additional" 
voters (those who contributed to the higher turnout) all voted against the 
65Moskovsky Komsomolets December 30, 1995. 
66 Notice that the percentage of eligible voters who voted in support of the 
Constitution E, can also be expressed as product of turnout T and percent of 
actually casted votes in support of the issue v; : Tv; = E, 
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constitution and against reforms. They infer that such a pattern is an anomaly 
and is a consequence of electoral falsifications in the form of added ballots. But 
such a conclusion needs to be approached with caution. 
In fact, the analysis encounters a problem known in the literature as 
"ecological inference." The "ecological inference" is the process of using 
. aggregate (i.e., "ecological") data to learn about individual-level relationships 
when individual-level data are not available. This leads to an "ecological 
problem," i.e., that existing statistical methods produce extremely unreliable and 
overconfident inferences (King 1997). For example, studies using aggregate 
electoral results and the statistics of the share of black voters in electoral 
districts to derive the estimates of the likelihood of a specific voting decision of 
a black voter - found that more then 115 percent of black voters voted for the 
Democrats in some districts or that a negative percent of them voted for the 
Republicans. Of course, no one accused Democratic candidates of stuffing 
the ballot boxes on those grounds. Rather these absurd results indicate the 
faulty nature of the methodology, and illustrate the improper use of aggregate 
data. King (1997) lists these and many other "absurd" examples to stress that 
impossible results occur with regularity in the case of ecological inference, 
which also signals that the results within the possible range may be extremely 
distorted as well. 
To place the assessements of voting fraud in Russia in a standard 
ecological problem framework, consider first a well-known problem of 
determining a proportion of voting age whites 13iwhltess and non-whites 13i"on-whltes 
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who actually participate in the election based on the known turnout T1 and on 
the race composition of the voting age population, x 1whites and xt
0 n-whites (X1non-
whites = 1 - x 1wh1tes) in district i. In every district the turnout T1 is weighted sum of 
proportions of whites and non-whites who participate in the election: T1 = ~thltes * 
To estimate district aggregates of the fraction of whites and non-whites 
who vote, awhiles and anon-whites, researchers often use some version of 
Goodman's (1953) regression. Specifically, one can regress data for turnout in 
different districts on the proportions of whites and non-whites in the population 
T1 = b1 * Xthites + b2 * Xt
0n-whites and take the coefficients b1 and b2 from this 
least squares regression as an estimates of ~whites and ~non-whites. 
This, in fact, is what was done on the aggregate voting data in Russia by 
those alleging massive fraud. Consider the turnout as being composed of a 
fraction of the voting age population who are 11pro-reform 11 and a fraction of the 
voting age population who are 11anti-reform 11 
Taking into account that the two groups compliment each other, or that x1agalnst 
= 1 - X1pro, we can write 
Ti= ~1pro *' Xto + ~1a9a1nst * (1 _ Xto) 
Assume also that all pro-reform voters participate in elections, or that ~1pro = 1 
and X1pro = Fe1orm. In the case of the constitutional referendum, this is 
equivalent to assuming that the "pro-reform" voters all vote in support of the 
constitution while those who are not "pro-reform," (1 - Xtr0 ), either vote 'against' 
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or abstain. In fact, on that specific ballot - in the 1993 Russian Constitutional 
Referendum - abstaining could lead to the defeat of the Constitution as the 
referendum rules required a higher than 50 percent turnout to make the 
referendum valid. Among eligible voters whom we denote as "not pro-reform," 
only a part actually partidpated in the voting, while others decided to abstain.· 
Thus the total turnout can be expressed as 




against * (1 _ Eto} = 13
1
against + (1- 13iagalnst * E
1
pro} 
Notice that the regression T1 = a+ b * Et0 estimates coefficients a = ~galnst 
and b = 1 - ~gainst. Then if coefficient b is "irregular," this in Sobyanin view 
indicates falsifications. If the regression of T1 on a + b * X1pro reveals that b is 
close to zero or negative, that implies that the turnout of "not pro-reformers" 
13a9alnst = 1 - b is close or greater than 100 percent. Such a value of ~gainst is 
suspicious, because the group of "not pro-reformers" is defined to include 
voters who abstain, and in the Russian case it turns out that Goodman 
regression estimates that an impossibly high fraction of 'not pro-reformers' 
actually participated. 
As we noticed above, ecological analysis in general and Goodman 
regression in particular often produce "impossible" or unreliable results. The 
existing literature provides a detailed description and an analysis of the 
ecological inference problem, and concludes that in many circumstance the 
Goodman regression is not an appropriate method. Scholars in the ecological 
inference literature have almost universally interpreted the frequent out-of-
bounds estimates as evidence of aggregation bias. A part of the solution to the 
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ecological problem suggested by King (1997) is to use a model which imposes 
restrictions on the possible values of regression coefficients to make sure that 
they are not outside the possible bounds for each smallest unit of observation. 
Nevertheless, Sobyanin and his colleagues use the out-of-bounds estimates as 
their primary evidence of electoral fraud. Here, then, we can identify the most 
relevant factors that complicate the use of Goodman regression in the Russian 
case, and show that such regression can produce 'impossible' results for 
reasons other than fraud. 
Notice, that the Goodman type regression T1 = a+ b * Et0 produces a 
negative estimate of b only if the correlation between T1 and E1pro is negative. 
To the best of our knowledge, Sobyanin et al. did not formulate their analysis in 
the terms of a Goodman regression (they simply correlated turnout with the 
proportion of those who actually voted pro-reform among all eligible voters). 
Statistically their analysis is equivalent to determining the sign of b from the 
regression Et0 = a+ ~ * T1• A simple algebraic transformation connects the 
coefficient of correlation between the two variables with the estimate of the 
coefficient of the linear regression. Because it is the negative correlation 
between the turnout and the proportion of eligible voters who expressed 
themselves as 'pro-reform' voters which is deemed "anomalous," in what 
follows we show that a negative correlation between these two variables (T1 
and E1Pro) can arise "naturally'' as a consequence of data aggregation. 
First, a weak or negative correlation between T and E1 might be deemed 
anomalous only if it is assumed that the data are homogeneous - that every 
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observation is like any other except for the variables measured. Myagkov and 
Sobyanin (1995) implicitly assume that the percentage of voters V1 who voted 
in support of the Constitution or pro-reform parties is independent of the 
characteristics of electoral districts. That is, for any district the expected vote for . 
the constitution is independent of the characteristics of the district or that E (V1pro 
I .x;) = E(Vt0 ). Homogeneity of districts, though, is an assumption and not a 
fact. For example, there could be unobservable intervening variables that 
correlate both with vote and turnout in a district. In such cases, the aggregate 
analysis reveals nothing about the choice of 'additional' voters or alternatively, 
about the rates of participation among pro-reform and anti-reform voters, but 
indicates that in some districts we cari find both higher turnout and lower 
support for the Constitution and pro-reform parties. Latter we show that higher 
turnout and higher conservatism characterize non-urban districts as compare 
with urban districts. 
The following example illustrates the problems that arise when vote and 
turnout are not independent. Let the true relationship between the vote V for or 





aE!or =a+ 2f3T 
It follows from this expression that if a and f3 are both positive (e.g., if the vote 
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against a motion increases in districts with higher turnout), then oEIOTis 
necessarily positive. On the other hand, if~ is negative (e.g., if the vote for the 
motion decreases in districts with relatively high turnout, as in Russian case), 
then oEIOTis positive only if Tis less than -a/2{3. The predicted_ relationship 
between T and E1i then, is not linear or even positive and monotonic; instead, if 
turnout is sufficiently high for a sufficiently great number of observations, then a 
simple linear model would yield a negative estimate of the relationship between 
T and E1, and a weaker relationship overall between T and E1 than between T 
and Ea. 
One needs not assume that a simple linear function such as expression 
(3) describes the relationship between V and T for problems to arise in the 
interpretation of the correlation (or its absence) between E1 and T. All we 
require is for V1 to bear some monotonic relationship to T. In this event, either V1 
or Va must bear a decreasing relationship, so that when we multiply the variable 
bearing the decreasing relationship and T ( which is, of course, increasing with 
T), we open the door, as an artifact of simple algebra, to a non-monotonic 
relationship between T and either E1 or Ea. Whether non-monotonicity actually 
characterizes the data will depend on the range of values T assumes in the 
data and the strength of the relationship between T and Va. 
That is, 
if T assumes only relatively low values such as is typical in most U.S. 
elections, the relationship between T and E1 as well as T and Ea will be 
positive; 
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if T assumes only high values, such as was the case in the most recent 
Quebec referendum on separatism, and if T and V1 bear a sufficiently 
strong (negative) relationship, then the correlation between T and E1 can 
be negative; and 
if T varies widely and if T and V1 again bear a sufficiently strong 
(negative) relationship to each other, then the relationship between T 
and E1 will not be monotonic, and estimates of this relationship based on 
a simple linear model will be unreliable if not meaningless. 
These possibilities must be addressed before any conclusion is 
advanced about fraud in Russia's December 1993 elections. First, we see here 
that we should not anticipate the same relationship between E1 and T as we 
observe between Ea and T as the scholars suggest. In and of itself, the 
differences between the two correlations hold no implications for fraud. Second, 
before deeming the negative relationship between E1 and turnout 'anomalous,' 
we must first assess whether there are variables that can predict both higher Ea 
and higher turnout in districts. 
That the negative correlations can arise "naturally" as a consequence of 
the relationship between V and Tis evident when we look at election returns 
from other countries.67 For example, higher turnout in Poland's 1993 elections 
67 It is natural and not anomalous to find a correlation between turnout T and 
the vote for some specific parties. In the United States, for example, increased 
turnout often works to the advantage of Democratic candidates (Radcliff 1994; 
Tucker and Vedlitz 1986; DeNardo 1980) since Democratic Party identifiers and 
supporters tend to vote at lower rates than Republicans (Radcliff 1994; 
Abramson, Aldrich and Rhode 1991; Avery 1989; Burnham 1982). Similarly, a 
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aided the rightist Democratic Union (the correlation between the percent of 
eligible voters who voted for DU and turnout is + 0.48) but hurt the leftist Polish 
Peasants' Party (the correlation here is - 0.25). In Ukraine's 1994 presidential 
election, the correlation between turnout and E, for incumbent president 
Kravchuk was +0.74 whereas the correlation between T and the percent of 
eligible voters supporting his opponent Kuchma was -0.46. In Bulgaria's 1994 
parliamentary elections, the correlations between T and the percent of eligible 
voters supporting the leftist People's Alliance and the dominant BSP coalition 
were positive, but the correlations for the three democratic parties receiving 
more or less significant electoral support (Alliance of Democratic Forces, 
Bulgarian Business Block, and Democratic Alternative for the Republic) were 
either zero or negative. 
Of course, one might argue that fraud was pervasive in Poland, Ukraine, 
and Bulgaria for some of the same reasons it was pervasive in Russia -- a 
poorly developed technology and administration for counting votes. But 
Canada offers an ·especially salient example of a strong positive correlation 
between T and Ea but a weak or zero correlation between T at its opposite, E1• 
Taking the aggregate outcomes in the province's 125 election districts as our 
observations, Figures 4.8 and 4.9 graph turnout in Quebec's most recent (1995) 
cross-national analysis of turnout and the vote for the left-of-center parties in 19 
industrial democracies confirms that the success of 'left' parties is affected by 
the rate of turnout so that the leftist share of the vote increases by about one-
third of a point for every percentage point increase in turnout (Pacek and 
Radcliff 1995). 
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separatist referendum against T times the vote for separation (E1) and T times 
the vote against separation (Ea), respectively. Once again, the correlation 
between T and E1 is negative (-0.20) whereas the correlation between T and Ea 
is positive (+0.32). If we look again at Figure 4.8 we should also note that the 
. . 
range of turnout in the Canadian data is relatively high - between 84 and 97%. 
That is, it is in exactly the range where we would most likely expect, on the 
basis of our discussion in the previous section of expression (3), to see a 
negative fraud-free relationship between T and E1• Thus, if the relationship 
between T and ERc is not anomalous in Canada (and elsewhere), we cannot 
assume a priori that it is anomalous in Russia. 
However, accounting for such a relationship requires identifying a 
variable that intervenes between T and V1 so as to generate a negative 
correlation between T and Va . And here, as even Myagkov and Sobyanin 
(1995) suggest, urbanization appears to be such a variable for Russia.68 The 
relevance of this variable in Russian voting patterns is suggested by several 
studies based on aggregate regional data which suggest that support for reform 
is concentrated in urban areas, whereas rural regions are more likely to oppose 
681n fact, to suppose otherwise is to suppose that Russia is somehow unique 
among post-communist states. The pattern of greater support for leftist or anti-
reform parties in rural areas has been observed in the Czech and Slovak 
republics (Obrman 1992), in Bulgaria (Ashley 1990; Koulov 1995), in Romania 
(Shafir 1992), in Albania (Szajkowski 1992) and in Hungary (Keri and Levendel 
1995). In Poland's 1993 elections we find a strong negative correlation (-0.68) 
between support for the pro-reform Democratic Union and percent of rural in a 
province. Moreover, both turnout and support for conservative parties is 
reported to be higher in rural areas in Bulgaria (Krause 1995). Latvia (Bungs 
1994), Slovakia (Fisher 1995), and Hungary (Oltav 1995). 
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reform (Slider, Gimpelson and Chugrov 1994, Smirnyagin 1996). Moreover, 
turnout also correlates with urban-rural distinctions. Approximately 78 percent 
of respondents to a post election survey from rural areas claimed to have taken 
part in the December 1993 election whereas only 69 percent from cities with 
populations under 100,000 claim to have done so (Wyman et al. 1994, 1995). 
Although this study, like most polls elsewhere, overestimates overall turnout, 
this pattern is reflected in the within-region data. For all three elections (the 
presidential 1991 elections, the April 1993 Referendum and the December 
1993 elections, see Table 4.10), there is a significant correlation between 
turnout and the percent of the population in a rayon classified as rural (with the 
exception of Murmansk region, where cities are populated largely by career 
military and their families). At the same time, we see a negative correlation 
between the vote for Yeltsin and the percent of rural population in all regions in 
1991, in 12 regions in April 1993, and in all but 1 region in December 1993 
(Sakhalin). 
Table 4.10 classifies a rayon as urban if not more then 10 percent of its 
population is rural and mixed (non-urban or rural) otherwise and gives the 
average turnout figures in December 1993 for' urban' and 'mixed' rayons in 
each of the 23 regions in our sample, as well as the difference in these turnout 
rates. Table 4.11 also gives the average vote for Russia's Choice in these same 
rayons, as well as the difference in Russia's Choice's support. Note in particular 
that in every region, non-urban turnout is greater than urban turnout, and in 
every region, support for Russia's Choice is greater in urban rayons than 
Mikhail G. Filippov Political Competition in Federations 245 
elsewhere. 
Previous discussion was intended to show that the comparison of 
electoral results for non-homogeneous districts produces unreliable inferences. 
We show that even within regions, urban and non-urban districts demonstrate 
different electoral charc;tcteristics. Now consider what happens when we 
aggregate districts nationwide. Although the rationalization for predicting a 
positive correlation between T and E is based on a consideration of individual 
actions, Sobyanin and Myagkov's (1995) conclusions rest on data aggregated 
across the entire country. If instead, we consider the same correlations between 
the percent of eligible voters supporting the constitution and turnout within, and 
not across regions, as Table 4.12 shows, 20 out of 23 regions in 1993 exhibit a 
positive correlation between T and E1• These correlations may not be uniformly 
strong, but they do suggest an interesting explanation for a near-zero 
aggregate correlation. To take an extreme possibility, suppose there are three 
regions and that each consists of three rayons. Suppose turnout in region 1 's 
rayons is 30, 35, and 40%, that it is 45, 50, and 55% in the three rayons of 
region 2, and that it is 60, 65, and 70% in region 3's three rayons. Finally, 
suppose V, is 20, 15, and 10 in the first, second, and third rayons of each region 
respectively. Then a region-by-region graph of E, against T would produce three 
positively sloping lines that, despite the perfect correlation within each region, 
would generate a zero aggregate correlation. 
Something like this occured in December 1993. Looking at support for 
the constitution and excluding the five regions for which the correlation between 
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T and E1 is negative or essentially zero, Figure 4.10 graphs the overall 
relationship between T and E1 across all rayons in the remaining 18 regions in 
the data set. Notice that the cloud of data here is not much different than the 
cloud reported by Sobyanin and Myagkov (see Figure 4.1 O)~ H9wever, Figure 
4.11 disaggregates the data by region, graphs the best fit lines for the 
relationship between T and E1 for each of these 18 regions, and reveals a 
pattern not dissimilar from our example - a set of approximately parallel, 
positively sloping lines. Thus, at least with respect to the constitutional 
referendum - the 'anomaly' or not - a zero correlation between turnout and E1 is 
a function of differential turnout rates across regions rather than a consequence 
of the absence of any within-region relationship between T and E1• Since Table 
4.12 disaggregates the data by region, we cannot explain the absence of 
significant positive correlations in the third and fourth columns (party list voting) 
by an error arising as result of aggregation across regions. However, as we 
demonstrated above, we may not exclude a possibility of aggregation error 
resulting from aggregation of districts with other distinctive characteristics - e.g., 
urban and non-urban, large and small cities, economically successful and 
declining areas - to name only few possibly relevant distinctions. 
There is additional evidence that aggregate data analysis, aimed to 
identify "extra" voters and their choices, provides unreliable results. For 
example, instead of looking at the percent of eligible voters supporting the 
constitution, consider the percent of eligible voters who cast invalid ballots. 
Unless the fraudulent ballots cast by those who implemented fraud were 
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otherwise invalid (blank or improperly marked), by artificially increasing turnout, 
fraudulent ballots cast against or in favor of constitution should produce a 
negative correlation between T and E 1nvalld· Similarly, we should predict a 
negative correlation between T and Einvalid when looking at voting for party li~ts. 
However, if we look at the two last columns of Table 4.12 we see that a 
. negative correlation appears in only 4 of 23 regions in the case of constitution 
referendum and in only 5 regions in the case of party list voting, thereby 
seriously undermining the contention that the method can be used to reveal 
electoral 'irregularities.' 
Our analysis also indicates a problem with the argument about the 
ultimate motivation for fraud in 1993 - namely, ensuring the election of regional 
bosses to the Federation Council (Myagkov and Sobyanin 1995). Specifically, 
those bosses did not run in every region and did not u'niformly win in those 
regions in which they did run. However, as Table 4.14 shows, the pattern of 
correlation between the turnout and the support among eligible voters for the 
Constitution, for Russia's Choice, and for Yabloko is the same in all regions. 
Moreover, all regions exhibit the same pattern in the relationship of urban-rural 
demography and the support for Russia's Choice and turnout. At the same time 
district by district, we cannot find anything 'unusual' in the pattern of turnout in 
December 1993 as compared with turnout in the 1991 presidential election or 
in the April 1993 referenda balloting. Based on analysis of electoral statistics 
for all 786 rayons, we must conclude, that pattern of turnout is very similar in all 
of these elections, and although it decreases over time, this decline is 
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proportional both across the country and within regions. In every region there is 
a significant correlation between turnout in April and December 1993, between 
1991 and April 1993, and between 1991 and December 1993. Similar 
'anomalous' negative correlations between turnout and support for Yeltsin and 
other pro-reform indicators are presented in 1991, April 1993, in December 
1993, in December 1995 and in the 1996 presidential elections. 
We conclude that the methodology of revealing electoral fraud through 
examining the correlation between turnout and the percent of eligible voters 
supporting one position or another is fraught with dangers, the most notable 
being that a negative or insignificant correlation can characterize honest as well 
as fraudulent elections. A negative or insignificant correlation can be a 
consequence of the way we aggregate our data and the existence of an 
intervening variable that establishes a connection between turnout and vote. 
Once again, such a methodology might prove useful, but only if we can 
preclude the existence of confounding things such as a correlation between 
preferences and some exogenous variable like the percent of rural population, 
or if we can somehow control for the influence of such variables. In the Russian 
case in addition, there appears to be a strong enough correlation between non-
urban conservative preferences· and turnout for any attempts to reveal electoral 
fraud that overlook such a correlation to be not trustworthy. 
4.6 Conclusion 
There are two views one can take of the effort to identify irregularities in 
Mikhail G. Filippov Political Competition in Federations 249 
Russia's aggregate electoral data. One view takes irregularities as merely an 
indication of potential fraud that must be explored by other means before 
definitive conclusions can be reached. The second assumes that irregularities 
can be identified and· quantified with sufficient precision so· as to allow for the 
calculation of the extent· and form of fraud. Although our analysis does not 
necessarily undermine the first view, it finds the second indefensible, at least 
with respect to the two methodologies used to argue for the existence of 
pervasive fraud in Russia's December 1993 elections. 
We are not arguing that Russia's elections avoided electoral fraud 
altogether. Our arguments in this section are intended primarily as notes of 
caution about using aggregate electoral statistics to reveal fraud and quantify its 
magnitude. It should also be emphasized that we cannot apply the proposed 
methods by setting our null hypothesis equal to the proposition that there was 
fraud. Since, as we have tried to show, almost any pattern in the aggregate 
data is consistent with fraudulent as well as fraud-free elections, doing so 
defeats the·purpose of the proposed methodologies - detecting fraud when we 
are not certain it exists or are uncertain about its magnitude. 
Simultaneously with cautioning against the use of aggregate data for 
revealing 'irregularities,' we also wanted to reclaim these data for analytical use 
by showing that it has only been asserted, but by no means proven, that these 
data were fraud-produced. 
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Tables: 






Rate of saving in 1991 % 
(6.7) 
-0.1 
Growth in retail trade 1990-91 % 
(-3.4) 
-0.05 
Cars per thousand in 1991 
(-1.2) 
Growth (decline) in the number of -0.2 
hospital beds per capita 1990-93 % (-2.1) 
-0.3 
Economically active population % 
(-2.2) 
0.06 
Rural population in the Region % 
(1.1) 
0.00 
Vote for Yeltsin in 1991 
(.84) 
Number of observations 75 
A-squared 0.71 
Corrected A-squared 0.68 
Mean of De12endent Variable 12.1 
1 Here and in all other tables t-statistic is in parentheses. 
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Rate of saving in 1991 % 
(8.8) (3.9) 
Rate of decline in unpaid wages -0.1 -0.1 
in the end of 1995 (-2.2) (-1.6) 
Number of enterprises delaying wage 0.2 0.01 
payments, per 10,000 (4.4) (2.5) 
Growth in real incomes -0.2 -0.1 
in 1995 (-3.2) (-2.2) 
"Extremely needy Regions" as 1.4 1.1 
defined in 1995 Budget (5.6) (4.7) 
-0.2 -0.2 
Rural population in the region % 
(-2.1) (-2.6) 
-0.6 -0.3 
Economically active population % 
(-3.1) (-1.9) 
0.7 
Vote for the CPRF in 1993 
(4.9) 
0.2 
Vote for Zhirinovsky in 1993 
(2.7) 
Vote against (not ''for'') Yeltsin 0.1 
in 1990 (2.8) 
Number of observations 75 75 
R-squared 0.75 0.83 
Corrected R-squared 0.72 0.8 
Mean of Dependent Variable 24 24 
Mikhail G. Filippov Political Competition in Federations 257 
Table 4.3. Vote for Zuganov in the First Round of the 1996 Presidential 
Elections 
Variables 
Intercept 211.1 154.9 
(5.4) (4.4) 
Rate of savings in 1991 % 1.0 0.55 
(5.8) (3.4) 
Income average nominal growth, % -0.7 -0.5 
(-3.5) (-3.0) 
Real wage growth, April 1996, % -1.1 -0.9 
(-4.2) (-3.9) 
Increase in unpaid wages between 01/01/97 and -0.04 -0.04 
06/03/96, % (-2.7) (-2.8) 
Number of enterprises delaying wage payments, per 0.03 0.03 
10.000 (2.0) (2.6) 
Share of investments financed by federal budget % -0.4 -0.6 
(-2.0) (-3.4) 
Rural population in the region % 0.30 0.30 
(3.7) (4.4) 
Share of economically active population -0.31 -0.02 
(-1.3) (-0.0) 
Dummy for power sharing treaty -1.0 -0.7 
(-.6) (-.6) 
Vote for CPRF 0.14 
in December 1993 (5.0) 
Number of observations 75 75 
A-squared 0.79 0.85 
Corrected A-squared 0.76 0.82 
Mean of dependent variable 34.5 34.5 
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Table 4.4. Vote for Zuganov in the Second Round of the 1996 Presidential 
Elections 
Variables 
Intercept 184.1 177.8 
(4.4) (4.0) 
Rate of savings in 1991 % 0.73 0.68 
(4.1) (3.3) 
Income average nominal growth, % -0.5 -0.5 
(-2.6) (-2.4) 
Real wage growth, April 1996, % -0.9 -0.9 
(-.3) (-3.0) 
Increase in unpaid wages between 01/01/97 and · -0.07 -0.04 
06/03/96, % (-4.0) (-3.9) 
Number of enterprises delaying wage payments, per 0.04 0.03 
10.000 (2.6) (2.6) 
Share of investments financed by federal budget % -0.9 -0.9 
(-4.0) (-4.0) 
Rural population in the region % 0.36 0.36 
(4.0) (4.0) 
Share of economically active population -0.08 -0.05 
(-.3) (-.2) 
Dummy for power sharing treaty -3.8 -0.7 
(-2.0) (-2.0) 
Vote for CPRF in 0.19 
December 1993 (.4) 
Number of observations 75 75 
R-squared 0.71 0.71 
Corrected R-squared 0.67 0.66 
Mean of dependent variable 43.4 43.4 
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Table 4.5. Growth of Wage Arrears between January and June 1996 
Variables 
Intercept 
Growth in real incomes in 1995 
Index of industrial production (1995=100) 
Average wage level 


















Vote for pro-democratic parties in 1995 3.07 
Number of observations 
R-squared 
Corrected R-squared 
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Share of tax revenue raised remaining in region, 1995 -0.12 
(-2.3) 
Increase in unpaid wages between May and June 1996 0.1 
0/o (3.2) 
Nominal Income Growth in 1995 -0.05 
Consumer Price Growth in 1995 
Vote for Gen. Lebed in the first round 
Vote for Zhirinovsky in the first round 
Vote for Yavlinky in the first round 
Number of observations 
R-squared 
Corrected R-squared 
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Table 4.7. Tax Distribution In Russia 
Share of tax Estimated net Share of tax Estimated net 
revenue balance of revenue balance of 
raised financial flows raised financial flows 
remaining in '000 rubles per remaining '000 rubles per 
region(%) capita in region capita 
% 
Russia 59 765 65 175 
Adygeiya 66 -100 79 -177 
Altai Republic 67 -791 82 -793 
Bashkortostan 74 597 88 90 
Buryatiya 78 -248 77 -134 
Dagestan 79 -659 85 -573 
lngushetiya MD MD 89 -621 
Kar.-Balk. 77 -318 82 -353 
Kalmykiya 57 -702 78 -590 
Karach.-Cherk. 66 -131 77 -246 
Kareliya 67 295 95 -76 
Ko mi 58 1046 60 256 
Marii El 73 -266 77 -147 
Mordnvia 72 -159 78 -75 
· Sakha 100 -295 100 -30 
North Ossetia 66 -345 75 -301 
Tartarstan 77 469 84 57 
Tyva 75 -1245 84 -991 
Udmurtiya 62 469 61 117 
Khakasiya 76 221 74 -1 
Chechnya MD MD MD MD 
Chuvashiya 68 144 71 80 
Altai Krai 73 -164 78 -177 
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Table 4.7. Tax Distribution In Russia (continued) 
Share of tax Estimated net Share of tax Estimated net 
revenue balance of revenue balance of 
raised financial flows raised financial flows 
remaining in '000 rubles per remaining '000 rubles per 
region(%) capita in region capita 
% 
Krasnodarskii Krai 61 455 67 110 
Krasnoyarskii Krai 65 1038 65 348 
Primorskii Krai 61 519 61 188 
Stavropolskii Krai 59 306 68 -2 
Khabarovsk Krai 65 332 62 159 
Amurskaya Obi 67 86 64 1 
Arkhangelskskya Obi. 70 345 69 77 
Astrakhanskaya Obi. 63 201 71 -10 
Belgorodskaya Obi. 58 800 59 266 
Bryanskaya Obi. 63 238 71 54 
Vladimirskaya Obi. 58 549 60 176 
Volgogradskaya Obi. 60 688 62 208 
Vologodskaya Obi. 66 625 64 255 
Voronezhskaya Obi. 61 358 66 125 
lvanovskaya Obi. 64 141 65 69 
lrkutskaya Obi. 64 885 65 251 
Kalliningrad 63 437 68 117 
Kaluzhskaya Obi. 62 316 69 68 
Kamchatskaya Obi. 74 -311 77 -540 
Kemerovo 74 107 82 -90 
Kirovskaya Obi. 64 307 71 73 
Kostromskaya Obi. 61 -90 65 29 
Kurganskaya Obi. 70 141 73 -42 
Kurskaya Obi. 63 428 63 146 
Leningradskaya Obi. 60 660 65 159 
Lipetskaya Obi. 60 967 63 199 
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Table 4.7. Tax Distribution In Russia (continued) 
Share of tax Estimated net Share of tax Estimated net 
revenue balance of revenue balance of 
raised financial flows raised financial flows 
remaining in '000 rubles per remaining '000 rubles per 
region(%) capita in region capita 
% 
Magadanskaya Obi. 67 -137 69 -675 
Moskovskaya Obi. 51 1096 58 314 
Murmanskaya Obi. 64 701 62 264 
Nizhegorodskaya Obi. 52 1056 58 366 
Novgorod Obi. 66 208 68 23 
Novosibirsk Obi. 67 395 70 104 
Omsk Obi. 64 469 71 54 
Orenburgskaya Obi. 58 627 63 113 
Orlovskaya Obi. 60 134 64 -1 
Penzenskaya Obi. 65 129 77 -12 
Permskaya Obi. 53 1114 58 295 
Pskovskaya Obi. 68 74 75 -19 
Rostovskaya Obi. 59 418 64 162 
Ryazanskaya Obi. 59 608 57 225 
Samarskaya Obi. 52 1478 55 532 
Saratovskaya Obi. 62 375 67 104 
Sakhalinskaya Obi. 71 4 74 -92 
Sverdlovsk Obi. 57 1128 62 387 
Smolenskaya Obi. 60 437 56 130 
Tambovskaya Obi. 65 115 73 14 
Tverskaya Obi. 57 1181 52 158 
T omskaya Obi. 57 1181 68 123 
Tulskaya Obi. 63 443 65 119 
Tyumenskaya Obi. 65 840 65 119 
Ulyanovskaya Obi. 59 486 54 249 
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Table 4.7. Tax Distribution In Russia (continued) 
Share of tax Estimated net Share of tax Estimated net 
revenue balance of revenue balance of 
raised financial flows raised financial flows 
remaining in '000 rubles per remaining ··ooo rubles per 
region(%) capita in region capita 
% 
Chelyabinskaya Obi. 62 812 61 293 
Chitinskaya Obi. 72 98 75 -41 
Yaroslavskaya Obi. 52 1137 52 495 
Moscow City 54 2817 60 724 
St. Petersburg 55 1237 57 392 
Evreiskaya AO 77 -535 77 -179 
Arinskii-Buryatskii 80 -425 83 -484 
Komi-Permyatskii 77 -427 81 -427 
Koryakskii AO 68 -6677 77 -5918 
Nenetskii AO 70 42 82 -419 
Taimyrskii AO 73 341 61 -395 
Urst-Ordynskii Surya 73 -778 85 -510 
Khanti-Mansi AO 40 9297 59 1393 
Chukotskii AO 69 -2582 78 -2833 
Evenk. AO 79 -2725 78 -2096 
Yamalo-Nenetskii AO 45 9480 72 1134 
Sources: Lavrov, Alexey. "Russian Budget Federalism, First Steps, First Results". Segodnya. 
June7, 1995 McAuley, "The Determinants of Russian Federal-Regional Fiscal 
Relations: Equity or Political Influence?" Europe-Asia Studies Vol.49, No.3. 1997. 
431-444. 
Table 4.8 
Turnout in 23 Russian Regions 
Region December 1993 April 1993 July 1991 
Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum 
Krasnoyarsk Kray 0.51 77.05 34.38 0.61 80.17 49.48 0.72 0 .. 9 0.59 
Archangelk obi 0.54 68.46 47.21 0.66 82.05 56.3 0.74 0.83 0.68 
Briansk obi 0.64 83.29 55.35 0.68 87.29 55.25 0.82 0.99 0.73 
Vladimir obi 0.6 72.91 50.98 0.7 82.16 62.68 0.8 0.89 0.73 
Vologod obi 0.59 76.95 52.27 0.69 85.52 59.73 0.77 0.91 0.72 
Voroneg obi 0.59 83.45 47.5 0.73 90.76 60.26 0.81 0.94 0.71 
Kalinigrad obi 0.56 64.56 49.47 0.64 76.36 57.49 0.74 0.84 0.69 
Kemero obi 0.53 75.58 44.83 0.58 84.53 43.37 0.7 0.91 0.62 
Kirov obi 0.58 78.51 47.55 0.72 86.56 58.25 0.79 0.98 0.71 
Kursk obi 0.64 80.99 42.66 0.7 88.93 48.81 0.85 0.97 0.67 
Magadan obi 0.48 63.89 43.44 0.58 75.94 50.63 0.67 0.83 0.61 
Murmansk obi 0.5 72.96 43.69 0.59 78.88 52.68 0.68 0.92 0.56 
Nignii Novgorod obi 0.52 78.85 43.36 n/a 78.85 43.36 0.76 0.99 0.67 
Novgorod obi 0.59 77.79 53.97 0.66 86.59 57.69 0.78 0.94 0.71 
Orenburg obi 0.55 79.95 39.13 0.65 88.14 50.94 0.79 0.94 0.64 
Penza obi 0.64 84.63 53.94 0.71 89.77 58.68 0.84 0.96 0.74 
Permt obi 0.44 60.34 39.35 0.59 69.92 55.29 0.71 0.87 0.67 
Saratov obi 0.58 84.59 47.97 0.68 91.43 54.05 0.78 0.97 0.71 
Sachalinsk obi 0.5 63.16 43.46 0.56 72.56 47.6 0.7 0.85 0.65 
Sverdlovsk obi 0.49 76.01 40.5 0.67 87.01 55.55 0.79 0.95 0.71 
Smolensk obi 0.65 81.68 59.34 0.71 88.6 61.13 0.83 0.96 0.75 
Tverobl 0.62 84.47 52.99 0.7 91.14 56.25 0.8 0.94 0.68 
Tula obi 0.6 75 51.98 0.68 83.98 58.91 0.78 0.89 0.71 
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Table 4.9 
Correlation between Turnout and Vote times Turnout 
Parties 
1991 April 1993 Constitution Conservaties Russia's Choice All others 
Krasnoyarsk Kray -0.32 0.26 0.7 0.9 -0.4 . -0.68 
Archangelk obi -0.53 -0.07 0.6 0.75 -0.15 -0.6 
Briansk obi -0.57 -0.14 0.27 0.81 -0.41 -0.65 
Vladimir obi -0.39 0.21 0.5 0.86 -0.38 -0.69 
Vologod obi -0.35 0.14 0.69 0.83 -0.14 -0.6 
Voroneg obi -0.69 -0.76 -0.05 0.94 -0.64 -0.79 
Kalinigrad obi -0.35 0.46 0.73 0.69 -0.2 -0.49 
Kemero obi -0.65 -0.1 0.79 0.96 -0.58 -0.77 
Kirov obi -0.47 -0.17 0.22 0.84 -0.29 -0.68 
Kursk obi -0.32 -0.45 0.17 0.96 -0.64 -0.87 
Magadan obi 0.23 0.86 0.71 0.91 -0.4 0.17 
Murmansk obi -0.47 0.52 0.8 0.87 -0.12 -0.43 
Nignii Novgorod -0.23 0.08 0.08 0.91 -0.53 -0.81 
obi 
Novgorod obi -0.64 0.37 0.85 0.91 -0.49 -0.63 
Orenburg obi -0.53 -0.27 0.45 0.92 -0.6 -0.79 
Penza obi -0.24 -0.42 -0.15 0.95 -0.61 -0.82 
Permt obi -0.27 0.57 0.89 0.75 -0.16 -0.54 
Saratov obi -0.48 -0.04 0.45 0.84 -0.31 -0.62 
Sachalinsk obi 0.03 0.79 0.8 0.58 0.52 -0.07 
Sverdlovsk obi 0.07 0.64 0.85 0.75 -0.17 -0.65 
Smolensk obi -0.7 -0.1 -0.3 0.94 -0.63 -0.83 
Tver obi -0.69 ~0.15 0.01 0.96 -0.79 -0.88 
Tula obi -0.73 -0.28 0.37 0.94 -0.74 -0.85 
Mikhail G. Filippov Political Competition in Federations 267 
Table 4.10 
Correlation between the percent of Rural Population, Turnout and Support 
for Yeltsin 
Vote for 
Turnout Yeltsin Communists 
1991 April 93 Dec93 1991 April 93 Dec93 Dec93 
Krasnoyarsk Kray 0.68 0.77 0.79 -0.73 -0.04 -0.33 0.18 
Archangelk obi 0.52 0.78 0.73 -0.62 0.34 -0.25 0.23 
Briansk obi 0.83 0.8 0.81 -0.65 -0.21 -0.12 -0.05 
Vladimir obi 0.82 0.81 0.85 -0.63 0.02 -0.29 -0.05 
Vologod obi 0.78 0.82 0.76 -0.63 -0.04 -0.41 -0.17 
Voroneg obi 0.61 0.6 0.67 -0.53 -0.52 -0.65 0.22 
Kalinigrad obi 0.58 0.54 0.32 -0.7 -0.06 -0.1 -0.09 
Kemero obi 0.86 0.82 0.85 -0.72 -0.1 -0.22 0 
Kirov obi 0.61 0.68 0.63 -0.69 -0.26 -0.53 0.24 
Kursk obi 0.72 0.72 0.73 -0.58 -0.43 -0.4 0.28 
Magadan obi 0.71 0.79 0.84 -0.82 0.6 -0.22 0.68 
Murmansk obi -0.16 0.14 0.13 -0.1 -0.14 -0.29 0.33 
Nignii Novgorod obi 0.71 0.81 0.81 -0.72 -0.67 -0.67 0.48 
Novgorod obi 0.82 0.81 0.8 -0.72 0.37 -0.11 0.4 
Orenburg obi 0.76 0.86 0.84 -0.83 -0.44 -0.61 0.01 
Penza obi 0.78 0.8 0.76 -0.71 -0.17 -0.39 0.17 
Permt obi 0.26 0.65 0.45 -0.77 -0.11 -0.48 0.46 
Saratov obi 0.83 0.81 0.85 -0.68 -0.21 -0.48 0.18 
Sachalinsk obi 0.85 0.81 0.83 -0.57 0.52 0.12 -0.32 
Sverdlovsk obi 0.5 0.57 0.64 -0.62 0.04 -0.41 0.48 
Smolensk obi 0.71 0.67 0.58 -0.84 -0.36 -0.42 0.15 
Tver obi 0.8 0.8 0.71 -0.7 0.07 -0.32 -0.15 
Tula obi 0.77 0.8 0.81 -0.87 -0.45 -0.44 0.35 
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Table 4.11 
Difference in Turnout and Vote for Russia's Choice in Urban and Rural 
Areas 
Vote for Russia's Choice Turnout 
Rural Urban Difference Rural Urban Difference 
Krasnoyarsk Kray 0.09 0.17 -0.08 0.59 0.42 0.16 
Archangelk obi 0.16 0.25 -0.09 0.55 0.46 0.09 
Briansk obi 0.09 0.16 -0.07 0.65 0.55 0.1 
Vladimir obi 0.13 0.19 -0.06 0.59 0.53 0.06 
Vologod obi 0.12 0.19 -0.07 0.61 0.52 0.09 
Voroneg obi 0.07 0.19 -0.11 0.62 0.47 0.15 
Kalinigrad obi 0.14 0.22 -0.08 0.53 0.51 0.02 
Kemero obi 0.08 0.15 -0.06 0.62 0.45 0.16 
Kirov obi 0.09 0.16 -0.07 0.58 0.49 0.09 
Kursk obi 0.06 0.17 -0.1 0.68 0.5 0.18 
Magadan obi 0.13 0.15 -0.02 0.5 0.43 0.08 
Murmansk obi 0.19 0.24 -0.06 0.5 0.47 0.03 
Nignii Novgorod obi 0.1 0.16 -0.07 0.54 0.43 0.1 
Novgorod obi 0.12 0.15 -0.04 0.57 0.52 0.05 
Orenburg obi 0.08 0.18 -0.1 0.61 0.43 0.19 
Penza obi 0.06 0.11 -0.06 0.67 0.53 0.15 
Permt obi 0.23 0.32 -0.09 0.42 0.39 0.03 
Saratov obi 0.07 0.17 -0.09 o.63 0.47 0.16 
Sachalinsk obi 0.09 0.09 -0.01 0.53 0.45 0.08 
Sverdlovsk obi 0.15 0.26 -0.12 0.51 0.44 0.07 
Smolensk obi 0.08 0.15 -0.08 0.67 0.57 0.1 
Tver obi 0.1 0.19 -0.09 0.64 0.51 0.13 
Tula obi 0.11 0.17 -0.06 0.6 0.53 0.07 
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Table 4.12 
Correlation between Turnout and Vote for Yeltsin or Reforms 
1991 April 1993 December 1993 
Krasnoyarsk Kray -0.32 0.26 -0.4 
Archangelk obi -0.53 -0.07 -0.15 
Briansk otil -0.57 -0.14 -0.41 
Vladimir obi -0.39 0.21 -0.38 
Vologod obi -0.35 0.14 -0.14 
Voroneg obi -0.69 -0.76 -0.64 
Kalinigrad obi -0.35 0.46 -0.2 
Kemero obi -0.65 -0.1 -0.58 
Kirov obi -0.47 -0.17 -0.29 
Kursk obi -0.32 -0.45 -0.64 
Magadan obi 0.23 0.86 -0.4 
Murmansk obi -0.47 0.52 -0.12 
Nignii Novgorod obi -0.23 -0.23 -0.53 
Novgorod obi -0.64 0.37 -0.49 
Orenburg obi -0.53 -0.27 -0.6 
Penza obi -0.24 -0.42 -0.61 
Permt obi -0.27 0.57 -0.16 
Saratov obi -0.48 -0.04 -0.31 
Sachalinsk obi 0.03 0.79 0.52 
Sverdlovsk obi 0.07 0.64 -0.17 
Smolensk obi -0.7 -0.1 -0.63 
Tver obi -0.69 -0.15 -0.79 
Tula obi -0.73 -0.28 -0.74 
Table 4.13 
Correlation between Turnout and Vote for candidates in Federal Council 
1'st Winner 2'nd Winner third 
Krasnoyarsk Kray -0.33 Head, Kray Administration 0.2 Director of chemical company 0.21 
Archangelk obi 0.03 Head, Oblast Administration -0.54 Chairman Brick compary -0.56 
Briansk obi 0.4 Former Head,.Oblast 0.32 Military officer -0.29 
Vladimir obi 0.34 Head, Oblast Administration 0.12 Representative of the President -0.27 
Vologod obi -0.61 Mayor, Cherepovets City 0.42 Head, Oblast Administration 0.41 
Voroneg obi -0.64 Head, Oblast Administration -0.52 Executive of Oblast Administration 0.74 
Kalinigrad obi -0.34 Deputy Prime Minister 0.34 Head, Oblast Administration -0.31 
Kemero obi 0.45 Former Chaiman of Soviet -0.27 Deputy chief of local newspaper 0.01 
Kirov obi 0.06 Head, Oblast Administration -0.14 Rector -0.28 
Kursk obi 0.75 Chairman of Soviet Councli 0.71 Head, Oblast Administration -0.43 
Magadan obi -0.15 Joint Stock company director -0.49 Director of constuction compuny 0.56 
Murmansk obi -0.15 Articservice company 0.47 Official of Oblast administration -0.48 
Nignii Novgorod -0.44 Governor -0.04 Chairman of Soviet Councli 0.45 
obi 
Novgorod obi 0.66 Head, Oblast Administration -0.22 Director -0.65 
Orenburg obi 0.5 Head, Oblast Administration -0.64' Director 0.68 
Penza obi 0.53 Head, Oblast Administration -0.54 Head of City Administration 0.02 
Permt obi -0.11 director -0.36 president of company 0.44 
Saratov obi 0.6 Head, Oblast Administration -0.02 First Deputy of Head of City Admini~tration -0.49 
Sachalinsk obi 0.02 Head, Oblast Administration 0.03 Director 0.38 
Sverdlovsk obi -0.19 former Governor 0.14 no official position 0.01 
Smolensk obi 0.74 Head, Oblast Administration -0.83 Deputy Minister 0.7 
Tver obi 0.62 Head, Oblast Administration -0.61 Professor 0.57 
Tula obi 0.67 Chairman of collective Farm -0.26 President of Company Moscow resident -0.63 
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Table 4.14 
Regions where local 
heads won the elections 
577 
16 
Regions where All Regions 
local heads either 
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Figures: 
Rate of Saving in 1991 and Vote 
for the CPRF in 1993 
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Rate of Saving in 1991 and Vote 
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Rate of Saving 1991 and Vote 
for G. Zuganov in 1996 
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Russia 1993 (Official Results and 
Sobjanin's Estimates) 
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Figure 4.5 
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Quebec Referendum 1995, Vote "Yes" 
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Quebec referendum 1995, Vote "No" 
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Turnout and Vote "For" Constitution 
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Regression Lines for Selected 18 Regions 
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